

Peace-building Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina:

Well-Intentioned but Misguided¹

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Keywords

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Abstract

Since the end of the Cold War, many internal conflicts have occurred all over the world. In response to these situations aid donors, including the United Nations, governmental aid organizations, and NGOs have implemented many projects to rebuild war-torn societies. However, some of those projects have resulted in having harmful effects on the process of rebuilding societies. This paper argues that even being started with good intentions, some projects without careful consideration of the post-conflict settings can play a role of dividing a society in the long run. In order to examine this point, this paper focuses on the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina and takes up a Japanese aid project carried out in the education sector. In conclusion, this paper emphasizes that peace-building operations must be implemented based on the long-term perspective in order not to do any harm to a post-conflict society.

Introduction

More than fifteen years have passed since Boutros-Ghali, the sixth Secretary General of the United Nations, introduced the concept of peace-building in his report,² and the international community has implemented many projects based on this concept. However, it is time to

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examine the international community's peace-building efforts in the post-conflict situations for these 15 years, because we can identify some cases in which aid operations carried out in the name of peace-building have worsened the situation and created new obstacles instead of bringing durable peace. The Bosnian case is an example of this.

The international community has implemented many projects and invested great resources in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter BiH) in order to fulfill the goals envisioned in the Dayton Peace Accord (hereafter DPA), which aimed to rebuild the post-conflict BiH society as an ethnically intermingled one, as it used to be. However, although more than thirteen years have passed since the DPA was concluded, the present situation of BiH cannot be said to have become stable. We can still observe political hindrance of minority groups' return




Figure 1. Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina after DPA

Source: Office of the High Representative (OHR)
 (<http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/maps/>) (5th Feb., 2009)

to their “homes of origin”³ and Serb nationalists’ zeal for the separation of their entity, Republika Srpska (hereafter RS), from BiH. Serb nationalists still have been laying for a chance to merge with neighboring Serbia.

Owing to the frightful war which lasted for about three and a half years from March 1992 to December 1995, divisions among people have been created both physically and mentally, especially among the three main ethnic groups: Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats. So-called “ethnic cleansing” occurred all over BiH during wartime, and it completely changed the demographic map of the country. Half of the population of the country became either refugees or internally displaced persons (IDPs). Thanks to the DPA, which created two political entities in one country, RS and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter FBiH), the war was finally over (see Figure 1). However, the problem of IDPs remained, as they were unable to return to their homes of origin, where other ethnic group had now become a majority. To make matters worse, such a majority group had often occupied assets, such as apartments, which once belonged to the other ethnic group.

In conflict settings or in the post-conflict situation, donor agencies have to consider whether their operations have done any harm to the society or not. That is, donor agencies have to follow the so-called “Do No Harm” principle.⁴ According to this principle, aid donors have to evaluate things as either “connector” or “divider” of people in the conflict settings, and it is obvious that aid donors have to utilize the former to rebuild war-torn societies. For example, a school can be a connector if an association of teachers and parents from the different ethnic groups is established to discuss matters concerning their children after the violent conflict between them. In this case, donor agencies have to support the school by implementing projects which strengthen the ties between people. On the other hand, a school can be a divider if the curricula contain aspects that segregate people. In this case, donors have to try to remove those harmful factors in order to unite people.

Unfortunately, we can observe the latter case in BiH, where different curricula have been adopted in the two entities. For example, students are taught different histories according to their ethnic backgrounds. In addition, as religious symbols are displayed in the classrooms, students from one ethnic group with a different religious faith cannot attend such a school. In BiH, as the dividing lines among people can be drawn along differences between ethnicities and religions, schools can be quite mono-ethnic. Owing to these divisions, the process of minority return which international community has been trying to propel has not yet been

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successful.

