

Realizing Global Development Governance at the United Nations

-Two Competing Regimes and the Roles of Three East Asian Countries-

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I. Introduction

Today, we are witnessing a change in the international order. This situation is being caused by two main factors: weakening leadership of the developed countries and the increasing power of the emerging economies like China and India in international political and economic scenes.

The world economy has long been led by the western developed countries, mainly the US, Europe and Japan, and liberalism has been the key philosophy since the end of World War II. Based on that philosophy the Bretton Woods institutions were created and have promoted international trade, finance, and development. It can be said that we have lived in a world based on western values for more than 60 years. However, the western-led international order is shaking, and we are currently living in the turmoil.

The US, EU and Japan are experiencing a hard period in which they cannot overcome the economic and financial problems they face. The US economy took a downturn when the “Lehman Shock” occurred in 2008, and it still has not emerged from the recession. In Europe, the EU has been struggling to save Greece from bankruptcy; meanwhile, other financial problems have occurred in the southern

countries such as Spain and Italy. In the case of Japan, she has been experiencing economic stagnation for more than 20 years since the bursting of the economic bubbles in the early 1990s. Thus, the economic powers of the western countries are weakening, and the political powers of them are also shrinking at the same time.

In contrast with the situation of the developed countries, the so-called emerging powers are increasing their influences in international political and economic scenes. The leading emerging powers are the BRICS, which is an acronym for Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Next to the BRICS there are 11 other emerging economies, which have been named as the “NEXT 11” by Goldman Sachs: Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, South Korea, the Philippines, Turkey, and Vietnam.

We can no longer undervalue the decisions and the movements of these emerging powers because they have already shown their power in the recent some political and economic events. For example, in the case of selecting the president of the World Bank, an election was carried out for the first time in the bank’s history. Previously, the president had been chosen from a US banker or a US diplomat who was recommended by the US government without an election taking place, but this time, the emerging powers put forward a candidate: the Nigerian Minister of Finance, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala. The second example appeared in the reform of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Emerging powers required the reform of quota and voting shares of the IMF in order to increase their voices, and they passed the reform plan in 2010. In addition to the reform of quota and voting shares, emerging powers obtained two seats in the executive board of the IMF.¹ The third example was the official statement of proposing a formation of a development bank, the BRICS Bank, by the BRICS after the fourth summit was held in New Delhi in March 2012. This idea of establishing a new bank to support developing countries was an expression of distrust against the IMF. In addition to these examples we can point out the South Korean presence in world politics: the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, the new president of the World Bank Jim Young Kim, and the fourth high-level forum on aid effectiveness held in Busan in 2011 to name but a few.

Judging from the power-shift occurring in the international political and economic scenes, it can be assumed that a paradigm shift will also take place. In other words, it can be said that we are in the midst of a transition period from the traditional order to a new

order, which is still obscure. In such a situation, power struggles are taking place in the sphere of development cooperation regarding the creation of new regimes. In this paper, the two overlapping regimes on development cooperation will be examined to consider the realization of global development governance in a new era. Also, we will examine the roles of three East Asian countries, China, South Korea and Japan in realizing global governance in the field of development cooperation. Those countries are different types of donors: China as an emerging donor, South Korea as a newcomer of the DAC, and Japan as a traditional DAC member country with the long experience of aid giving. Therefore, it is reasonable to take these countries for considering the future course of worldwide development cooperation. Moreover, in the midst of the change of the OECD-DAC, we have to focus on these countries' development cooperation policies which are to some extent different from the western model promoted by the OECD-DAC.

II. Changing Development Landscape

The international development regime is now about to change drastically. In order to understand the circumstances surrounding the regime today, we must focus on the change of OECD-DAC, which is the most affected by the trends of international politics.

OECD-DAC is composed of 23 rich industrialized countries² and was established in 1961. It has played a role of the forum for aid donors to determine guiding principles of aid giving to recipient countries for more than 50 years. The DAC was established with the following aims: 1) to realize the efficient implementation of aid, 2) to review aid quality and quantity of member countries regularly, and 3) to increase grants and concessional aid for developing countries. The second point above, *inter alia*, which requires member countries to receive peer reviews about their aid policy and aid records is a unique feature of the DAC. Owing to this system, member countries' aid policies are converged in certain directions.

