

「A Comparative Study of Maritime Cultures : A Study of
the Actions and Procedures of Vessel Traffic Service
Officers in Japan and Korea」

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論文要旨

近年、海上輸送による貿易量が増加しているが、その船舶の大半は外国船籍である。しかし、海上交通の発展に伴い、外国船舶の海難事故も増加傾向である。海上交通センター (Vessel Traffic Service Center) は海の安全を支える機関の一つであり、海上管制官は安全航行に必要な情報を提供している。本論文は、日本と韓国の海上管制官の緊急時における外国船への対応を文化面から比較検証することを目的としている。筆者は、関門海峡海上交通センター (北九州市)、釜山 VTS センター及び釜山新港の管制官を対象としたアンケート調査を実施した。論文は、4章から構成されている。まず序章では、関門海峡と韓国で発生した海難事故、またアンケート調査を実施した釜山港と関門海峡に言及している。

第1章は、先行研究として日本と韓国の摩擦について調査した。まず、日韓両国の意識調査に触れ、相手国に関する理解や認識の状況を検証した。日韓を巡っては、4つの課題、すなわち教科書問題・領土問題 (竹島・独島)・靖国問題・従軍慰安婦問題は未だ解決されておらず、両国の関係改善には至っていないのが現状である。本章では、文化面から両国の摩擦への対応や認識を調査することが目的であり、歴史や政治に焦点を当てていないが、上記の問題に関して両国の認識を考察する意義があると考え、両外務省の見解や動向も比較の対象とされている。更に、両国の文化を調査し、相違点と類似点をまとめた。

第2章では、日韓のコミュニケーションの比較研究を行った。両国とも高コンテクスト文化であり、儒教や仏教に影響を受けているため、集団意識や和を重んじ、面子を保つ等の特徴が類似している。一方で、韓国民は日本人よりも主張が強く、国際舞台でも柔軟性があることが示唆されている。次に、本論文の核となる日韓海上交通管制官のアンケート調査の結果を集計した。加えて、2009年関門海峡で発生した韓国船籍カリナスターと海上自衛艦「くらま」の衝突事故、及び2014年韓国南部の沖合で沈没した旅客船セウォル号の交信記録を分析し、管制官の船舶に対する対応を検証した。両国管制官の対応を比較した結果、双方の文化による影響が明確に現れていることが示されている。

第3章では、前章で調査した緊急時における管制官の外国船への対応の分析、及び日本と韓国の海難事故を再検証し、文化面からのアプローチを試みた。分析から、両国管制官の情報収集が不十分であり、双方とも船舶の動向を的確に把握していなかったという点が明らかになった。また、関門海峡 VTS センターの管制官は外国船に対して英語で情報提供を行っていたが、曖昧な表現や日本語の母語干渉を受けた表現が見受けられた。また、韓国珍島 VTS センターの管制官は、セウォル号の船内や乗務員、更には乗客の緊迫した状況を十

分に把握しておらず、一方的な情報提供や助言に加え、船舶からの要請にも十分な対応が出来なかったと推測される。この事故では、修学旅行生を含む乗員・乗客 295 名が犠牲となる大惨事となった。

第 4 章では、第 2、3 章の調査・分析を基に、筆者は緊急時の対応、及び海上交通管制官が外国船舶と英語で通信を行う上で、海難事故を防ぐための改善策 3 点を提案している。

1. 的確な情報提供を目指すため、各船舶に必要な情報を可能な限り収集し、他の機関と情報共有する。
2. 管制官は英語での交信が必須であることから、実践的な海事英語を効果的に習得し、明瞭、明白、かつ迅速に対応出来るよう英語力の向上を図る。
3. 日韓共に管制官の海事英語教育が実施されているが、今後は更に充実した教育プログラムが必要である。アジアの船舶が通峡するため、殆どの船員は非英語話者である。従って、管制官は様々な特徴を持つ英語に対応しなければならない。そこで、乗組員の英語を分析し、英語教育に活かすことが重要であることから、日本と韓国の海事英語研究者や管制官も含めた共同調査・研究プログラムの構築が必須と考えられる。

本論文の目的は、アンケート調査及び事故報告書を基に日韓海上交通管制官の緊急時における対応の比較検証を行い、海難事故防止のための改善策を論じることである。更に筆者はまとめとして、長きに渡る日韓関係の改善に向けて、お互いに歩み寄り理解し合い、文化面・教育面・経済面で協力出来るような関係を構築するための第一歩として、海上交通の安全に日韓が共同で取り組む日韓海事英語共同研究を提案している。急速に経済発展を遂げているアジアにおいて、釜山港は世界有数のハブ港として最大規模を誇り、また関門海峡はアジアの玄関口として、重要な役割を果たしている。同時に、両海域の管制官も重要な任務を担っていることから、管制官のミスリードによる海難事故を防止するためにも、日本と韓国が協力をし、海の安全を守ることが必須である。この共同研究には学識者だけでなく、海上交通に携わる関係者の協力も必要で、それによって海難事故防止に向けた具体的な提案がなされることを期待したい。

ABSTRACT

International trade has grown rapidly throughout most of Asian maritime regions with most vessels being of foreign origins with foreign registered crew members of multiple nationalities. With this rise in marine traffic, the number of accidents at sea has escalated. At present, many support services are available but one of the most important roles is played by the Vessel Traffic Service Center (VTS Center). The operators at these centers provide necessary information to the vessels to ensure safe navigation. The purpose of this thesis is to study the actions and procedures of the VTS Operators in Japan and Korea during emergency situations. The author has carried out questionnaires and surveys in order to comparatively examine measures of the two countries at the Busan VTS Center and Busan New Port in Korea, and the Kanmon Kaikyo VTS Center in Kitakyushu City in 2013. This thesis is composed of four chapters that begin with an introductory chapter in which the author gives a general overview of marine disasters in Japan and Korea at the Port of Busan in Korea and the Kanmon Passage in Japan.

In Chapter 1, the root of some current conflicts between Japan and Korea is considered. Firstly, general impressions and perspective of each other among the Japanese and South Koreans are described. Next, four issues that have resulted in conflict between the two countries which include historical textbooks, Takeshima / Dokdo territories, Yasukuni Shrine and the comfort women issue are examined. These conflicts have yet to be unsettled and hence, it has been difficult to establish improved relations. This thesis, however, does not focus on the history and politics behind these issues but the statements of government agencies such as the Foreign Ministries and reactions of the both governments are needed to help consider their perceptions of each other at the heart of controversy. Furthermore, cultural dynamics of these cultures are examined to help shed light on the core value differences and similarities that drive these conflicts.

In Chapter 2, the author considers the complications of differences in the communication styles that effect relation between Japan and Korea. Both societies demonstrate high context cultures with a strong sense of group values. A strong belief in harmony and saving face in their respective cultures originates Buddhism and

Confucianism. However, unlike Japan the Korean argue their opinions more strongly and respond at the international places more flexibly than the Japanese. Results of the questionnaire surveys given the VTS operators are considered in relation to marine incidents in Japan and Korea. These include a collision between the Korean registered containership Carina Star and a Self-Defense Force ship Kurama in the Kanmon Passage in 2009. In another detailed incident, the ferry Sewol sank near Jindo Island in South Korea in 2014 with more than 250 passengers and crew members losing their lives. After inspection of the actions and correspondence of the Jindo VTS operators through VHF communication records, it was evident that their measures and reactions are influenced by distinct cultural perceptions and judgements.

In Chapter 3, an analysis of their actions and correspondences in emergency situations and marine accidents is provided through cultural dynamics. Judging from this analysis, it is considered that the operators in both countries did not collect accurate information sufficiently and with the result of not understanding the vessels' exact movements. The Kanmon Kaikyo VTS operators contacted the vessels in the median of English. Thus, some expressions and messages were ambiguous and indirect and, as a result, the Carina Star could not understand their real intentions. Likewise, the Jindo VTS operators could not provide accurate information and advice because they did not get detailed information on the Sewol ferry, furthermore, their communications between the coast guard, patrol vessels and helicopters were not sufficient.

In Chapter 4, the author has suggested 3 points for better procedures for improved communication between the VTS operators and foreign vessels in order to prevent accidents on the basis of Chapter 2 and 3. The first is that the VTS operators should get accurate information on vessels more rapidly in order to provide them with better and precise timing for maneuverability. Second, they need to improve their English skills because they often communicate with foreign vessels. Messages must be made simple, accurate and clear. Third, joint studies on not only Maritime English but also measures in emergency situations will be necessary in the near future. In both the Port of Busan and the Kanmon Passage, vessels from Asian countries pass through these areas. Most crew members are non-English speakers, hence, the operators contact the crew who

speak many varieties of English. It is essential for operators to be familiar with a variation of English accents.

Finally, this thesis suggests possible solutions to help prevent marine accidents. Furthermore, the survey, analysis, and results of this thesis as well as future prospects for research in these areas could lay the groundwork for a program to research and study Maritime English with better procedures for improved communications for safe navigation. This first step could encourage both countries to have better cooperation leading to better relations in not only maritime relations but a better relationship in other areas such as education and culture.

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Introduction

International trade and travel has grown rapidly in South Korea and Japan. With this, accidents at sea have been on the rise. At present, many support services such as ship financing, marine insurance, maritime legal services, maritime education and research & development¹ have been established in order to prevent marine disasters. In fact, there was a collision between a Korean registered containership and a Self-Defense Force ship in the Kanmon Passage in 2009. Moreover, a ferry sank near Jindo Island in South Korea in 2014 and many passengers and crew members were sacrificed. It is considered that one of the causes is that the Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) operators did not provide information or advice to the vessels accurately. This thesis is to study the actions and procedures of the Vessel Traffic Service officers in Japan and Korea. The author will examine comparative measures of the two countries in emergency situations through surveys and VHF² communication records, and find out solutions in order to prevent accidents at sea.