As we can find a correlation between the problem associated with minority return and the education sector, we especially focus on the problems in the education sector in BiH in the latter half of this paper. Education seems to have a pivotal role for fostering people with tolerance, and can be the first step to creating a democratized society. However, we should take account of the adverse effects of education when its contents harm relationships between people. To make matters worse, we can observe cases in which an aid donor's operation seems to have worsened the situation, and this seems to have made a lasting adverse effect on the relationships between different ethnic groups. Such a case can be found in one of the Japanese aid projects, which will be fully examined later in this paper.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the international community's peace-building efforts and to determine whether or not they have brought about durable peace to war-torn societies. In order to accomplish this purpose, we will study the case of Bosnia. First, the international commitments and the international framework of peace-building in Bosnia after the end of the conflict will be examined. Secondly, we will study the *status quo* of Bosnian society by examining the ethno-political factors which impede the return of minority people to their homes of origin. Thirdly, we will take up the problems in the education sector and see how the international community has been tackling them. Fourthly, we will examine a Japanese aid project in the education sector as a controversial case which seems to have worsened the situation. Lastly, the idea of peace conditionality will be examined in terms of its goal of not causing any harm to a post-conflict society in implementing aid projects.

Overview of the post-conflict peace-building in BiH

The Yugoslav wars, accompanied by the collapse of the federation, had a significant influence on European countries. The EU was expected to settle the conflicts, but it could not play a leading role in facilitating a peace negotiation among the parties concerned. Although in the case of the Bosnian war, some ceasefire ideas were proposed by the EU initiative, they proved ineffective. The ceasefire agreement of the Bosnian war was, eventually, led by a US initiative and the DPA was reached in November 1995.

In terms of bilateral assistance for BiH, the amount of ODA by the US has been salient, but the management of peace-building operations in BiH has been led by the European initiative. A meeting on peace implementation for Bosnia and Herzegovina was held in London in

December 1995, where 44 countries and multilateral organizations participated, including IMF and the World Bank. At the meeting in London, the international framework on assistance for BiH was set, and the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) was established. The role of the PIC is to review and check the progress in terms of whether it follows the direction of the DPA or not. The PIC, following Annex X of the DPA, appoints the High Representative, who takes responsibility for the civilian part of the DPA. In 1997, as the PIC recognized the implementation process to be slow, owing to obstructions by ethno-politicians, it provided the High Representative with the authority to remove those politicians from their posts. For example, in March 1998, the High Representative dismissed the Croat mayor of Stolac, south of Mostar, because he had blocked the Muslim families, the minority group in that municipality, from returning. However, this strong action taken by the High Representative has been criticized, because those obstructive officials were, nevertheless, elected by the people of that community in a democratic manner.⁵

Even after a thirteen year commitment by the international community, BiH society has not become stable, and there are still problems arising from the relationships among the three main ethnic groups. The closure of the Office of the High Representative, which was scheduled for June 2007, was postponed as a result of the nationalistic movements after the national election of December 2005. According to R. Aitken (2007), this awkward atmosphere was created from the outset of the peace-building operations by the international community, whose understanding of the Bosnian war was preoccupied with the “ethnic framing” of the problem.⁶ Aitken insists that international policy-makers regarded the Bosnian civil war as an ethnic conflict, and that they applied an ethnic framing to both the DPA and the post-conflict peace-building operations. This international community’s understanding was the same as that of the ethno-nationalists who promoted and created the ethnic divisions during wartime. Because of this approach to the reconstruction of BiH society, institutions, including educational and political systems, could be easily politicized by ethno-politicians, and the situation has not changed in that regard since the war. Among other things, education is the most vulnerable sector for politicization, and is exploited by politicians to reproduce students who believe that the ethnic divisions are inevitable in BiH society.

Hampering factors for minority return

To a considerable extent, the problems in the education sector are associated with the

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problems of IDPs. In Annex VII of the DPA, there is a statement that “[A]ll refugees and displaced persons have the right freely to return to their homes of origin. They shall have the right to have restored to them property of which they were deprived in the course of hostilities since 1991 and to be compensated for any property that cannot be restored to them. The early return of refugees and displaced persons is an important objective of the settlement of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Parties confirm that they will accept the return of such persons who have left their territory, including those who have been accorded temporary protection by third countries.”⁷

Although more than one million people, including both refugees and IDPs, had returned to their homes of origin by the end of 2007,⁸ many Bosnian cities are said to be mono-ethnic places.⁹ As the ultimate purpose of the DPA is to rebuild BiH society as the multi-ethnic one it used to be, the international community has urged the minority returns.¹⁰ Owing to the international community’s efforts, the number of minority returns to each entity reached its peak in 2002 (see Figure 2). However, there are still more than 130,000 IDPs in BiH: 57,795 in the FBiH and 72,036 in the RS.¹¹ In addition, as Figure 2 shows, the pace of the minority return has already slowed down and a relatively small number of people have returned in the last three years. This seems to demonstrate the unwillingness of IDPs, who usually come from rural areas, to return to their homes of origin. It also shows the obstructionism of the majority group against minorities. In terms of the former case, it is noted that more than ten years of living in urban areas has changed the IDPs’ minds, so that they often decide not to return to their homes of origin. This trend is especially apparent among the young




Figure 2. Minority Returns in/to BiH from 1996 to 2007

Source: UNHCR, 2007, *Statistics Package*.