We can point out two important roles the DAC has played in the international development debates since the mid-1990s. First, we should refer to the OECD strategy, "Shaping the 21st Century: the Contribution of Development Co-operation," which was adopted in May 1996. This was an epoch-making document because the numerical targets and the target years were shown for many development-related issues such as poverty, education, health and so on. The international development goals shown in this strategy became the foundation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)

adopted by the United Nations in 2000. Second, we can point to the DAC's initiative to promote the debate about aid effectiveness. According to Brian Atwood, present chair of the DAC and the former administrator of USAID in the Bill Clinton era, the DAC started the discussion on aid effectiveness in the mid-1990s after the announcement of the new strategy (Shaping the 21st Century).³ In the new millennium, the DAC has embarked on a worldwide debate on aid effectiveness and hosted conferences on that matter. Four high-level forums were held in Rome in 2003, in Paris in 2005, in Accra in 2008, and in Busan in 2011⁴, and countries that participated in these forums have been making efforts to realize aid coordination and aid harmonization.

Thus, the DAC has played a significant role in deepening the discussion on foreign aid and in promoting the international development regime. However, it is criticized that structural fatigue has become apparent with the DAC because the DAC has been like a club of industrialized countries whose powers are diminishing in not only economic but also political scenes. Such a situation was caused by the “Lehman Shock” and the consequent economic downturn of the industrialized world. Contrast to the situation of the DAC member countries, the power of emerging economies, such as China, Brazil, India, and Russia, is increasing in both economic and political arenas. The DAC has started to approach these emerging economies and has managed to invite these countries to the debate of aid effectiveness.




Figure 1. Donors' Total Gross ODA in 2009

Source: OECD website <http://www.oecd.org/dac/aidstatistics/trackingtrendsbeyondthedac.htm>

A chart provided by the DAC is useful to understand the significance of the emerging powers in the sphere of international development cooperation (see Figure 1). We can tell that the ODA volumes of some non-DAC countries have already surpassed those of the DAC countries. We do not have official statistics on aid of some non-DAC countries, but it is estimated that the volumes of ODA of those countries would be larger than the figures shown in the chart. Recently, the DAC has recognized the significance of non-DAC countries, especially emerging powers, to fulfill the internationally agreed development goals, including MDGs by the target year of 2015. Although the DAC has limited its membership only to the western industrialized countries that are regarded as “democratic” and “liberal” states, the DAC has started collaboration with countries beyond its membership.

With regard to the BRICS, Russia, acceding to OECD membership, began reporting her ODA flows to the DAC in 2011, and the other four BRICS countries are invited to the DAC meetings regularly. Moreover, the DAC created the China-DAC study group to deepen understanding of the Chinese way of development cooperation. The DAC also started to pay special attention to the idea of South-South Cooperation (SSC), in which development cooperation is carried out among developing countries. SSC is not a new phenomenon, but rather an old idea originally termed as technical cooperation among developing countries (TCDC) and defined in the Buenos Aires Plan of Action in 1978,⁵ four years after the creation of the special unit for TCDC in the UNDP in 1974.⁶ Responding to the changing international political and economic order, the DAC or developed countries began to consider the usefulness of another form of development cooperation, SSC, which they have not emphasized for almost 40 years.

Now, we are witnessing the changing development landscape where developing countries, especially the emerging powers, have voices to modify or improve the international development regime that has long been orientated or dominated by only the developed countries. Under these circumstances, two overlapping development regimes are emerging.

III. Two Overlapping Regimes

With regard to the international development regime it is pointed out that a so-called “regime complex” had existed until the mid-1990s. A regime complex is a situation

in which the scope of overlapping is small and actors can have advantages in such overlapping regimes. Also, it can be explained as “an array of partially overlapping and nonhierarchical institutions governing a particular issue-area”⁷. However, if the scope of overlapping is large and the norms and the rules are not consistent among the regimes, those regimes will be competitive with each other.