According to “World Port Source”, the Port of Busan in South Korea is a vital gateway and Korea’s main port. It is “connecting the country to the Pacific Ocean and Asia”. The Port of Busan became a central harbor for Northeast Asia. In the Kanmon Passage in Japan, trading vessels from South Korea, China and other Asian countries, domestic vessels, fishing boats and pleasure boats pass. Although the passage is narrow and the tidal currents are strong, the amount of the vessels is approximately 700. (Sea and Safety³) About 70 percent of the vessels are foreign registered vessels.

There are 7 VTS Centers⁴ in Japan and 15 VTS Centers⁵ in Korea. They provide information, navigational advice, instructions and warnings for safe navigation at sea. It contributes to safety of life at sea, safety and efficiency of navigation and the protection of the marine environment. Maritime English⁶ is used for the communication between VTS Center and foreign vessels. However, some crew members of foreign vessels do not comply with the VTS officers or even ignore them. It is essential to maintain an environment mutual understanding in order to avoid accidents. Misunderstandings and miscommunication between the VTS officers and foreign vessels can lead to serious accidents.

Chapter 1 considers the histories and cultures of Japan and Korea in a comparative light. First of all, a review of contemporary conflicts between both countries is necessary to highlight the dynamics of the actions and correspondences over controversial topics such as historical textbooks, Takeshima / Dokdo territories, Yasukuni Shrine and the comfort women issue. These difficult issues still remain unsettled but this thesis does not discuss or consider these topics from a political basis. The dialogues, however, between both governments are helpful to describe and compare their actions from a cultural perspective. Moreover, Korean and Japanese viewpoints are clearly illustrated in this manner. Korean values of independence and tradition, the *Haan* culture considered ideals of face, group consciousness and harmony are considered. Whereas the influences of Shinto, Buddhism and Confucianism on the Japanese group oriented society, and their own ideas of face or the culture of shame and ideals of respect or sincerity are considered. In Chapter 2, first the author explains the cross-cultural communication patterns of Japan and Korea. It is said that both Koreans and Japanese display a high context culture⁷ with similar communication styles, but some distinct differences are clear, so possible reasons are examined. Second, the mission content of the VTS Center in Japan and Korea which is one of the support services will be shown. Third, the author conducted a questionnaire survey on the actions and procedures in emergency situations at the Kanmon Kaikyo VTS Center and Busan (Busan VTS Center and Busan New Port). Furthermore, marine accidents in Japan and Korea are considered through the VHF communication records. Thus, this chapter is a fundamental part of this thesis.

Chapter 3 is an analysis of the surveys of the VTS centers in Japan and Korea, and compares the actions and correspondences of the operators in the two countries. Moreover, these results are considered through their cultural perspectives in order to illustrate how actions can be influenced by other unfamiliar cultures. In Chapter 4, misleading communication of the VTS operators with vessels will be investigated and analyzed. The author suggests what cultural mindsets or perspectives prevent accurate communication with vessels. Finally, better procedures for better communication between the VTS operators and foreign vessels are recommended by the author. The goal of this thesis is to consider ways for smoother communications to ensure safe navigation

in order to avoid and reduce accidents at sea. In addition, the author would like to consider possibilities to improve maritime-related cultural relations between Japan and Korea. It has been said that Japan and Korea are nations both close geographically and distant politically. It is essential to improve this relationship to help establish joint partnerships to hopefully improve future maritime networks.

Chapter 1 Background

1. The Japanese and South Korean Nation : Perceptions of each other

There have been a “historical issue” and a “territorial dispute” between Japan and Korea and they are mutually “close but distant” countries. The reason is that Korea was under the rule of Japan from 1910 to 1945. The Korean government and nation claim that the nation was hurt during this period. However Japan has not apologized to Korea for Japanese past mistake and indemnified Korean people for the damage.

According to the Genron NPO and East Asia Institute (2014), 20.5 percent of the Japanese public had a “favorable” impression or “relatively favorable” impression of South Korea. However, 54.4 percent of them had an “unfavorable” or “relatively unfavorable” impression. On the other hand, only 17.5 percent of the South Korean public had a “good” or “relatively good” impression of Japan. Approximately 70 percent of Korean nation still have a negative impression on Japan. “*Analysis Report on Comparative Data*” (2014) points out the following reasons:

Historical issue and territorial disputes had a negative impact on mutual impressions. As for the reason why the South Korean public had unfavorable impressions of Japan, over 70% of the respondents answered “Inadequate repentance over the history of invasion” and “Continuing conflicts on the issue of Dokdo” respectively. “Unfavorable words and actions by Japanese politicians” were over 20%. In comparison, the Japanese raised the concern with “criticism of Japan over historical issues” at 73.9%. As for the reason for positive impression, “Interest in South Korean TV drama and music” was raised as the most positive by Japanese respondents, and the South Korean side, “Japanese people are kind and earnest” and “Japan is a developed country with a high living standard” were the major reasons. (4)

It is important to understand the above reasons behind the impressions between the two countries and the state of mutual understanding and awareness among the

Japanese and South Korean public. The Genron NPO and East Asia Institute (2014) describes that the Japanese public perceives South Korea through its culture and recent events, however, the South Korean public perceives Japan through territorial dispute and history. The following statements (See Table 1.) are the response to the question “what will come up when one another’s countries are mentioned?” and “historical event or incidents in Japan and South Korea that you know”.

| |
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| <p>Question 1: What will come up when one another’s countries are mentioned?</p> <p><Public Opinion in Japan></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Korean cuisine (46.0%) 2. Korean TV drama and K-POP (36.3%) 3. Sinking of the MV Seoul (38.2%) 4. Issue of Takeshima/Dokdo Island (36.7%) 5. Comfort women (31.0%) <p><Public Opinion in South Korea></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Issue of Dokdo/Takeshima (66.5%) 2. Comfort Women (55.8%) 3. Unfavorable words by politicians (24.3%) 4. The Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (19.7%) <p>Question 2: Historical events or incident in Japan and South Korea that you know.</p> <p><Public Opinion in Japan></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Seoul Olympics (67.0%) 2. Japan/South Korea World Cup (63.0%) <p><Public Opinion in South Korea></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Japanese invasion of Korea by Hideyoshi Toyotomi (1592-98) (86.3%) 2. Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 3. Forced annexation of Korea by Japan |
|---|

Table 1. The data of the response to the two questions. (*Analysis Report on Comparative Data* .The Genron NPO and East Asia Institute: 2014)

This data clearly shows that the Japanese public is concerned with culture and recent events, and the South Korean public is interested in the events of World War II and the conflicts between Japan and South Korea. Furthermore, the issues which hinder the development of bilateral relations are that the “Takeshima/Dokdo issue” is prevalent for Japan and Korea, and the “Anti-Japanese Sentiment in South Korea” matter for Japanese. “*Analysis Report on Comparative Data*” mentions the following results:

Regarding hindrances on the development of bilateral relations, the “Takeshima/Dokdo issue” was prevalent for both countries: 68.9% (83.7% last year) of the Japanese and 92.2% (94.6% last year) of the South Korean chose the answer. The second most popular answer for the Japanese was the “Anti-Japanese Sentiment in South Korea,” which comprised 46.6% (55.1% last year), or almost the half of the respondents, then it was followed by “historical awareness and education in South Korea” with 40.0% (33.8% last year). The second leading opinion in South Korea was “historical awareness and education in Japan,” which reached the half-point mark at 52.2% (61.1% last year). (9)

Both the Japanese and the South Korean nation think that the territorial issue is prevalent for both countries. Although more than 90% of the South Korean people chose the issue, less than 70% of the Japanese people chose it. These figures prove clearly that the Takeshima/Dokdo issue is most important for the South Korean nation.

One final point is the importance of the Japan—Korea relationship. According to the “*Analysis Report on Comparative Data*”, it mentions that “Japan—South Korea relations are viewed as “important” by more than 60% of the Japanese and 73% of the South Korean despite the severe climate”(12). The following reasons (See Table 2.) behind the recognition of the importance of the Japan-South Korea relations are shown in the data.

| The importance of the Japan-Korea relationship |
|--|
| <p><Public Opinion in Japan></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. South Korea is a neighboring country (60.3%) 2. Both countries are allies with the United States and cooperation with each other is necessary for the peace and security in the Northeast Asia region (45.5%) 3. As countries in the same Asian region, there are considerable historical and cultural relations (42.2%) <p><Public Opinion in South Korea></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Japan is a neighboring country (60.4%) 2. Both countries are allies with the United States and cooperation with each other is necessary for the peace and security in the Northeast Asia region (45.0%) 3. There are mutual benefits between Japan and South Korea due to the mutual dependency and cooperation in economy and industries (42.9%) |

Table 2. The data of the response to “The importance of the Japan – Korea relationship”. (Analysis Report on Comparative Data .The Genron NPO and East Asia Institute, 2014)

Although more than 50% of Japanese people and around 70% of South Korean people had negative impressions on one another’s countries and have conflicts on the territorial dispute and historical issues, more than 60% of Japanese and 73% of South Korean people think that the Japan – Korea relations are important. Japan and Korea are neighboring countries and they need to cooperate with each other for the peace, economies, industries and security in the Northeast Asia region. The two countries have to make an effort to close the gap in the perception among them and promote mutual understanding.