(http://www.unhcr.ba/updatejan08/SP_12_2007.pdf).

generations, who have been integrated into social services and educational institutions in the urban areas.¹²

In spite of the efforts by the international community, some aid donors have adopted policies that canceled out the achievements of the international community. For instance, Germany, which was once a refuge for more than 300,000 Bosnian people, repatriated them to BiH, because Germany had suffered from the burden of supporting refugees at the expense of US\$2 billion a year.¹³ As those who were forced to return to BiH could not return to their homes of origin, Germany's self-centered action generated another massive number of IDPs in BiH.

Another example of inappropriate action taken by the donor agencies, which hampered the reverse of the ethnic cleansing, was the reconstruction of dwellings for the refugees. In the early years after the conflict, donors rebuilt war-damaged houses and sent refugees to those "new" houses, which were located not in their homes of origin, but in the territories controlled by the same ethnic group. Those who transferred to these new houses changed their status from refugees to IDPs. It then becomes more difficult for the minority group to return to their homes of origin, because their properties were now being used by the other ethnic group, which represented the majority in the territory.¹⁴ Similar to this example, aid donors sometimes built new houses for the IDPs of the same ethnic group in order to change the demographic map of the region in favor of their political situation. For example in Ortiješ, a new village built just south of Mostar, houses were built by the local Croatian authority for the Croat IDPs, who originally lived in Central Bosnia canton but fled from there because of the "ethnic cleansing". As the population of Croat group increased, it has had a significant influence on the local election. As J. Boyce (2002) states, "reconstruction aid can serve to reinforce the demographic results of ethnic cleansing."¹⁵

In order to reverse the demographic situation caused by ethnic cleansing, the UNHCR implemented the *Open Cities* program in 1997. The UNHCR categorized a municipality as having Open City status if it declared that it would accept minority returns. In exchange for the public pronouncement and acceptance of actual returns by this municipality, the UNHCR provided assistance to the majority group as well as to the returnees. If the municipality failed to carry out its commitments, its open-city status was revoked and reconstruction aid was terminated. This scheme had seemed to be effective in reversing the ethnic cleansing but, in fact, some defects were found in the initiative. According to a report by the

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International Crisis Group, four weaknesses were found in this scheme: the lack of a proper selection process; inadequate monitoring; ineffective solution to the problem of property rights violations (double occupancies); and non-result-oriented practices when rewarding the open-city status.¹⁶ As a result of these flaws, even municipalities where the minorities were not eager to return were granted the status and, on the other hand, the number of minority returns increased in municipalities without such status.

Education in BiH

The total contribution by the international community to the education sector was US\$227,196,736 from 1996 to 2002.¹⁷ This amount of contribution was utilized to repair or reconstruct devastated infrastructures. Instead of paying attention to the content of education, aid donors focused simply on “the right to education”. In other words, equal access to education for pupils belonging to the three main ethnic groups, including IDPs, was sought.¹⁸ This approach seemed to be humanitarian, and many donors started to build/rebuild/repair schools.

Before examining the problems related to the education sector in BiH, we should discuss the education system in BiH. There is no Ministry of Education at the state level. Instead, each entity has the authority on education. In the RS, where there is a centralized system, there is only one authority on education. On the other hand, in the decentralized FBiH, there is one federation-level Ministry of Education, and each canton also has its own Ministry of Education. Therefore, there are 12 authorities on education in total in BiH. After the end of the war, the demographic map of BiH became completely different from the result of the population census held before the war in 1991. The reason for this change has attributed to the ethnic cleansing by the ethnic majority which drove ethnic minorities out of the region. Institution-buildings took place under these circumstances and the majority group adopted the systems which were favorable to them. The education sector was no exception, and the majority group adopted curricula that were advantageous to it. Owing to this segregative approach by the majority group, the policy of minority return promoted by the international community, whose aim was to recreate BiH society as *the status quo ante-bellum*, was unsuccessful. As there is no contact with other ethnic group pupils and different histories are taught in schools, the societal divisions among people have deepened, and the antagonism against other groups has been reproduced in the schools.