Until the mid-1990s, two regimes were influential in the sphere of international development, and many stakeholders were participating in both of them. One had been promoted by the World Bank, and the economic growth approach was emphasized. The other had been promoted by the UN System, especially the UNDP, and the poverty reduction approach was emphasized. The former approach was favored in the 1960s and in the 1980s, while the latter approach was dominant in the 1970s. According to Hiroko Ogawa (2008), this regime complex was dissolved in the mid-1990s when both organizations realized the necessity of both approaches to achieve development results.⁸ OECD-DAC also adopted the integrated approach and announced the new strategy (Shaping the 21st Century) based on that concept.

However, two overlapping regimes have just come into being. In this section, we will consider how these two regimes were established and examine the relationship between these two regimes. Then, we will analyze that the two regimes have been creating a regime complex again or a competitive relationship.

III-1. United Nations Development Cooperation Forum

The creation of the United Nations Development Cooperation Forum (hereafter as DCF) was proposed at the World Summit held in 2005, and the DCF has come into being since 2008. The creation of the DCF was one of the efforts to strengthen ECOSOC, which has not worked effectively as it was originally designed. Reforming ineffective and inefficient ECOSOC has been a long-time problem of the UN.

At the World Summit, the main topic was the reform of the Security Council, but the arguments regarding reform came to a dead end owing to a collision of views among member states. Miko Maekawa (2012) analyzed that there arose a tendency to shift the interests of reforming the Security Council to that of ECOSOC around 2005 at the UN.⁹ As there had been a certain progress of reforming the UN system in the sphere of development since 1997, it is quite reasonable that the reform of ECOSOC was considered

to be an extension of that process. The reform of the system regarding UN development operations was initiated by the former Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. He proposed the ideas of the UNDAF¹⁰ and the UNDG¹¹ in his first report, “Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform,”¹² in 1997 in order to coordinate the development operations across the UN system. In addition to these reforms, he launched a high-level panel on system-wide coherence. The panel submitted a report called “Delivering as One” in 2006 just before Kofi Annan’s term of office expired. Thus, it can be concluded that Kofi Annan made considerable efforts to reform the UN system in the area of development.

The idea of holding a biennial high-level Development Cooperation Forum was decided at the World Summit,¹³ and the purposes of the Forum were proposed by the Secretary-General in the next year.¹⁴ After receiving the report of the Secretary-General, the Forum’s mandate was defined in the General Assembly resolution which requires the DCF will:

- a. Review trends and progress in international development cooperation, and give policy guidance and recommendations to promote more effective international development cooperation;
- b. Identify gaps and obstacles with a view to make recommendations on practical measures and policy options to enhance coherence and effectiveness and to promote development cooperation for the realization of the internationally agreed development goals, including the MDGs;
- c. Provide a platform for Member States to exchange lessons learned and share experiences in formulating, supporting and implementing national development strategies; and
- d. In accordance with the Rules of Procedure, be open to participation by all stakeholders, including the organizations of the United Nations, the international financial and trade institutions, the regional organizations, civil society and private sector representatives.¹⁵

The last point reflects the significant role of the non-state actors, such as CSOs, NGOs, private sector, and philanthropies, in the sphere of development cooperation. Donor governments are no longer the only actors in the decision-making process of development cooperation. In creating the DCF, favorable opinions were expressed by

delegates from many developing countries. Among these voices, an opinion stated by an Indian delegate is quite important to consider the long-time deficit of the traditional development cooperation regime. He stated as follows:

In the context of systemic issues, it is particularly important to implement the commitment to enhancing the ability of developing countries to participate meaningfully in decision-making, an important component of which is to assist developing countries in enhancing their capacity to assess the impact that policy changes have on them.¹⁶

On the other hand, a delegate from the United States showed a somewhat discouraging attitude toward the creation of the DCF. He stated as follows:

Our support for resolution 61/16 is (thus) contingent upon our understanding that the resolution has no financial implications. The Department of General Assembly and Conference Management must be accorded flexibility and time for adequate planning in order to ensure that it can utilize existing resources, as noted in the Secretariat's statement.¹⁷

From these examples, we can observe gaps between donors and recipients with regard to discussing development issues at the UN. Norms, rules, guiding principles, and aid modalities on development cooperation have been determined by donor countries in the traditional development cooperation regimes. It is obvious that donors have had advantages in the decision-making process over recipient countries in making national development plans. In addition to that, with regard to the aid coordination efforts led by the OECD-DAC, it is said that developing countries are showing concerns of their relatively declining power in negotiations against developed countries that have gained collective power through aid coordination process.¹⁸ As Mawdsley (2012) mentions, the expectations expressed at the creation of the DCF seem to reflect developing countries' desire to become rule-makers rather than rule-takers.¹⁹

III-2. Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation

After the discussions on aid effectiveness in the four high-level forums from Rome to Busan, a new forum was established to ensure effective development cooperation. The Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (hereafter as the GP-EDC) has just come into being in June 2012 after the discussions of the Post Busan Interim Group meetings.