2. Japanese and Korean Historical Encounters

There have been serious issues between Japan and Korea such as “history textbooks”, “territorial issues”, “Yasukuni Shrine”, and “comfort women”. In October 1900, the Great Han Empire issued Imperial Ordinance Gwangme—4 No. 41, which was putting Ulleundo⁸, Jukdo and Seokdo (Dokdo) under the power of the Governor of Uldogun. On January 30 1902, the first Anglo—Japanese Alliance was signed in London and Britain recognized Japan’s special interest in Korea. In 1903, Nakai Yozaburo, who was a businessman from Shimane Prefecture, went near Ulleundo and Dokdo for fishing. Next year, the Japanese Navy decided to establish a watchtower on Ulleundo and started operating two watchtowers there. In 1904, the Japan—Korea Protocol and the First Korea—Japan Agreement were signed, the following year, the Second Korea—Japan Agreement deprived diplomatic rights from Korea and sent the Residency—Central to rule over Korea. In 1905, the Japanese Ministry of Home Affairs asked the Cabinet Meeting to incorporate “Takeshima” into Japanese territory and make it part of the Oki, Shimane Prefecture. The Japanese cabinet agreed with the incorporation. However, the following year (1906), the Korean Government did not accept Japan’s incorporation of Dokdo and its claim to sovereignty over Dokdo. In August 1910, Korea was annexed by Japan. (The Korea—Japan Annexation Treaty) In 1943, the leaders of the United States, the United Kingdom and China announced “the Cairo Declaration”⁹. It confirmed the dependence of Korea as follows: “three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.” (Mofa, Korea) In 1944, Japan forced Korean men to undergo a conscription checkup. According to Japanese records, during World War II, approximately 365,000 Korean men were drafted into the Japanese army. In 1945, atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima (August 6) and Nagasaki (August 9) by the U. S. Many people were either killed or injured there. Japan was defeated by the United States and the Allied Powers. As a result, Japan surrendered on August 15, 1945 accepted “the term of the Potsdam Declaration”¹⁰, and Japanese colonization of Korea came to an end. The Republic of South Korea was established on August 15, 1948.

From 1947 to 1949, the first to fifth drafts of the U. S.—Japan Peace Treaty marked

Dokdo as part of Korea's territories, but the sixth draft of the U. S. – Japan Peace Treaty marked the island as part of Japan's territory due to the request of GHQ political adviser William J. Sebald. The Korean War broke out on June 25 1950. After the founding of North and South Korea, the Korean peninsula became a bloody battlefield.

On January 18, 1952, Korean President Syngman Rhee issued the Proclamation of Sovereignty over the Adjacent Seas and established the Peace Line or "Rhee Line". On January 28, 1952 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan protested against the Peace Line. Two rounds of Korea – Japan Negotiations were held on February 15, 1952 and on April 15, 1953. From 1953 to 1962, the Japanese government sent official letters on the Dokdo/Takeshima issue to the Korean government four times, but Korea erected posts and announced that they would station a security squadron. A lighthouse operated on the island. Furthermore, the Korean government rejected the Japanese proposal which was the referral of the Dokdo issue to the International Court of Justice, and they announced that they all economic would cease relations between the two countries. On the other hand, from October to November in 1962, KCIA Director Jong-pil Kim had a meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Ohira Masayoshi and Japanese Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato, and Kim and Ohira agreed with a sum of the Settlement of Problems on Property, Claims and Economic Cooperation.

Japanese Prime Minister Miki Takeo and Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo paid homage at Yasukuni Shrine. They visited Yasukushi Shrine on August 15 (the anniversary of the end of the Pacific War) in 1975 and 1978. In 1982, the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology had changed the expression "Japan's invasion of other Asian Countries" to "Japan's advance into" (423) in history textbooks for high school students under the authorization system. On August 26, 1982 Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary Miyazawa Kiichi stated the government's view on history textbooks, saying, "From the perspective of building friendship and goodwill with neighboring countries, Japan will pay due attention to these criticisms and make corrections at the Government's responsibility." (Mofa, Japan) On August 15 1985, Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro paid homage at Yasukuni Shrine officially. In 1989, Japanese Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru expressed "deep regret and remorse

to North Korea concerning the past wrongs perpetrated by Japan on the Korean Peninsula at the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives.” (Mofa, Japan)

In 1991 and 1992, Korea comfort women filed a suit at the Tokyo District Court, and they asked the Japanese government to pay compensation. In 1993, Korean President Young-sam Kim stated that Korean government had a plan to ask for the Japanese government’s full disclosure of the facts on the comfort women, but not to ask for pecuniary compensation. In 1992, Chief Cabinet Secretary Kato Koichi officially recognized the fact that the Japanese government had been involved in the comfort stations during the war. On August 4, 1993, after the Japanese government studied the issue of “comfort women”, the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono announced the expression of sincere apologies and remorse to all “comfort women”.

On October 24, 1994, Minister of International Trade and Industry Ryutaro Hashimoto mentioned that it was not clear that the Pacific War was a war of aggression. The next day, the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed regret over Hashimoto’s statement. In 1995 on the 50th anniversary of the end of the Pacific War (on August 15), Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama said the following;

During a certain period in the not too distant past, Japan, following a mistaken national policy, advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare the Japanese people in a fateful crisis, and, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations... I regard in a spirit of humility, these irrefutable facts of history, and express here one again my feelings of deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology. (Mofa, Japan)

His statement has been followed by to Japanese prime ministers until today. The Asian Women’s Fund was established for Korean and Filipino comfort women. However, the Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan was opposed to the fund.

On February 7, 1996, the Korean government had a plan to build a pier for patrol

vessels and fishing vessels at Dokdo, and on April 29, 1996 the operation on the pier at Dokdo was started. In October the Korean government protested that Japanese leaders officially paid homage at Yasukuni Shrine and Japan's insistence that "Takeshima" is a Japanese territory. The Korean government did not accept them and defended of Dokdo. Territorial issue on Takeshima / Dokdo recurred. In 1997, the operation on the pier of Dokdo had been completed and a monument to commemorate it was established. On September 25, 1998, Korea and Japan signed the New Fisheries Agreement and agreed with the joint management of resources. In October, Korean President Dae-jung Kim visited Japan and Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo proclaimed New Korea-Japan Partnership toward the 21st Century. Two days later, the Korean government announced the opening of its doors to Japanese pop culture from films, video and so on.

On April 3, 2001, the "Atarashii Rekishi Kyokasho wo Tsukurukai (Tsukurukai) , known in English as the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform published, passed the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology's (MEXT) authorization process, after 137 items had been amended with the authorizers' opinion. However, Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Seung-soo Han made a demand on the Japanese government for the correction of 35 items. In July, the Korean government suspended the open-door of Japanese culture and New Korea — Japan Partnership toward the 21st Century due to the Japanese government attitude towards the history textbooks. In October, Korea and Japan signed the Korea-Japan Commission for the Joint Study of History.

From 2001 to 2006, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited Yasukuni Shrine for paying homage five times, and he expressed remorse over Japan's past wrongs. On the other hand, in 2001, a group of more than 900 Korean people asked a court order to prohibit the Prime Minister's acts of paying homage at Yasukuni Shrine. The Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade made a statement expressing regret. In 2002, the FIFA World Cup Korea/Japan was held in Korea and Japan.

In 2006, Japanese Ambassador Toshiyuki Takano mentioned "Takeshima" as Japanese territory at a press conference of the Seoul Foreign Correspondents' Club in February. In April, Japanese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Shotaro Yachi visited Korea

in order to discuss the settlement of diplomatic friction caused by the planned hydrographic investigation in the sea near Takeshima/Dokdo. Korean President Moo-hyun Roh announced a statement on bilateral relations between the two countries. He said, "Japan's claim to sovereignty over Dokdo is nothing more than the claim to an area which it occupied during its imperialistic war of aggression," expressing his readiness to take a hard line stance on the issue. On July 5, the National Oceanographic Research Institute of Korea started an observation of ocean currents in the sea near Dokdo. In July 2008, the "MEXT" of Japan included the territorial issue over Dokdo between two countries in its educational curriculum guidelines for junior high schools.

On March 11, 2011, a megathrust earthquake struck the Tohoku region (Tohoku earthquake). The Korean government had offered assistance to Japan, and that was the biggest budget. On the other hand, on August 10, 2012, Korean President Myung-bak Lee visited Dokdo / Takeshima, and he emphasized that Dokdo had been Koreans' territory. Japanese Prime Minister Toshihiro Noda showed his disagreeing attitude against Lee's action, and sent a letter to Lee and proposed to take the territorial dispute over islets of Dokdo/Takeshima, to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to resolve the territorial issue. Korea sent back the protest letter and it was handed to Seoul's Embassy in Tokyo. The Korean government said, "The islets called Dokdo/Takeshima do not exist, and such a term is so incorrect and unjust that we cannot accept." (Japan Times / 2012/8/24)

On December 28 2015, the governments of South Korean and Japan came to an agreement over the "comfort women" issue. However, majorities in both countries have come out in opposition to the latest agreement.

2.1 Historical Textbooks

School education has been discharging three important roles: unity of a language, integrated historical recognition, and ensuring & unity of the constituents' identity which the nation and the people need. In that respect, historical textbooks have been a medium, so they have been describing the history in order to be consistent with the direction of the nation and people. Historical description has been done under the settled education policy in nearly all nations. In other words, the historical recognition which the Government of Japan intends, and the writers' historical viewpoints come into conflict with Korean historical recognition, and the issue developed into the diplomatic problem. In 1982 and 2001, they fought over the textbook content and came into a conflict of national feeling between Japan and Korea. In Japan, each public and private school selects one history textbook from a list of seven or eight authorized by the Ministry of Education, Culture Sports, Science and Technology every 4 years. This screening process then lasts one full year (Masalski, 2001). In this section, the circumstances behind the controversy and the movement against the issue will be explained.

2.1.1. The Historical Textbook Controversy

Kano and Tsuchiya (2002) described the movements over the historical textbook controversy between Japan and Korea. History textbooks used in Japanese junior high schools, which are edited by "Atarashii Rekishi Kyokasho wo Tsukuru Kai (known in English as the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform)", and published from Fuso Company, were decided to be officially authorized by the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology in 2001. However, a citizens' group, historical scholars and educators in Japan asked Fuso Company to amend the textbook contents and appealed not to adopt the textbooks because they brought the Historical recognition into question. Not only Japan, but also Korea and China protested the Society's textbooks. The screening process developed into the diplomatic problem as well as the history education controversy. The issue over historical recognition has been the focus of periodic controversy in Japan and Asia since the post-World War II Era. Japan justified Japan's colonial rule and equivocated "aggression". Not only the general opinion in Japan but

also Korea, China and other Asian countries protested strongly against the attitude of Japan. In 1982, Chief Cabinet Secretary Kiichi Miyazawa stated that “from the perspective of building friendship and goodwill with neighboring countries, Japan will pay due attention to these criticism and make corrections at the Government’s responsibility.”¹¹

Masalski (2001) refers to Ienaga Saburo who was a prominent historian. In 1965 he filed the first of his three lawsuits against the Ministry of Education, charging that the process of textbook approval was unconstitutional and illegal. She explained the circumstances behind Ienaga’s affair.