International policy-makers paid little attention to the historical, cultural and educational factors of the Bosnian war, and developed a peace agreement in which only “the right to education” was referred to in the Annex 4 of the DPA.¹⁹ A more pragmatic approach should have been contemplated, and the international community should have considered the adverse effect of education in a politically ethnocentric society. However, there was no warning by the international community regarding this aspect of education. It was not until 2002 that the international community publicly addressed the idea that education must be regarded as a security issue.²⁰ Since then, the role and the effect of education in the peace-building operations in BiH have been discussed.²¹ According to A. Premilovac, a member of Cabinet of the Head of the OSCE mission to BiH, “in present-day BiH the way of children are educated poses a threat to the long-term stability to the country.”²² She also states the following, with regret: “[U]nfortunately, this connection between education, security and stability in BiH was not made when it should have been--in the early days of post-war reconstruction.”²³ Aid donors often set a low priority on education, and pay little attention to the quality of education, which is considered to be an internal affair. Instead, donors set a priority on the quantity of their assistance, and merely construct the school buildings. However, as Premilovac states, “[A] school is more than bricks and mortar. Better facilities do not necessarily imply better education.”²⁴

Troubles with the education reform

The Office of High Representative (OHR) handed over the authority on human rights issues to the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Mission to BiH in mid-2002.²⁵ Since then, the issues regarding education have become one of the central concerns to the OSCE. As stated earlier, education has been politicized, and has been well-correlated with the problems related to ethnic divisions. Different curricula and the exercise of segregation in the schools have been the most controversial problems in the education sector.

Several measures geared toward solving the problems in the education sector have been taken up by the initiative of the international community in cooperation with the Ministries of Education in BiH. Among them, the *Interim Agreement on Accommodation of the Specific Needs and Rights of Returnee Children* was signed by the Minister of Education, Science, Culture and Sports of the FBiH and the Minister of Education and Culture of the RS in March 2002. Then, the Implementation Plan for the *Interim Agreement* was adopted and signed not only by the

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Ministries of the FBiH and RS, but also by the Cantonal Ministries of Education in November 2002.²⁶ The top priority of this agreement was to give the returnee children the right to adequate education, and this interim measure left room for the ethnically-colored subjects to be taught as a “national group” of subjects. These subjects are language and literature, history, geography, nature and society, and religious instruction.

On the other hand, Article 11 of the *Framework Law on Primary and Secondary Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina* states that the free movement of parents, students and teachers are to be ensured in the sense of their right to choose their place of residence and employment.²⁷ In order to facilitate the minority returns and reintegrate these people in their homes of origin, the different curricula adopted by each Ministry should be standardized to a certain degree.²⁸ However, as total standardization was impossible to implement in reality, the common core elements were set in each of the 18 subjects in the primary and secondary education. This curriculum is called the Common Core Curriculum (CCC), and was adopted by all the Ministries of Education in August 2003. The CCC means that a certain percentage of the content covered is the same across the different curricula, and that the remaining percentage can be different depending on the curriculum. For instance, in the subjects of mathematics or science, the percentage of the common portion is almost 100%, whereas in the national group of subjects, the percentage is far smaller. In practice, as the curricula are still ethnically colored throughout BiH, there are still inappropriate contents in the national group of subjects in spite of the efforts by the Textbook Commission, whose task was to review the textbooks and remove improper descriptions.²⁹

The second problem arises from the relationship between education and religion. This relationship is highly controversial in BiH, because the lines which divide people are drawn along ethnic and religious differences. Although Pledge 1 of the *Education Reform* signed by the Ministers of Education of both the FBiH and RS in 2002 promises the establishment of integrated multicultural schools free from political, religious, cultural and other bias and discrimination,³⁰ education in BiH has been religiously biased. For instance, there are many inappropriate school names and symbols which represent the commemorations peculiar to their religious and ethnic background.³¹ Although the religious education classes are provided as optional classes in public schools, it is reported that students who do not attend these classes are criticized and discriminated against by their classmates and teachers.³²