Its main functions are defined as follows:

- a. Maintain and strengthen political support for effective development co-operation;
- b. Carry out monitoring of the implementation of the Busan commitments;
- c. Facilitate knowledge exchange and lessons learned; and
- d. Support the implementation of the Busan commitments at the country level.²⁰

Four principles were agreed upon at the Busan forum: 1) ownership of development priorities by developing countries; 2) focus on results; 3) inclusive development partnerships, and 4) transparency and accountability to each other. Based on these principles members of the GP-EDC are obliged to fulfill the commitments and actions agreed in the outcome document as well. Members are expected to utilize the country-system of the recipient countries, to accelerate the efforts to achieve gender equality, to increase further the volumes of untied aid, to promote predictability and transparency of development aid, to reduce fragmentation and restrain the proliferation of aid channels, and to achieve sustainable development in fragile states and so on. As to the actions, members are expected to make efforts in the following four themes: 1) South-South and triangular cooperation; 2) collaboration with the private sector; 3) combating corruption, and 4) financing for climate change.²¹

The functions and the purposes of the GP-EDC overlap to a considerable extent with those of the DCF. Both forums will support members by giving political support or policy guidance for the purpose of achieving effective development cooperation. Moreover, both forums provide members with chances to exchange and share both knowledge and experiences of development. We will examine what these overlaps imply from the regime theory perspective in the next section.

III-3. An Analysis from the Regime Theory Perspective

According to the regime theory, we will have a situation of the so-called “forum shopping” if the overlapping regimes coexist. Each actor can choose the most suitable regime for itself in such a situation. The creation of the GP-EDC has brought about a situation where two competitive regimes coexist, and some actors seem to be practicing in the “forum shopping.” Also, it is pointed out that coexistence of the overlapping regimes creates a problem with regard to efficiency. The larger the scope of the overlap becomes, the more difficult solving the problems will be. Moreover, if inconsistency exists between these two regimes, the effects of each regime might be set off.²²

We have to examine to what extent these two regimes overlap. As we have already examined the similarities of their mandates, we will now compare the structures of these two regimes (see Table 1). We can observe the similarity again in the structures of these two regimes. In particular, we can find out the same concept in the compositions of both the advisory group and the steering committee. The two regimes take into consideration the participation from emerging economies, civil-society organizations, and private sectors, which have become indispensable elements for the debate of development cooperation today. In the case of the GP-EDC it adopts the system of co-chairs chosen from the three categories: the recipient countries, the provider countries, and the recipient and provider countries. Moreover, as to the balance among these categories, the GP-EDC takes the recipient countries more into consideration than the provider countries. It can be said that the GP-EDC had an advantage of the late-comer in designing the structure of the regime. As to the memberships, the members in the category of countries and territories overlap to a great extent. Theoretically, the DCF is open to all UN member countries, but it assumes that gaps of attitudes may exist among the countries toward the DCF. On the other hand, the countries and territories of the GP-EDC are those who have promised to carry out the commitments of the Busan outcome document. Therefore, the discussions in the GP-EDC can be more vital than those in the DCF.