The Ministry of Education had rejected his history textbook because he wrote too many illustrations of the “dark side” of the war, such as an air raid, a city left in ruins by the atomic bomb, and disabled veterans. In 1982 the Ministry had ordered Ienaga to remove critical language in his history textbook, insisting that he write of the Japanese army’s “advance into” China instead of its “aggression in” China. Of “uprising among the Korean people” instead of the “March First Independence Movement¹².” Pressure applied by China and Korea succeeded in getting the Ministry to back down and resulted in the Ministry’s adding a new authorization criterion: that textbooks must show understanding and international harmony in their treatment of modern and contemporary historical events involving neighboring Asian countries. Ienaga’s lawsuits lasted thirty years. Although in 1997 – in response to Ienaga’s third lawsuit instituted in 1986 – the Supreme Court of Japan unanimously upheld the Ministry’s right to continue screening textbooks, Ienaga and his fellow critics enjoyed a partial victory. The court requested “that the Government refrain from intervening in educational content as much as possible.”... The most widely used Japanese textbooks in the mid- and late-1990s contained references to the Nanjing Massacre, anti-Japanese resistance movements in Korea, forced suicide in Okinawa, comfort women, and Unit 731 (responsible for conducting medical experiments on prisoners of

war)—all issues raised in Ienaga’s suits.¹³

However, in 1995, the group named “Jiyushugi Shikan Kenkyukai” revolted against the international understanding and cooperation, and they disregarded the result of the post war history. They argue that Japanese aggression of Asian countries was right. They established the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform and edited social studies textbooks (history and civics) which were used in junior high schools from 2002. The big problem was that the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology decided to officially authorize the textbooks. Korea and China had their doubts about the Government of Japan because it accepted these textbooks which had wrong historical recognition and viewpoints. They said that it meant that the Japanese Government had a problem on historical recognition. (Kano • Tsuchiya.26)

In 2001, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, Mr. Yasuo Fukuda commented on the decision of the textbooks against the criticism of Korea and China¹⁴:

2. Japan’s textbook authorization system is founded on the basic principle that a diverse range of textbooks employing the creativity and originality of private sector authors and editors will be published, and without the Government defining specific historical perspectives or outlooks. Historical perspective or outlooks represented in textbooks should not be identified as those of the Japanese Government.

3.The Japanese Government’s basic recognition of its history is reflected entirely in the Prime Minister’s statement issued on 15 August 1995 commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II. Japan humbly accepts that for a period in the not too distant past, it caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations, through its colonial rule and aggression, and expresses its deep remorse and heartfelt apology for this. Such recognition has been succeeded by subsequent Cabinet and there is no change regarding

this point in the present Cabinet. (MOFA of Japan)

Fukuda quoted a statement of the Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama in 1995. He mentioned the historical recognition of the Japanese Government and historical perspective or outlooks represented in textbooks should not be identified as those of the Japanese Government.

The Korean textbook system is different from Japan's textbook authorization system. In Korea, history textbooks have been edited by National Institute of Korean History and the 1st Tosho Kenkyu-Kaihatsu Institute. It means that school textbooks are edited and authorized by the Government of Korea and historical awareness and viewpoint accepted by it has been reflected in the historical textbooks. On the other hand, history textbooks are Japanese government authorized ones, so even when the historical recognition and viewpoints are not identified as those of the Japanese Government, the textbooks which fulfill the condition of approval will be accepted by the government. The Chief Cabinet Secretary, Fukuda mentioned on the history textbook system as follows:

The standards to be applied are, first and foremost whether the book to be authorized is appropriate as a textbook in accordance with the Regulations of Textbook Authorization. What the text approval system considers fundamental is to ensure that flaws, such as obvious mistake or a lack of balance, to be eliminated and remedied in light of objective academic research and appropriate reference material at the time of authorization. During the process of the recent authorization of textbooks, various concerns have been expressed from neighboring countries. However, the authorization was carried out impartially based on the Regulations of Textbook Authorization, including the Course of Study and the "Provision Concerning Neighboring Countries." (MOFA of Japan)

Chung Jae-jeong (2008)¹⁵ mentioned that Japanese Government cannot control the

historical perspectives contained in history textbooks under the current system of inspection of textbooks and the spirit of the Japanese Constitution guaranteeing academic freedom and freedom of thought. The Japanese government's historical perspectives were previously disclosed by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama's statement (1995) and the "New Japan-Korea Partnership towards the 21th Century" (1998). (242-243) The Japanese Government said that it has been taking necessary consideration towards neighboring countries, however, "necessary consideration" is an ambiguous words and definite standard is not clear. Although the Japanese Government didn't accept proposed amendment from Korea, the Korean Government adopted strong measures towards Japan such as interruption of cultural liberalization of Japan, and cancellation or postponement of interchange and events with Japan. In Japan, a citizens' movement was extended actively, while a view which historical recognition of Fuso Company's textbook was not accepted by Korea, China and other Asian countries, and the textbook was an obstacle to interchange between the countries spread throughout Japan. As a result, the rate of the adoption of Fuso Company's textbook was 0.03%, so Korea felt greatly relieved and thought highly of the rate. In November 2001, the Historian Conference which was supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan was held in Seoul, and Japanese and Korean historians talked with each other. After that, the conference would be held in turns by Korea and Japan. (Kano · Tsuchiya, 2002) On May 8, 2001, Mr. Han Seung-soo, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea conveyed a message officially to Mr. Terusuke Terada, Japanese Ambassador to the ROK, on the decision by the Government of Japan to authorize history textbooks to be used in Japanese junior high schools from 2002. Minister for Foreign Affairs Makiko Tanaka commented the official stance conveyed by the Government of the Republic of Korea on the decision to Authorize Japanese History Textbooks¹⁶:

The tense atmosphere and concern in the ROK over this issue has been conveyed repeatedly to Japan in various forms, and as the person in charge of foreign affairs I take this matter seriously. Japan has made explanations

to the ROK on Japan's view on history and its textbook authorization procedure, and it recognizes that the Government of the ROK, taking such Japanese stance into account, formulated its stance after serious and careful considerations. The Government of Japan regards it important to accept this with sincerity and study it closely. Next year we schedule to hold a historic event, the Year of Japan-ROK National Exchange. I regard that it is important for both the governments and the peoples of Japan and the ROK to join their hands for further developing Japan-ROK relations, so that we will build a future-oriented relationship between our two countries and at the same time facing the past squarely. (MOFA of Japan, 2001)

Kano and Tsuchiya (2002)¹⁷ described the change of the education curriculums in Korea, too. Korea was released from the Japanese colonial rule, but the Korean War broke out and the nation was divided. Korea aimed for unity of the nation and a monoethnic nation based on a racially homogeneous, and they set forth a patriotic spirit and an anti-communist policy. From the 1970s to the 1980s, the aim of the curriculums was the development of the national culture instead of "the patriotic spirit" or "an anti-communist policy". In the late 1980s, independency and inventiveness (originality) was emphasized and the autonomous pride in history was set forth. In 1990s, they aimed the problem-solving powers and fundamental endowment as democratic citizens. In the latest curriculums, they added "ability of a search", "use of information", and "participating of community life". Korean curriculums in the 1990s have a common aim of social studies in Japan. (p.28)

2.1.2 New Movements and Developments in Korea about Japanese Historical Textbooks

Ju-bek Sin¹⁸ states the new movement of Korea on the Japanese historical textbook. Although Korea and Japan have been disputed over historical recognition a new movement appeared from community organizations. They thought they should search the alternation plan in order to solve the problem. In July 2001, the First Korea-Japan Textbook Institute was held and they discussed the historical textbook controversy. In

Marth 2002, community organizations of Korea, China and Japan agreed to make a common historical textbook. Their movement pioneered the new field to solve the historical conflict among three countries. The movement had a great meaning.

The new movement of Korea was related to the change of “in and out situation”. It means that the conflict was ruined, the friction of the principle was eased, and the basic power of the citizens’ movement was formed. The Kim Dae-jung Administration was composed of the people who shared the democratization, so they responded flexibly. From the 1990s, Korean society thought that they had to get over the nationalism and it should be improved to open. Boycott of Japanese products was criticized as a narrow-minded nationalism. Furthermore, there are five new movements on the historical textbook controversy in 2001 compared with in 1982. The first, some Korean people criticized burning Japanese national flags on the protest meetings. Secondly, in 1982, the group in relation to the government took a leading part in protest meeting, however, in 2001, the public protest demonstrations were taken control by the civic organizations. Thirdly, the local government of Korea made a protest movement spontaneously. As a result, in Kumamoto Prefecture, Kikuyo town assembly decided not to adopt historical textbook edited by “Atarashii Rekishi Kyokasho wo Tsukuru Kai”. The fourth, the North Korea announced the criticism of Japanese distorted textbooks several times, but the Korean Government didn’t join them in both 1982 and 2001. Finally, taking advantage of historical textbook controversy in Korea, new scholars had interest in this issue. They cope with it methodically and in the long term, and they take part in the citizens’ movement which intends to solve the problem. (p.228-229)

Chung (2008) describes “How the Historical Dialogues Developed”. Both Japan and Korea are democracies in which academic freedom and freedom of thought are respected, and there exist diverse differences of historical perspective among the two peoples. The governments of the two countries have provided support for historical dialogues between historians and history teachers as part of the effort to get over the ongoing problem. For example, the Korea—Japan Meeting Commission for the Joint Study of History and the Korea-Japan Meeting of Historians were organized. Actually, twelve members from each country took part in the activities which the Korea-Japan Commission for the Joint

Study of History carried out between May 2002 and May 2005. The agenda of the subcommittee was presented and discussed every other month in Korea and Japan.