As only one religion is taught in each school, students are indifferent to other religions,

and this situation can make people intolerant to others whose religions are different from their own. For the purpose of reducing the tensions caused by religious issues, the OHR implemented the pilot course entitled *Culture of Religions* across the country in 2004. The major religions in BiH—Christianity (Catholicism and Orthodox), Islam, and Judaism—are taught in *Culture of Religions* in order to advance inter-religious tolerance and reduce potential misunderstandings about the other religious faiths.³³

In spite of the promising approach of this scheme, five negative aspects in implementing this subject were found in a study by the OSCE.³⁴ First, textbooks and teaching supplies for this subject are so insufficient that teachers who teach this subject complain about it. Secondly, in spite of the difficulty of teaching the different religions, there is little teacher training. Thirdly, there is little monitoring and support by the government. Fourthly, *Culture of Religions* becomes an additional burden on the pupils in the RS, and the addition of this subject requires pupils to attend school for more than 30 hours a week, which is considered to be illegal.³⁵ Lastly, there has been opposition and intervention by religious communities. They have even demanded the authority to determine the content, textbooks, and teachers for this subject.

Another problem of the so-called “Two Schools under One Roof” represents all the problems mentioned above. These phenomena can be found in the following three “mixed” cantons where Bosniaks and Croats have been in fierce competition: Central Bosnia, Herzegovina-Neretva, and Zenica-Doboj (see Figure 1). There are still 54 schools in these three cantons where both students and teachers of different ethnicities have no mutual contact: there are two separate entrances, two teachers’ rooms, two principals, and two different timetables even on the same premises.³⁶

Japanese ODA to BiH

Before examining the Japanese aid projects for the BiH education sector, a general overview of the Japanese aid to BiH should be given.

In the first donor meeting held in 1995, the overall framework of the international interventions in the political, security, economic and social spheres of post-conflict BiH was established. Japan was one of the members of the PIC and started its official development assistance (ODA) to BiH in February 1996, soon after the London meeting.³⁷ As Japan’s ODA had mainly concentrated on the Asian countries beforehand, the assistance to the Balkan

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region was quite a new phenomenon. Moreover, it can be said that this was the second challenge for the Japanese government to use its ODA for the purpose of building peace in a post-conflict society, after the Cambodian case. So far, ¥36 billion (€212 million, US\$344 million) has been spent from 1996 to 2006 in BiH in three aid categories: lending, grant assistance, and technical assistance (see Table 1).

Table 1. Total amount of Japanese aid to BiH (billion yen)

	lending	grant assistance	technical assistance
1996-2006	4.11 (€ 24million, US\$39 million)	27.817 (€ 163 million, US\$265 million)	4.23 (€ 25 million, US\$ 40 million)

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan

(http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/shiryo/kuni/07_databook/pdfs/08-10.pdf)

As to lending, only a small amount of money was disbursed up to 2001, and there was no loan agreement between the Japanese government and BiH from 2002 to 2006. It seems that Japanese government regards BiH as a country that has not recovered enough to repay the loan. In the category of technical assistance, the Japanese government has received 443 trainees and has dispatched 38 experts and 483 research members to the field so far. In addition to these personnel, the Japanese government has provided equipment and materials at a cost of ¥119 million (€0.7 million, US\$1.1 million). In contrast with the other two categories, the Japanese government has spent a great amount of money in grants for the purpose of repairing and reconstructing social infrastructures such as bridges, schools, hospitals and so on. As the Japanese government has promoted the notion of “Human Security” as one of the pillars of its diplomacy since the mid-1990s, 22 projects have been carried out under the name of the “Grassroots Human Security Project” in this category.

However, as the targets of the grant assistance were not human beings, but rather infrastructures, during the initial phase of the post-conflict situation from 1996 to 2002, the projects implemented by grant assistance can be categorized as “hard” rather than “soft” ones. It is often said that Japan’s ODA has a comparative advantage in building infrastructures. This means, in other words, that Japan’s ODA is not good at human resource development. This feature of the Japanese ODA was also reflected in the post-conflict peace-building in BiH, and a controversial case has emerged in the primary school construction project.