Table 1. Comparison of the structures of the DCF and the GP-EDC

	DCF	GP-EDC
Members	193 countries, multilateral institutions, CSOs, parliamentarians, local government, private sector	158 countries and territories, 38 international organizations, 7 other organizations (CSOs, parliamentarians, UN Global Compact, private sector)
	Advisory Group (22)	Steering Committee (15)
Chair/Co-chairs	UNDESA-USG	Ms. Armida Alishabana (Indonesia) Recipient (R) Ms. Justine Greening (UK) Provider (P) Ms. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala (Nigeria) R and P
Recipient countries	(3) Ghana, Afghanistan, Rwanda	(5) Chad, Guatemala, Bangladesh, Samoa, Timor-Leste*
R and P	(3) India, Brazil, Mexico	(1) Peru
Providers	(4) European Commission, Finland, Austria, Switzerland	(3) European Commission, Korea, USA
Parliamentarians	(1) Inter-Parliamentary Union	(1) Inter-Parliamentary Union
CSO	(3) Action Aid, CIVICUS, IBON	(1) BetterAid
Academia	(1) Novartis Foundation	----
Private Sector	----	(1) Center for International Private Enterprise
Multilateral institutions	(2) NEPAD, IMF	----
Multilateral development bank	(1) Islamic Development Bank	(1) World Bank
UNDP	(2) BRSP, SSC	(1) UNDP/UNDG
OECD	(2) WP-EFF, DCD	(1) OECD-DAC

* representative of g7+ group of fragile and conflict-affected states

Sources: <http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/newfunct/advismem/shtml>

<http://www.aideffectiveness.org/busanhlf4/en/about/global-partnership/748.html>

Particular attention should be paid to the commitments of the UNDP and the OECD. In the case of the GP-EDC, as a joint secretariat the UNDP and the OECD are going to provide support for the GP-EDC to function effectively.²³ It is reasonable that the OECD, which has played a role of organizer to convene forums on aid effectiveness, will continue to commit to this issue. However, we must examine why the UNDP has committed to the newly-born GP-EDC in spite of the existence of a similar forum in the UN system that has already worked since 2008.

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According to an insider who was present at the Post Busan Interim Group meeting held in May 2012 to discuss the creation of the GP-EDC, the demands to increase the role of the DCF by BetterAid was turned down without any support by the chair of the meeting or the delegates from the UNDP.²⁴ As the UNDP is on the lists of both the advisory group of the DCF and the steering committee of the GP-EDC, it seems that the forum shopping has not been carried out by the UNDP. However, judging from the above statement, the UNDP does not seem to have much expectation toward the DCF, but rather seems to emphasize the GP-EDC.

This attitude of the UNDP may have arisen from the characteristics of the organization. The UNDP is an agency whose emphasis is put on the operational activities in local places. It is reasonable that the UNDP as a practical and pragmatic agency prefers the GP-EDC which is expected to function effectively based on the discussions of the four high-level forums. In addition to this, as the member countries have shown their willingness to commit in the GP-EDC, the UNDP can collaborate with the developing countries easier in the GP-EDC than in the DCF.

If we examine these two regimes from the viewpoint of legitimacy, we can say that the DCF has a “democratic legitimacy” and the GP-EDC has a “functional legitimacy.” It is desirable to seek “democratic legitimacy” for the purpose of realizing global governance. However, it is quite reasonable that organizations like the UNDP and the OECD who have led the debate on aid effectiveness seek “functional legitimacy.” Therefore, it is assumed that the UNDP and the OECD prefer the GP-EDC to the DCF.

Table 2. Comparison of the Four Organizations

	INCLUSIVENESS	EFFECTIVENESS
IFI	👍👍	👍👍👍
DCF	👍👍👍	👍
OECD-DAC	👍	👍👍👍
WP-EFF	👍👍	👍👍

Source: Brenda Killen and Andrew Rogerson (2010) “Global Governance for International Development: Who’s in Charge?” *Development Brief* (Consultation Draft) Issue 2, OECD.

Killen and Rogerson (2010) examined which existing organization was best suited to be in charge of global governance for international development. The existing organizations they listed were the International Financial Institution (IFI), which

is represented by the World Bank and the IMF, the DCF, the OECD-DAC, and the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF) which led the four forums on aid effectiveness and can be regarded as the predecessor of the GP-EDC. They analyzed these four organizations from two respects: “inclusiveness” and “effectiveness.” Judging from their results, the DCF was superior to the other organizations with respect to “inclusiveness,” but was inferior to the others with respect to “effectiveness” (see Table 2). However, as the members of the GP-EDC become almost the same as that of the DCF, the score of the GP-EDC can be thought to be higher than that of the WP-EFF with respect to “inclusiveness.” Then, if we follow the judgment by Killen and Rogerson, the total score of the GP-EDC will be higher than that of the DCF.