The Korea—Japan Meeting of Historian was established in 2001, following the proposal made by the Korea-Japan Joint Commission for the Promotion of the Study of History, which carried out activities from 1997 to 2000. The purpose of the meeting was to deepen mutual understanding among history researchers of the two countries and widen the opportunities for exchange and cooperation, so the meeting held annual sessions in Korea and Japan alternately. It included the three major agenda; the trends of historical study in the two countries in the post-war period, the movements for modernization in world history, and the past and present of nationalism. The results of the meeting were recently published in the form of a booklet such as a handbook for understanding the consciousness of historians of the two countries¹⁹. The joint history study project supported by the government of the two countries could go a long way towards achieving its objective, depending on how it carries out its operation. (248)

2.1.3 Prospects of a Joint Historical Study Project to Achieve Balanced Views of History

Chung (2008) said that “Korea and Japan have maintained, and will continue to maintain, closer relations than any other two countries in the world in terms of geography, history, culture and ethnicity”. (254) The people of Japan and Korea need to come to a understanding, respect each other, have a more flexible, refined attitude, and live in peace. Chung pointed out five suggestions as followings:

- 1) Historians, history teachers and those who are interested from both countries should made further efforts to discuss the issue of historical perspectives and explore ways of improving them...For the present, the Korea—Japan Commission for the Joint Study of History, supported by the two governments, can play such a role by carrying out an in-depth study of the subjects causing historical conflict between the two countries and by providing its results to both the compilers of history textbook and teachers for future reference.

- 2) The government authorities of the two countries should always bear in mind that the issue of historical conflict can easily incite nationalist fervor, and that with a hidden agenda may try to take advantage of the matter in the name of politics or diplomacy....Those concerned need to learn to look at the history of relations between the two countries from an objective and relative perspective, rather than trying to stick to their own ethnocentric path.
- 3) ... One needs to look back on such periods with a degree of detachment, particularly in modern times, in order to build a successful relationship based on a spirit of friendliness and cooperation....
- 4) ...Thus, one should pay full attention to various aspects of the relations between the two Koreans as well as between North Korea and Japan.
- 5) It is not a good idea for either Korea or Japan to look at the other party only from the context of bilateral relations. Each of the two has developed diverse relationship with other countries, so the history and cultures of each have many aspects that cannot be understood from a perspective that involves only the two.... When the two countries are ready to take such a flexible attitude towards each other, the historical conflict between them may subside considerably, if not completely. (255-256)

It is important for them to research jointly and understand each other history as well as face their own history and the facts. They should cooperate with each other to understand the history, not turn their eyes away from the facts in the past.

2.2 Takeshima / Dokdo

One of the pending issues is a territorial conflict happening between Japan and Korea. The two countries have been competing for the proprietary of a small island named “Takeshima island (Japanese name)” or “Dokdo island (Korean name)” (See Figure 1.). This issue hinders the development of bilateral relations. The assembly of Shimane Prefecture decided to proclaim the 22nd of February as Takeshima Day in 2005. However, the conflict between Japan and Korea got worse. Furthermore, South Korean President Myung-bak Lee arrived in Takeshima (Dokdo) on August 12, 2012 and he established a stone monument. He is the first President to visit the island. In regards to his actions, the then Japanese Prime Minister Noda expressed his gratitude to the Korean government. The relation between Japan and Korea had worsened. Both Japanese and South Korean people think that there is a territorial dispute between two countries.



Figure 1: Takeshima / Dokdo Island

(2016/3/29 <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/takeshima/index.html>)

2.2.1 The Takeshima/Dokdo Territorial Dispute

According to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)²⁰ of Japan, Takeshima is located in the Sea of Japan approximately 158km northwest of the Oki islands at 37°14' north latitude and 131°52' east longitude. The island which is part of Okinoshima Town of Shimane Prefecture is comprised of two islands, Higashijima (Mejima) Island and Nishijima (Ojima) Island and numerous small islands. The total area is approximately

0.20 square kilometers (See Figure 2.). The two are precipitous volcanic islands and cliffs along the coastline on all sides. Although they have scarce vegetation and drinking water resources, underground natural gas resources seems to exist around Takeshima Island. In the early 17th century, the Japanese people used the islands as a fishing ground for sea lions and abalone. Sea lion hunting started on a full scale level in the early 1900s. The Takeshima issue is that both Japan and Korea have been claiming the territorial sovereignty over Takeshima/Dokdo.

The beginning of the Takeshima issue is that in January 1952, the President of the Republic of Korea, Syngman Rhee, issued a declaration concerning maritime sovereignty, with which he established the “Syngman Rhee Line” and encompassed the island of Takeshima and a large area of water with fishery jurisdiction. The Japanese government²¹ made a protest against the declaration and the line. The conflict between Japan and the ROK over the territorial sovereignty of Takeshima occurred due to the affair.




Figure 2: The position of Takeshima / Dokdo

(<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/takeshima/index.html>)

2.2.2 Japanese and Korean Attitudes

Japan and Korea assert the recognition of the existence of Takeshima/Dokdo through various documents and maps, and the opinions are drastically opposed in historical backgrounds on the island.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan claims the following consistent position on

territorial sovereignty over Takeshima:

1. Takeshima is indisputably an inherent part of the territory of Japan, in light of historical facts and based on international law.
 2. The Republic of Korea has been occupying Takeshima with no basis in international law. Any measure the Republic of Korea takes regarding Takeshima based on such an illegal occupation have no legal justification.
 3. Japan will continue to seek the settlement of the dispute over territorial sovereignty over Takeshima on the basis of international law in a calm and peaceful manner.
- ※ The Republic of Korea has never demonstrated any clear basis for its claims that it had taken effective control over Takeshima prior to Japan's effective control over Takeshima and reaffirmation of its territorial sovereignty in 1905. (2)

On the other hand, the government of the Republic of Korea asserts the basic position on Dokdo as follows:

Dokdo is an integral part of Korean territory, historically, geographically and under international law. No territorial dispute exists regarding Dokdo, and therefore Dokdo is not a matter to be dealt with through diplomatic negotiations or judicial settlement. The government of the Republic of Korea exercises Korea's irrefutable territorial sovereignty over Dokdo. The government will deal firmly and resolutely with any provocation and will continue to defend Korea's territorial integrity over Dokdo. (1)

From the above assertions of each country, the basic positions over Takeshima/Dokdo among two countries are opposed fiercely and some compromises are not seen at all. In this thesis, the appropriateness of the assertions among two countries and the details of historical background will not be mentioned in order to find the actions

of both sides.

In January 1952, the ROK established “Syngman Rhee Line” and incorporated Takeshima into the ROK side of the line. The Japanese Government protested against the action, however, the ROK later stationed permanent security personnel on the islands, constructing lodgings, a monitoring facility, a lighthouse, and port and docking facilities. The Japanese Government stated that these actions by the ROK were clearly inconsistent with international to the law.²² In 1954 and 1962, Japan sought a peaceful solution and proposed the ROK three times that the dispute be referred to the International Court of Justice, but the ROK has rejected all such proposals. (4) Yamamoto (2012) describes that in 1965, nevertheless, the Takeshima issue was put off, Japan normalized the diplomatic relations with the ROK by Japan–Republic of Korea Basic Relations Treaty. In 1965, Japan and the ROK ratified United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and they needed to demarcate the intermediate line of Exclusive Economic Zone. At this time, the Takeshima issue was revived. Since 1996, the ROK has pushed ahead with a construction plan of the berthing facility and done military exercises. On the other hand, Japan has protested the action and there has been a conflict between Japan and the ROK. After that, they shelved the discussion of Takeshima and the New Japan-Republic of Korea Fishing Agreement was concluded in 1998. In 1999, the agreement became effective. (28-29)

According to the government of Japan and the ROK, they have conflicts against the events.

<1900 / 1905: The territorial jurisdiction of Takeshima/Dokdo>

In the early years of the 20th century, full-scale sea lion hunting started around Takeshima. However, sea lion hunting led to problems of excessive competition soon. Nakai Yozaburo, a resident of the Oki Islands in Shimane Prefecture, submitted a request to stabilize the sea lion hunting business in September 1904 to three government ministers (the Home Minister, the Foreign Minister, and the Agriculture and Commerce Minister). For the incorporation of the “Lyanko Islands” into Japanese territory and for a ten-year lease. The government heard the opinion of Shimane Prefecture and confirmed that there were no issues involved in bringing Takeshima under the

jurisdiction of the Oki Islands branch office of the Shimane Prefecture Government and that “Takeshima” was an appropriate name for the islands. In January 1905, the Government stipulated, through a Cabinet decision, that the islands would come under the jurisdiction of the Oki Islands branch office of the Shimane Prefectural Government and that the islands would be officially named “Takeshima.” This was communicated to the Governor of Shimane Prefecture by the Minister of Home Affairs. With this Cabinet decision, Japan reaffirmed its sovereignty over Takeshima. (MOFA of Japan)

On the other hand, the Korean Government insists that the Imperial Decree No. 41²⁴ clearly demonstrates the historical fact that the government of the Korean Empire exercised its sovereignty over Dokdo as a part of Ulleungdo. In the late 19th century, various problems arose in Ulleungdo, including illegal logging by the Japanese. The government of the Korean Empire demanded that the Japanese government order the withdrawal of the illegal loggers. The Korean Empire also decided to strengthen laws pertaining to the local administration of Ulleungdo. On October 24, 1900, the Uijeongbu (State Council) decided that “Ulleungdo shall be renamed Uldo” and “the post of inspector [dogma] shall be promoted to country magistrate [gunsul].” The changes were approved by the Emperor on October 25, 1900 and published as Imperial Decree No. 41 in the government’s official gazette on October 27, 1900. Article 2 of Imperial Decree No. 41 stipulates that “as regards to the district, all of Ulleungdo as well as Jukdo and Seokdo [Dokdo] shall be placed under the jurisdiction of Uldo-gun (Uldo country),” explicitly including Dokdo among the districts under the jurisdiction of Uldo-gun (Uldo country). (MOFA of Korea)