A controversial Japanese aid project

Among the Japanese projects in the category of grant assistance, there was a primary school construction project. Having received an official request from the BiH government to construct primary schools, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) conducted preliminary research in 1998 and then dispatched a project design team in 1999. Fourteen sites were selected from the preliminary research. However, after negotiating with the local government and checking the conditions for construction, the number of the project sites was reduced to eleven: 4 schools in the RS and 7 schools in the FBiH.³⁸ Among these 11 project sites, there was a controversial case, where both the UNHCR and Office of High Representative (OHR) criticized the construction and requested the Japanese government to stop building a primary school on that site.

This project site was located in Lukavica, an RS town on the outskirts of Sarajevo, and the construction site itself was just along the inter-entity boundary line. Many IDPs whose ethnicity was Serb had already formed a Serbian community and were living there. The UNHCR insisted that those IDPs would stay longer and would not return to their home villages/towns if a primary school was built. Moreover, as the community consisted of only Serb IDPs, the UNHCR and OHR cautioned that the school could be a mono-ethnic one. In spite of such cautions, receiving a strong request from the local Serb politician, the Japanese government carried out the project by making a contract with RS officials which included the condition that the school had to receive pupils from other ethnic groups as well.

The first phase of the construction was completed in 2003 and teaching at that school commenced in the 2003 academic year. I have visited this project site both during and after the construction: in 2002 and in 2005. The project site was located in just a few yards off the main road, which functioned as the boundary line between two entities. Although grass farm spread in front of the school, I found a residential area within a half hour walk. This area belonged to the Federation side, and another primary school was located there. When I visited the project site again in September 2005, a beautiful two-story building had been completed, and many students were studying there. The principal of the school showed me the facilities, and seemed to be very proud of the school.

The Japanese project seemed to be successful in terms of the number of pupils attending the school. However, I found a serious problem in this school during my visit. In some classrooms *icons*, the religious drawings of the Serbian Orthodoxy, are hung on the walls,

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and only Serb pupils attend that school. The textbooks are all written in the Cyrillic alphabet. Judging from these facts, we can affirm that the judgments of the UNHCR and OHR were correct. Moreover, according to an interview conducted in 2005 with the principal of another school on the Federation side, I was told that Serb pupils who had attended this Federation school before the war transferred to the new school built by Japanese ODA after its construction was complete. This principal criticized the Japanese ODA project for creating a division among pupils.

There is another example where I would argue that the Japanese ODA made a mistake in its primary school construction project. In this case, however, no international organization warned about the possible adverse effects of the project. This school is located in Mostar, a historically famous city in the southern part of BiH, where the fierce battles between Croats and Bosniaks occurred. The battles completely divided people in the city; now, Croats live in West Mostar, whereas Bosniaks live in East Mostar. The Japanese government decided to build a primary school in the West Mostar. I visited this school in 2005. The design of the school was similar to that of the school in Lukavica, and the facilities were quite good. During my interview with the principal, she showed me a school photo album in which there were snapshots of the Christmas party. This showed me that the pupils attending this school were all Croats.

How should we consider these cases? Should we regard these examples as the common failure of the ODA projects? Should we consider Japan's decision that IDP pupils' access to education was a humanitarian issue? Were there any other options for the Japanese government? These questions are particularly significant in post-conflict situations, and they must be fully considered before projects start. As shown in the above section, there are serious troubles with education in BiH. Education is a silent bomb which corrodes society if it has any harmful influences on the relationships among people. If we have different curricula and harmful descriptions in the textbooks, these can be removed. However, the physical barriers which segregate people are not easily removed. In other words, the school buildings themselves reproduce the segregation. The Japanese ODA project can be said to have aggravated the problem by creating a physical distance between ethnic groups.

Peace conditionality

In order to avoid the problems which we saw in the Japanese aid project, Boyce (2002)

proposes the idea of “peace conditionality” in implementing aid operations in the critical moment after the conflict.³⁹ Peace conditionality entails the disbursement of assistance by aid donors in exchange for actual peace-building practices by the aid recipients. According to Boyce’s study, the international community has implemented peace conditionality in Bosnia by trial and error. For instance, development aid was provided on the condition of co-operation on the prosecution of war criminals, and it proved to be effective.⁴⁰ However, there were some unsuccessful cases like the UNHCR’s *Open Cities Initiative*, in which enforcement of the conditions was considered to be inadequate, because the municipalities with open-city status were not rewarded in accordance with the results.⁴¹