Judging from these analyses, we can conclude that the scope of overlapping of these two regimes is so large that these two regimes do not seem to create a regime complex. Also, as the norms and the rules are not so different, two regimes are not competitive either. We can assert that two regimes have been creating an inefficient situation, because the scope of overlapping is quite large. Then, we wonder why these two similar regimes have been created. We do not have a clear answer from these analyses, but we can assume that both developed countries and the pragmatic international development agencies prefer a practical regime to a regime under the UN which might be a forum with few practices. It can be thought that the relationship between two regimes will be clearer after the start of the debate in the Global Partnership. We have to ascertain whether these two regimes will be competitive or not in the future.

IV. The Roles of Three East Asian Countries to Realize Global Development Governance

We have to consider what roles China, South Korea, and Japan can play to realize global development governance under the present circumstances in which we have two overlapping regimes. As the relationship between the two regimes is still not clear, we will consider the roles of these three countries in order not to create the competitive situation between these two regimes.

These three countries have some similarities and differences regarding their views on development cooperation. With regard to the similarities, we can point out that they have the same experiences of having been an aid recipient and of having graduated or graduating from that status. Also, it is common that they emphasize partnerships

in conducting development projects with recipient countries. This attitude also comes from the historical backgrounds that they experienced during their periods of being a recipient country. In spite of these similarities we can recognize differences among these three countries toward the emerging two overlapping regimes.

China

China is a leading emerging power and now has a considerable impact on the debate of development cooperation. Therefore, the OECD-DAC has tried to communicate with the Chinese agencies concerning foreign assistance through the China-DAC study group, and it is presumed that the OECD-DAC had an expectation to draw China into its circle through the communications at the study group. However, it seems that China has been skeptical about the DAC-led discussions on development cooperation.

Although China has her name on the list of the members who agreed with the Busan outcome document, it is said that she was persuaded by the South Korean government to agree to the document. In exchange of the agreement it is said that China demanded that the emerging economies must be excluded from the duty to practice harmonization. China's insistence met with other developing countries' approval and bore fruit in paragraph 2 of the outcome document, saying that "(t)he principles, commitments and actions agreed in the outcome document in Busan shall be the reference for South-South partners on a voluntary basis."²⁵

In contrast with the attitude toward the DAC-led regime, China seems to have shown a favorable attitude toward the DCF.²⁶ As China places emphasis on the principle of sovereign equality in her diplomacy, the DCF where developing countries have equal voices with the developed countries, in principle, may be preferred to the GP-EDC by China.

South Korea

South Korea is the newest DAC member country and was the host country of the Busan high-level forum on aid effectiveness. Also, South Korea is one of the members of the steering committee of the GP-EDC in the group of providers. Judging from these facts, we can presume that the South Korean government places emphasis on the discussions led by the DAC and the GP-EDC.

Japan

Japan's attitude toward these two regimes is relatively obscure compared with the other two countries. Japan is one of the original member countries and had been a non-western Asian member until South Korea was approved to join the DAC in 2010. In spite of its more than fifty-year presence as a member country in the DAC, it can be said that Japan's contribution to the worldwide discussion on aid has been little with the exception of the initiative exercised in setting the numerical targets and the target years in "the DAC new strategy" adopted in 1996.

However, we should refer to Japan's efforts to promote South-South Cooperation (SSC) and triangular cooperation, which is one of the common purposes of the DCF and the GP-EDC. Japan's aid experiences on these types of cooperation are worthy of special attention. The reason why Japan promotes SSC is that Japan herself was a recipient of SSC after WWII. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has been supporting SSC mainly by the Third Country Training Programme (TCTP) and the Third Country Experts Dispatch (TCED).²⁷ The TCTP was introduced in 1975 and the TCED started in 1995.²⁸ With regard to the triangular cooperation, the case of agricultural development in Mozambique is often referred to. Japan, Brazil, and Mozambique are collaborating in this case. JICA has provided technical cooperation for agricultural development in the savannah area called "Cerrado" in Brazil for almost 20 years and has succeeded in changing the barren land into a crop field. Now, Japan and Brazil have embarked on an attempt to change a similar tropical savannah in Mozambique to a sustainable agricultural land by adopting similar techniques to what was used in the case of Cerrado.²⁹