<1943: The Cairo Declaration>

“Was Takeshima included in the “territories which Japan has taken by violence and greed” in the Cairo Declaration?” Japan and the ROK have different interpretations. The Cairo Declaration is described that “Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which Japan has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great power, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.” Korean government asserts that in the Cairo Declaration

(December 1, 1943), which laid out the basic position of the Allied Power on Japan's territorial boundaries after the end of World War II, it is stated that "Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which Japan has taken by violence and greed." The Cairo Declaration also confirms the independence of Korea as follows: "three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent." The Potsdam Declaration of 1945, which Japan accepted as a condition of its surrender, reconfirms that "the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out." (MOFA of Korea). On the other hand, Japanese Government says that Takeshima has never been Korean territory, whereas Japan had established sovereignty over the islands no later than the middle of the 17th century, reaffirmed it with the islands' incorporation into Shimane Prefecture by cabinet decision in 1905, and has exercised its sovereignty peacefully and continuously. This makes it clear that Takeshima was not territory that Japan took from Korea. (MOFA of Japan)

<1952: The San Francisco Peace Treaty & the Syngman Rhee Line>

The San Francisco Peace Treaty (effective in 1952) decided the territory of Japan after the World War II. In July 1951, while Japan was still under Allied occupation, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers designated Takeshima as a bombing range for the U.S. Forces by SCAPIN No. 2160. The Japan-U.S. Administrative Agreement stipulated that the Joint Committee should serve as a mean for consultation in making determinations about facilities and areas in Japan. Therefore, the fact that Takeshima was discussed by the Committee and the fact that the island was designated as an area for use by the U.S. Forces stationed in Japan clearly indicate that Takeshima is part of the territory of Japan. The San Francisco Peace Treaty signed in September 1951, stipulated that Japan should recognize the independence of Korea, and that Japan should renounce all rights, titles and claims to "Korea, including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet." In Article 2(a). On the other hand, the ROK submitted a letter to Dean G. Acheson, the Secretary of State of the United States, from Yang Yu Chan ROK Ambassador to the United States with such the following statement: "My Government requests that the word 'renounces' in Paragraph A, Article Number 2,

should be replaced with confirms that it renounced on August 9, 1945, all rights, titles and claims to Korea and the islands which were part of Korea prior to its annexation by Japan, including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton, Dagelet, Dokdo and Parangdo.” In Article 2(a), Dokdo is not explicitly mentioned, however, it does not mean that Dokdo is not included among the territories of Korea separated from Japan. In consideration of the Allied Powers’ stance reflected in the Cairo Declaration of 1943 and SCAPIN 677 of 1946, it should be understood that Dokdo is included among the territories of Korea separated from Japan. (Korean government) In response to this request from the ROK, in August of the same year the United States submitted a letter from Dean Rusk, United States Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, to Ambassador Yang, and in it clearly denied the claims of the ROK.

“ As regards to the island of Dokdo, otherwise known as Takeshima or Liancourt Rocks, this normally uninhabited rock formation was according to our information never treated as part of Korea and, since about 1905, has been under the jurisdiction of the Oki Islands Branch Office of Shimane Prefecture of Japan. The island does not appear ever before to have been claimed by Korea.” After Ambassador Van Fleet visited the ROK in 1954 and returned to the United States, he states the following report: the United State concluded that Takeshima was a territory of Japan and the island was not included among the islands that Japan released from its sovereignty under the San Francisco Peace Treaty.

In January 1952, the President of the ROK, Syngman Rhee issued a declaration concerning maritime sovereignty and he established the “Syngman Rhee Line.” Japanese government insists that establishment of this line, encompassing the island of Takeshima and a large area of water with fisheries jurisdiction, was a unilateral act in contravention of international law. In June 1954, the ROK Ministry of Home affairs announced that the ROK Coast Guard had dispatched a permanent battalion to Takeshima. In August of the same year, a vessel of the Maritime Safety Agency on patrol near Takeshima was fired on from the island, and with this incident it was confirmed that ROK security personnel had been stationed on Takeshima. Since then, the ROK has kept security personnel stationed on Takeshima and constructed lodgings, a monitoring

facility, lighthouse, and port and docking facilities. Such acts can never be accepted in light of Japan's position regarding its sovereignty over Takeshima. Japan has strongly protested against each and every measure taken by the ROK and has demanded the withdrawal of said measures each time. Takafuji (2011) describes the Japanese countermeasure against Syngman Rhee Line: Japanese government sent a verbal note as of January 28, 1952 and insisted that Syngman Rhee Line was not accepted absolutely. Kimura, Director-General of the Japanese Safety Agency said, "Mobilization is the last resort. I would like to take a measure of a peaceful settlement." (67) The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Okazaki said, "We shall repeat our argument patiently and will not use force to settle an international dispute." (67) On the other hand, Korea captured Japanese fishing boats which violated Syngman Rhee Line and some crew members were killed with a gun (Daihoumaru incident).

The ROK established the Syngman Rhee Line, claims the sovereignty over Takeshima, does fishing activities around Takeshima, fired on Japan patrol vessels and established structures on the islands. For the peaceful settlement of the dispute, Japan made a proposal in September 1954 to the ROK with a verbal note that this dispute over the sovereignty of Takeshima be referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), however, the ROK rejected the proposal in October of the same year. The government of the ROK conveyed its views to the Japanese party as follows:

- The proposal of the government is nothing but another false attempt disguised in the form of judicial procedures. Korea has the territorial rights *ab initio* over Dokdo and sees no reason why she should seek the verification of such rights before any international court.
- As the Japanese government is no doubt well aware, the aggression took place gradually, culminating in the annexation of all of Korea into Japan in 1910. For all practical purpose, however, Japan had seized the power to control Korea in 1904 when Japan forced Korea to sign the so-called Korea – Japan Protocol and the First Agreement between Korea and Japan.
- Dokdo was the first Korean territory which fell victim to the Japanese

aggression. Now, in view of the unreasonable and persistent claim of the Japanese government over Dokdo, the Korean people are seriously concerned that Japan might be repeating the same course of aggression. To Korea, Dokdo is not merely a tiny island in the East Sea. It is the symbol of Korean sovereignty. (MOFA of Korea)

<2012: Korean President Myung-bak Lee's visiting Takeshima/Dokdo>

South Korean President Myung-bak Lee visited Takeshima (Dokdo) on August 10th, 2012. (See Figure 3.) He is the first President to visit the island. Furthermore, on the 4th, Lee remarked that Japan's Emperor Akihito should apologize for Japan's 1910-45 colonial rule if he wishes to visit South Korea. (Korean Times: 2012/08/23) His visiting Takeshima (Dokdo) made the relationship between Japan and Korea worse. Foreign Minister Koichiro Genba summoned Ambassador of the ROK to Japan Shin Kak-soo in order to express Japan's intention of strong protest and made Ambassador of Japan to the ROK Muto return to Japan temporarily. Genba said, "It is necessary to take resolute measures concerning the territorial issue and I would like to consider peaceful resolution of the issue based on the international laws including filing a suit to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and measures for that purpose, as well as drastic reform in the government system concerning the territorial issues." (MOFA of Japan) Japanese Prime Minister, Noda sent a letter to Lee on Aug. 17, 2012 proposing to take the territorial dispute over islets Japan calls Takeshima, and Seoul calls Dokdo, to the International Court of Justice to resolve the row (The New York Times: 2012/08/24), however, the ROK sent back and rejected Japan's proposal in the same month.

Currently the Republic of Korea has been exercising its sovereignty over Takeshima/Dokdo as follows:

The Republic of Korea holds legislative, administrative and judicial jurisdiction over Dokdo. First, a Korean police force is stationed on Dokdo, patrolling the island. Second, the Korean military defends the waters and skies of Dokdo. Third, various laws and regulations including those specific

to Dokdo have been enacted and implemented. Fourth, a lighthouse and other government facilities have been established and are in operation on Dokdo. Fifth, Korean civilians are residing on Dokdo. The government of the Republic of Korea will continue to protest the territorial integrity of Dokdo.



Figure 3: President Myung-bak Lee visited Dokdo on August 10th, 2012

(<http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/11/13/stability-in-northeast-asia-bolstering-defence-diplomacy/>)

2.2.3 The Measures of Territorial Sovereignty for the Takeshima/Dokdo Controversy

The ROK have been exercising its sovereignty over Takeshima/Dokdo since 1954, furthermore, asserted that no territorial dispute exists regarding Dokdo and Dokdo is not a matter to be dealt with through diplomatic negotiation or judicial settlement. To Korea, Dokdo is not merely a tiny island in the East Sea. It is the symbol of Korean sovereignty. On the other hand, Japan's consistent position is that Japan will continue to seek the settlement of the dispute over territorial sovereignty over Takeshima on the basis of international law in a calm and peaceful manner. Japan thought that the relationship between Japan and Korea is important in the future and Japan would not like to use force to settle an international dispute. Takafuji (2011) described that Japan has discussed the issue of Takeshima as well as attaching great importance to an improvement of the relationship in two countries. It is important to explain Japan's

consistent position to Korea tenaciously and ask them to correspond calmly. If Japan had established more effective admonition and a system of surveillance, and exercised strict control of illegal entry, the present situation would have been different.