In fact, the Japanese government imposed conditionality on the school construction project, requesting local authorities to ensure that pupils from all three ethnic groups attended the school.⁴² However, such a request was neglected, and the schools discussed were mono-ethnic from the beginning. The Japanese government might have complained about the situation, but there have been no improvements so far in terms of the attendance of other ethnic pupils. From this, we can conclude that Japanese aid conditionality has not been effective at all. The Japanese government should have investigated the local conditions thoroughly before the contract was put in place. Moreover, the Japanese government should have monitored and should still monitor the administration of the schools and continue to request the fulfillment of the promise. Also, there was an option to break off negotiations with the local authority if it took an ambiguous attitude toward the fulfillment of the condition. Aid donors need to enforce the conditions of their contracts when they impose peace conditionality.

Conclusion

Although, so far, the DPA has been a pragmatic solution for Bosnian peace-building, the ultimate purpose of the DPA is to rebuild Bosnian society as the multicultural and multiethnic society it once was. In order to realize such a society, the international community has been struggling to promote minority returns. However, as the situation has been highly politicized from the beginning, the minority returns to communities have been obstructed by the ethnic majority, led by the ethno-politicians in such communities. In spite of projects such as the *Open Cities Initiative and Culture of Religions* by the international community, the circumstances have not substantially improved.

Among other things, schools form a setting for segregation between ethnic groups,

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and provide a situation where religions, ethnic distinctions and politics intertwine. The international community has come to recognize that education could be a critical non-traditional security issue in BiH society, and that the current practice of exclusive education could bring about a relapse into conflict in the future.

It can be said that the Japanese aid project of reconstructing schools without careful consideration has deepened the division among people. Of course, the project might have been initiated with good intentions to meet the basic human needs of the local population; in this sense, it can be recognized as humanitarian aid. However, we can point out that the project should have been considered from the long-term perspective as to whether or not it would do any harm to the Bosnian society.

We have to learn from the Bosnian case, in which even aid operations that started with good intentions in the name of peace-building can be regarded as failures from a long-term perspective. In order to avoid repeating the same mistakes in future operations, it is time to reconsider what peace-building really means, for whom peace-building operations must be implemented, and what kind of operations should not be implemented.

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NOTES

- 1 This paper is based on the presentation at the Second Global International Studies Conference held in Ljubljana, Slovenia from 23 to 26 July, 2008.
- 2 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1992, *An Agenda for Peace*, New York: United Nations.
- 3 As, in the case of BiH, return means to the home dwelling and property prior to 1991, some scholars use the term “domicile return” in order to distinguish this return form from the usual pattern of repatriation to one’s home country. See, Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Carl Dahlman, 2004, “The Effort to Reverse Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina: The Limits of Returns,” *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, Vol. 45, No. 6, p. 439.
- 4 See, Mary B. Anderson, 1999, *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace or War*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

- 5 Catherine Phuong, 2000, "‘Freely to Return’: Reversing Ethnic Cleansing in BiH," *Journal of Refugee Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 2, p. 178.
- 6 Rob Aitken, 2007, "Cementing Divisions? An Assessment of the Impact of International Interventions and Peace-building Policies on Ethnic Identities and Divisions," *Policy Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 247-67.
- 7 The General Framework Agreement, Article 1, paragraph 1, Annex VII.
- 8 According to a survey of the UNHCR, the number of people who have returned to BiH is 1,025,011, of which the numbers of refugees and IDPs are 446,611 and 578,400, respectively. See, UNHCR, 2007, *Statistics Package* (http://www.unhcr.ba/updatejan08/SP_12_2007.pdf).
- 9 Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Carl Dahlman, *op. cit.*, p. 457.
- 10 However, this approach has been criticized as a paradoxical one, because the DPA itself admitted and established the two entities that represented the result of the ethno-political war among the three ethnic groups. See, Catherine Phuong, *op. cit.*, p. 166.
- 11 UNHCR, *op.cit.*
- 12 Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Carl Dahlman, *op. cit.*, p. 449.
- 13 James K. Boyce, 2002, "Aid Conditionality as a Tool for Peacebuilding: Opportunities and Constraints," *Development and Change*, Vol. 33, No. 5, p. 1036.
- 14 For instance, a Christian NGO based in the UK built houses for the Croat refugees in Stolac, where Croats were the majority (based on an interview with an official in the OHR in November 2007).
- 15 James K. Boyce, *op. cit.*, p. 1036.
- 16 International Crisis Group, 1998, *Minority Return or Mass Relocation?*, Sarajevo: ICG (14 May), pp. 19-21.
- 17 UNDP, 2003, *International Assistance to BiH, 1996-2002: A Tentative Analysis of Who is Doing What, Where*, Sarajevo: UNDP, p. 39. This figure shows that the approved amount of money and the realized amount of money is smaller.
- 18 Other small ethnic minorities like Hungarians, Albanians, Jews, Roma and so on were not necessarily included as the target groups.
- 19 Wayne Nells, 2006, "Bosnian Education for Security and Peacebuilding?," *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 13, No.2, p. 231.
- 20 Paddy Ashdown, the then High Representative of the OHR, made a comment on education to the effect that it should be treated as a security issue (Wayne Nells, *ibid.*, p. 233). Also, the