We should remember that these three countries have significance in determining the future course of international development cooperation. China's influences on both political and economic scenes will increase beyond question, and China as a leading emerging power has a role and responsibility to represent other developing countries. South Korea will also show more presence in both political and economic arenas as an emerging power, and we should keep in mind that South Korea is in a key position in the GP-EDC. In spite of its decreasing economic power, Japan is still the third largest country with regard to GDP and has a considerable influence on the international development cooperation. If these three countries collaborate with each other while fulfilling each role

and responsibility, we may be able to prevent the two regimes from being competitive.

V. Conclusion

This paper focused on the two overlapping regimes in the context of the changing international order. We found that the two regimes, the DCF and the GP-EDC, overlap to a considerable extent with regard to both mandates and structures. Although the DCF has had an advantage regarding “inclusiveness” or “democratic legitimacy,” the GP-EDC has seemed to have gained “democratic legitimacy” as well as “functional legitimacy.” Then, these two regimes have a risk of being competitive because the structures are similar to a considerable extent and the scope of overlapping is large.

We may be able to prevent the two regimes from being competitive if we establish a hierarchy between the two regimes. We should set two stages in the decision-making process on international development cooperation. In the first stage, we discuss the matters in the GP-EDC and confirm the results of the discussions in the next stage of the DCF. This way of dividing the roles is like the case of “the DAC new strategy,” which later became the foundation of the MDGs at the UN. In other words, we should position the GP-EDC as a sub-regime of the DCF. Three East Asian countries, China, South Korea, and Japan, should aim to establish such a structure between the two regimes to realize global development governance in which both “democratic legitimacy” and “functional legitimacy” can be secured.

Notes

- 1 Europe lost two seats in the executive board instead.
- 2 If we include the European Committee (EC), the number of members of the DAC is 24.
- 3 Brian Atwood (2012), p. 3.
- 4 “The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness” was adopted in Paris High-Level Forum. In this declaration five principles are shown to improve aid effectiveness: ownership, alignment, harmonization, results, and mutual accountability.
- 5 UN, A/RES/33/134.
- 6 Special Unit was created in UNDP with a response to the General Assembly resolution 3251 (XXIX).
- 7 Kal Raustiala and David G. Victor (2004) p. 279.
- 8 Hiroko Ogawa (2008)

- 9 Miko Maekawa (2012).
- 10 The UNDAF is an acronym of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework which provides UN agencies operating at local levels with a common framework to make operational activities.
- 11 The United Nations Development Group consists of 32 UN agencies, including 8 agencies of funds and programmes, regional economic commissions, 9 specialized agencies, and so on. The UNDP administrator is a chair of this group and has a responsibility to report the progress of coordination among agencies to the Secretary-General.
- 12 UN, A/51/950.
- 13 UN, A/RES/60/1, para. 155 (b).
- 14 UN, A/61/90-E/2006/84.
- 15 UN, A/RES/61/16, para. 4.
- 16 Indian delegate Mr. Sen' s comment in A/61/PV. 56.
- 17 US delegate Mr. Miller' s comment in A/61/PV. 56.
- 18 Yasutami Shimomura (2009) p. 61.
- 19 Emma Mawdsley (2012) p. 190.
- 20 Information provided by the secretariat of GP-EDC (<http://www.aideffectiveness.org/busanhlf4/about/global-partnership.html>).
- 21 See Busan outcome document (<http://www.busanhlf4.org>).
- 22 Kenki Adachi (2011) p. 424.
- 23 This decision was agreed at Busan. The decision indicated in the paragraph 36 (d) of the Busan outcome document states that members will “ invite the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development and the United Nations Development Programme to support the effective functioning of the Global Partnership, building on their collaboration to date and their respective mandates and areas of comparative advantage” (<http://www.busanhlf4.org>).
- 24 Devspectator's blog, 23 May, 2012 (<http://devspectator.wordpress.com/tag/undcf/>).
- 25 Busan outcome document, paragraph 2 (<http://www.busanhlf4.org>).
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< 付記 >

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