Park (2011) mentions that although Japan has expressed the intention of strong protest against the ROK, Japan strongly maintains its peaceful position. The fact itself should be evaluated. On the other hand, Korean government thought that protection of the territorial sovereignty over Dokdo is more important than the relationship between Korea and Japan and the ROK has protected not peace but rather the national interest. However, how should the Dokdo issue be solved? One of the materials of Dokdo shows that Japanese people as well as Korean people lived together in the island in the end of 1800s. According to a survey in 1882, there were 140 Koreans and 78 Japanese people. The survey by Korean government in 1899 describes that Korean and Japanese people lived together. Korea and Japan should jointly develop a natural resource and fishermen of both Gyeongsang-do and Shimane should make a profit together so that they make Dokdo/Takeshima valuable.

Hyun (2008)²⁵ mentions the recognitions over Dokdo in Japan and Korea as follows:

Under such circumstances, it looks unlikely that a clue that might lead to settlement of the problem will be found. At present, the only peaceful way of settlement appears to be that of bringing the issue before the International Court of Justice. However, the Korean Government, which has effective control of the island, seen so reason to comply with such a request. As for the Japanese side, it has no choice but to continue its protest against Korea in addition to making suggestion for peaceful settlement of the issue. Such a natural course of action taken by the Japanese side only serves to stir up bitter memories of Korea's past as a Japanese colony among Koreans and arouse their anti-Japanese sentiment. Any statement made by Japan concerning its territorial right over Dokdo is likely to be regarded by Koreans as an act of aggression or as a challenge to Korea's sovereignty as an independent country. (90-91)

Koreans think that Dokdo is not only just a rocky island, but also is a symbol of sovereignty and independence, particularly in their relations with Japan. On the other hand, Japanese people think that Dokdo was the first victim of Japan's imperialistic invasion of Korea in the early 1900s for Koreans as bordering on the hypersensitive, more than 60 years on from the end of the Pacific. Hyun states the gap between Japan and Korea as follows:

The gap in their perspectives in the controversy over Dokdo is also a barometer of the maturity of their bilateral relations: On the one hand, Dokdo could be the detonator that blows bilateral relations to smithereens by stirring up territorial nationalism; on the other hand, it could be a cornerstone that helps them look at their unhappy past in a more objective fashion. Whether they will take the first or second path will depend on whether they take a coolheaded approach to the Dokdo / Takeshima issue, without getting swept away by nationalists seeking to fan the flames of confrontation and conflict. (91)

The positions of Japan and the ROK over Takeshima / Dokdo territorial dispute are incompatible with each other and an indication of the problem solving cannot be seen at all. Japan seizes Takeshima Island as the territorial dispute, while Korea seizes Dokdo as the symbol of Korean sovereignty or identity. It is difficult for Japan and Korea to understand each position over Takeshima/Dokdo. Takeshima/Dokdo dispute seems to be influenced by strong public sentiment among two countries, so the issue has not progressed towards resolution at all for many years. It is important to take a coolheaded approach and attitude to the serious issue and to find a good solution for two countries.

2.3 Yasukuni Shrine

One of the issues that make a relationship between Japan and Korea is Yasukuni Shrine. Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has visited the Yasukuni Shrine five times. As a result, his action eroded the relationship Japan and South Korea had built until now. Every August on the day the end of the war is commemorated, some Government ministers visit the shrine, too. Whenever the Japanese Prime Minister visited Yasukuni Shrine, it became the focus of international attention. Why is there such a rift not only between Japan and its neighbors but also between the way Koizumi sees his visits and the way in which China, Korea, and other countries perceive these visits? What do the visits mean? The views between Japan and Korea on Japanese Prime Minister's visit to Yasukuni Shrine are different. According to the Genron NPO and East Asia Institute (2014), approximately 70% of the Japanese respondents are tolerant toward Japanese prime ministers' visits to Yasukuni Shrine while 70% of South Korean respondents think "not acceptable". In addition, 24.9% of the Japanese respondents answered "no problem if a visit is made as a private citizen". On the other hand, 66.5% of the South Korean respondents answered that the Japanese prime ministers' visits to Yasukuni Shrine are "not acceptable, whether a visit is made in an official capacity or as a private citizen". In brief, South Koreans make a strong stand against Japanese prime ministers' visits to Yasukuni Shrine. After Japanese prime ministers visited the shrine, Korean government announced that Japanese prime ministers should have faced up the real history. According to the Asahi Shinbun digital, 51% of the Japanese people responds that the Japanese government should take criticism from China, Korea, the U.S. and Russia seriously (41). In this section, the author describes the outline of Yasukuni Shrine, the political history, actions, and view in Japan and Korea.

2.3.1 The Background of History

The origin of Yasukuni Shrine is Shokonsha which was established at Kudan, Tokyo in the second year of the Meiji Era (1869). At that time, Japan was in a process of a great reformation known as the Meiji Restoration in which it transformed into modern unified state. Before that era began, Japan had imposed itself a period of isolation for

about 250 years and communication with other countries was strictly limited. However, when the United States and other Western nations began to put pressure on Japan to open its doors to the world, decision-makers were polarized into two camps, for and against continuing isolation, and Japan was thrown into turmoil. The Tokugawa Shogunate had retained control over Japanese politics for 260 years. But, lacking the power to overcome this crisis, the Shogunate returned the reins of government to the Emperor. Thus, Japan built a modern state with the Emperor as its center. Currently, more than 2,466,000 divinities are enshrined here at Yasukuni Shrine. (See Figure 4) These are souls of men who made ultimate sacrifice for their nation since 1853 during national crisis such as the Boshin War, the Seinan War, the Sino–Japanese and Russo–Japanese wars²⁶, World War I, the Manchurian Incident, The China Incident and the Greater East Asian War (World War II). Not only soldiers are enshrined here, but also other people are enshrined. There are women’s and school girls’ divinities who were involved in relief operation on battlefields, a great number of students who went to work in factories for the war effort. They also enshrined ordinary Japanese citizen, Taiwanese and Korean people died as Japanese, the people who died during the Siberian detaining, and who were Class-A, B, and C war criminals and executed after having been tried by the Allies. Emperor Meiji, wishing to honor the memory of those who had died for their country, ordered the construction of a shrine to commemorate these people.

According to Yasukuni Shrine (See Figure 4), Shinto Faith is described as follows:

Japan still maintains the culture and tradition of respecting and worshipping the deceased. The Japanese have long believed that spirits of the deceased remain eternally on earth and guard their descendants. Even in today’s Japan, people consider their ancestors as their guardian deities, and thus as an object of worshipping because such traditional way of thinking along with the belief of Shinto is still inherited. In addition to this, Japanese people have respected and worshipped spirits of those who make prominent contribution to regional and national communities—not only to family communities as such. Yasukuni Shrine is an example which represents such genuine Japanese culture.

Yasukuni Shrine is a place to commemorate in a manner of Shinto, a traditional Japanese faith and a place for all the Japanese to show their appreciation and respect to those who died to protect their country. The spirits of these deceased are the object of worship at Yasukuni Shrine. Therefore, the shrine has completely different nature from that of tombs where bodies or bones of fallen soldiers are buried. (Yasukuni Shrine)²⁷



Figure 4: Photo of Yasukuni Shrine

(<http://www.yasukuni.or.jp/> 2016/10/29)

Japan has the culture and tradition of respecting and worshipping the deceased and such a traditional way of thinking along with the belief of Shinto is still inherited. Also, Yasukuni Shrine has a deep relationship with the Japanese imperial family. Takahashi Tetsuya (2008) proposed that Shintoism is an ancient Japanese religion whose followers believe that spiritual powers exist in the natural world and they believe that deities called '*kami*' reside in inanimate objects or natural phenomena, such as the sea, mountains, streams, lightning, and so forth. He also describes that Yasukuni Shrine was surely a symbol of Japanese militarism, as it was used as a means of encouraging

Japanese subjects to die for the motherland. The reason is that it has fulfilled the role of enhancing the morale of Japanese troops by honoring those killed in action as deities and heroes who sacrificed themselves for the Emperor and the motherland. Soldiers thought that it was their greatest honor to be placed in Yasukuni Shrine as deities alongside those killed in action before them and thus swore to sacrifice themselves for the grand cause. It was a custom for Yasukuni Shrine to invite bereaved family members from across the nation to the enshrining ceremony at its expense.

2.3.2 The Basic Position of the Government of Japan Regarding Visits to Yasukuni Shrine and Statements by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Sinzou Abe

A former Prime Minister Koizumi has visited Yasukuni Shrine five times during his administration. Whenever Japanese Prime ministers visit Yasukuni Shrine, South Korea protests Japanese Government and repeats that they never face up history seriously. Junichiro Koizumi said that his purpose of visiting Yasukuni Shrine was to express respect and gratitude to the persons who passed away in the war. The following statement is “Basic position of the government of Japan regarding Prime Minister Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni Shrine (October, 2005):

Prime Minister Koizumi is of the firm conviction that Japan’s present peace and prosperity are founded on the noble sacrifices made by those who lost their lives in the war. He visits Yasukuni Shrine to mourn and offer his respect and thanks to those who had to lay down their lives on the battlefield against their will; to reaffirm the importance of ensuring the present peace and prosperity of Japan, which those who died in the war were unable to witness; and to uphold Japan’s pledge not to engage in a war. He makes the visits as an individual citizen, not in an official capacity. (MOFA of Japan)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan asserts that it is erroneous to view that Prime Minister Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni Shrine are an attempt to glorify Japan’s past militarism. The Prime Minister has stated clearly that the purpose of his visits to the

shrine is to express respect and gratitude to the many people who lost their lives in the war, that he does not visit for the sake of the Class-A war criminals, and that Japan accepted the results of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. He has acknowledged that Japan damaged and caused the suffering of people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian through its colonial rule and aggression. The Prime Minister has repeatedly declared that Japan should squarely face “these facts of history in a spirit of humility, and with feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology always engraved in mind” and asserted Japan’s “resolve to contribute to the peace and prosperity of the world, prizing the relationship of trust it enjoys with the nations of the world.” He recently conveyed this message to the international community in his speech at the Asia–African Summit in April 2005 and reaffirmed it in his statement on the sixtieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War in August.