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- UNDP stated in its 2003 edition of the Early Warning Report that the national division of the school system in BiH was the most dangerous problem (UNDP, 2003, *Early Warning System—July–September 2003*, Sarajevo: UNDP, p. 7).
- 21 See Wayne Nells, *ibid.*; Astrid Fisher, 2007, “Integration or Segregation? Reforming the Education Sector,” Martina Fischer ed. *Peacebuilding and Civil Society in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ten Years after Dayton*, 2nd edition, Berlin: LIT Verlag; Aida Premilovac, 2007, “Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Neglected Security Issue” , speech at the OSCE parliamentary conference held in Slovenia from 29 September to 1 October (<http://oscebih.org/public/default.asp?d=6&article=show&iid=2119>)
- 22 Premilovac, *ibid.*
- 23 *Ibid.*
- 24 *Ibid.*
- 25 *Ibid.*
- 26 OSCE, 2005, *Report on Implementation of the Interim Agreement on Accommodation of Specific Needs and Rights of Returnee Children*, Sarajevo: OSCE, p. 3.
- 27 *Framework Law on Primary and Secondary Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina*.
- 28 There are 6 types of curriculum in BiH. In contrast with only one type of curriculum in the RS, there are 5 types in FBiH. Five cantons adopt the curriculum of the Mostar Institute and two cantons adopt the curriculum of the FBiH Ministry of Education. The three other cantons of Tuzla, Zenica-Doboj, and Sarajevo develop their own curriculum.
- 29 OSCE, 2005, *op. cit.*, p. 13.
- 30 OSCE, 2002, *Education Reform: A Message to the People of Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Sarajevo: OSCE, p. 9.
- 31 Some schools in RS have religious icons hanging in the classrooms.
- 32 Charles J. Russo, 2000, “Religion and Education in Bosnia: Integration Not Segregation?,” *Brigham Young University Law Review*, No. 3, p. 961.
- 33 OSCE, 2007, *Towards Inter-Religious Understanding in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Status Report on the Pilot Course Culture of Religions*, Sarajevo: OSCE, p. 2.
- 34 *Ibid.*
- 35 In the Federation cantons, as this subject is treated not as an addition but as an alternative, they do not have the same kind of problem.
- 36 OSCE, 2005, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

- 37 Although the Japanese government spent about US\$180million in humanitarian aid during the conflict, the official start of its ODA to BiH was in 1996.
- 38 JICA, 1999, *Shotou Gakkou Kensetsu Keikaku Yobi Chousa Houkokusho* (Preliminary Investigation Report for the Primary School Construction Project); JICA, 2000, *Shotou Gakkou Kensetsu Keikaku Kihon Sekkei Houkokusho* (Master Plan for the Primary School Construction Project); JICA, 2001, *Shotou Gakkou Kensetsu Keikaku Jigyouka Chousa Houkokusho* (Report on the Implementation of the Primary School Construction Project). The construction project of these schools consisted of two phases, and it was planned that 5 schools would be constructed by the start of the 2003 academic year.
- 39 James K. Boyce, *op. cit.*
- 40 *Ibid.*, p.1027.
- 41 *Ibid.*, pp. 1028-9.
- 42 I conducted an interview with a staff member of the Japanese Embassy in BiH in October 2003.