Japanese government also states that “at this historic turning point, Japan is determined to contribute constructively to the future of East Asia and, to that end, places great importance on its friendly relations with neighboring Asian countries, including China and the Republic of Korea. Japan has demonstrated this spirit through its actions over the past 60 years. The task of further strengthening its relations with neighboring countries and contributing to the peace and stability of the East Asian region is one of Japan’s most important policy priorities.” The statement by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (2005) is the follows:

On the 60th anniversary of the end of the war, I reaffirm my determination that Japan must never again take the path to war, reflecting that the peace and prosperity we enjoy today are founded on the ultimate sacrifices of those who lost their lives for the war against their will. In the past, Japan, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. Sincerely facing these facts of history, I once again express my feelings to deep remorse and heartfelt apology, and also express the feelings of mourning for all victims, both at home and abroad, in the war. I am determined not to allow the lessons

of that horrible war to erode, and to contribute to the peace and prosperity of the world without ever again waging a war. Japan's post war history has indeed been six decades of manifesting its remorse on the war through actions. I believe it is necessary to work hand in hand with other Asian countries, especially with China and the Republic of Korea which are Japan's neighboring countries separated only by a trip of water, to maintain peace and pursue the development of the region. Through squarely facing the past and rightly recognizing the history, I intend to build a future-oriented cooperative relationship based on mutual understanding and trust with Asian countries.

(MOFA of Japan)

Prime Minister Koizumi states that "in the past, Japan, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of Asian countries." And he also expresses his feeling of deep remorse, heartfelt apology and expresses the feeling of mourning for all victim. He seems to state an in-depth apologies to Asian countries. He also states that for the world peace, Japan will proactively fulfill its role as a responsible member of the international community so that Japanese nations will fix on the future.

In 2013, Prime Minister Shinzou Abe stated a "Pledge for Everlasting Peace" (MOFA of Japan) after visiting Yasukuni Shrine (See Figure 5). In summary, he contemplated on the precious sacrifices of numerous people who perished on the field wishing for the happiness of their families, and paid his deepest respects and gratitude on his visit. Japan must never wage a war again and this is his conviction based on the severe remorse for the past. Japan must be a country which joins hands with Asian nations around the world to realize peace of the entire world. Regrettably, it is a reality that the visit to Yasukuni Shrine has become a political and diplomatic issue. Abe does not intend to hurt the feeling of the Chinese and Korean people. He wishes to respect each other's character, protect freedom and democracy, and build friendship with China and Korea with respect.

Shinzou Abe says that Japan will discharge its responsibilities for the peace,

stability and prosperity of the world, too. Japanese government thinks that Japan has apologized to Asian countries profusely and has to shift Japan's focus on many kinds of issues such as progress of the developing countries, alleviation of poverty conservation of the global environment, nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the prevention and eradication of terrorism for the future for not only Asian countries but also the whole world.



Figure 5: Shinzo Abe, center, was the first Japanese prime minister since 2006 to visit a shrine in Tokyo honoring the country's war dead. Credit Toru Hanai/Reuters (New York Times DEC. 25, 2013)

2.3.3 The Statements by the Korean Government on the Visit to Yasukuni Shrine

South Korea has reacted angrily to visits to a controversial war shrine in Tokyo by Japanese MP's. Government spokesperson Minister of Culture, Sports and Tourism Yoo Jinryong released the Korean government's official statement in connection with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. The report says that Yasukuni Shrine glorifies Japan's past colonial rule and war of aggression and enshrines its war criminals, in defiance of the concerns and warnings of neighboring Asian countries and the international community. The facility distorts history by enshrining Class A criminals such as Hideki Tojo, who plunged East Asia into a devastating war,

and Kuniaki Koiso, who as Governor-General of Korea pillaged the country through coerced conscription, forced labor and commandeering of equipment and goods, bringing unspeakable suffering and damage to the Korean people. Prime Minister Abe's visit to the shrine clearly demonstrates his erroneous understanding of history. It is not too much to say that his anachronistic act compromises the fundamentals not only of relations between Korea and Japan but also of stability and cooperation in Northeast Asia. And he claims to make contributions to the international community under the name of so-called "active pacifism." If Japan truly desires to make an active contribution to international peace, it must first and foremost cast off false understandings of history, which denies the past and glorifies aggression, and instead confront history directly. Through full contrition and apology for its wrongs, it must seek first to build relations of trust with neighboring countries and the people of these countries who suffered such pain under the aggression of Japanese militarism and colonial rule. (Korea Net: 2013.12.26)

Korean government has thought that as long as Japanese prime ministers or cabinets continue to visit Yasukuni Shrine, they will not confront history directly and deny the past and glorifies aggression. The reason is that Class A criminals are enshrined in Yasukuni Shrine and a part of cabinets or Diet members glorify colonial rule, militarism, and a war of aggression. It is said that Yasukuni Shrine is a symbol of the Japanese war of aggression and militarism in Korea.

2.3.4 Criticism by Korean and Japanese Scholars and Intellectuals

Yu-Ha Park is a Korean scholar specializing in Japanese literature, and her book entitled *For the Compromise* was published originally in Korean in 2005, and translated into Japanese in 2006. She takes up Koizumi's statement issued on August 13, 2001 about his visit to Yasukuni Shrine to scrutinize his motivation. She admits Koizumi's feeling of remorse and apologies to victims of Japan's aggressions and colonial rule. She also admits his vow for peace under the postwar Japanese policy of denying war and desiring peace. But when he says that the present peace and prosperity of Japan are founded on the sacrifices of those who lost their lives in the battlefield while believing in

the future of Japan, and that he visits Yasukuni Shrine to express his respect and gratitude toward these people.

Yasukuni Shrine is the place where people were prayed for the souls of all those who had fought for the country and made ultimate sacrifices. However, Class A criminals have been enshrined in Yasukuni Shrine. Right-wing supporters of Yasukuni Shrine have thought that the Allied Powers passed judgment on an enshrined there and the “tradition” of Yasukuni was blemished by this. The acts of the military leaders were done on behalf of the Japanese nation, so there is a sense of being victimized among some members of the Japanese government. Koizumi’s message followed the policy of the right-wingers. More than three million compatriots lost their lives for the Japanese nation. Dying for the nation means that the compatriots are able to live on forever as a “Soul of the nation”, because Japan is the kingdom of God. In the statement by Junichiro Koizumi, he said “he was determined not to allow the lessons of that horrible war to erode, and to contribute to the peace and prosperity of the world without ever again waging a war.” However, the spirit of self-sacrifice has been thought as a matter of course and a sacred value. Koizumi’s vow (promise) seems to be contradictory to the spirit of Yasukuni Shrine. Park points out that Koizumi should have apologized to the Asian countries not expressed the gratitude because his visiting to Yasukuni seems to lead to “militarism”. He should have considered not only Japanese minds but also other’s one, and taken a discreet action.

Park (2011) describes that not only Japan but also Korea has taught the needs of “self-sacrifice”. Seoul National Cemetery is a sacred place where the soldiers and the spirits of dead soldiers who lost their lives to protect the nation of Korea are enshrined. The purpose of the establishment is that Korean people praise and inherit noble sacrifices and the spirits of patriotism, and protect Korean country strongly and strengthen the development of the top-ranking nation. In this explanation, the words such as protection, development, sacred of the nation, defense of the country and a national crisis are used and the supporters of visitors to the Yasukuni Shrine use the same words. It is natural that Korea and Japan hold “nationalism” and “national systems” in common. In a sense, it is said that Seoul National Cemetery is analogous to

Yasukuni Shrine basically. Japan is the wrongdoer and Korea is a victim, however, Korea is the wrongdoer in the Vietnam War passively. The victims and wrongdoers are enshrined at the Seoul National Cemetery. It is not easy to distinguish a victim from the wrongdoer. The remembrance of the nation will change into the conflict over historical interpretation.

Mourning is the place of historical education through “memory”. If so, Korean people need to search not only criticism of Yasukuni Shrine but also a method of the new mourning. We have to consider “How the structure of the wrongdoer was.” and “How victims yielded”. At the same time, we have to do “How the facts were concealed”. As a result, the mourning for the people who passed away for the nation will have a trace of a new meaning. Then, the conflict between Korea and Japan, and the split and discord over the past memory in Korea should found the beginning of healing. (Park 2011, 151-204). (Translated by the author, Kawamoto)

Takahashi (2008) who is a professor of Tokyo University made several important statements on the conflict of historical issue between Japan and Korea. He says that this issue involves a number of complicated factors, both as a domestic issue for the Japanese and as a historical issue between Japan and Korea. The first statement which he points out is “Shintoism” as follows:

Shinto shrines are built to house Shinto deities and generally take a variety of forms. Shintoism is an ancient Japanese religion whose followers believe that spiritual power exist in the natural world. They believe that deities called ‘*kami*’ reside in inanimate objects or natural phenomena, such as the sea, mountains, streams, lightning, and so forth. (198)

Yasukuni Shrine is a particularly special shrine among the Shinto Shrines in Japan because a large number of the spirits of the troops and people who were killed in the struggles were enshrined in the shrine. The number of deities who are not only Japanese but also foreigners housed in Yasukuni Shrine stands at about 2.4 million. Takahashi’s

second statement is that Japanese people have thought Yasukuni Shrine is a symbol of Japanese militarism.

For Japanese troops, sacrificing themselves for the Emperor, who was the head of state of the Japanese Empire, the high priest of state Shintoism and a living god, meant sacrificing themselves for the motherlands....In what respect, then, is Yasukuni Shrine seen a symbol of Japanese militarism? First of all, it has fulfilled the role of enhancing the morale of Japanese troops by honoring those killed in action as deities and heroes who sacrificed themselves for the Emperor and the motherland. Soldier thought that it was their greatest honor to be placed in Yasukuni Shrine as deities alongside those killed in action before them and thus swore to sacrifice themselves for the grand cause....Yasukuni Shrine was surely a symbol of Japanese militarism, as it was used as a means of encouraging Japanese subjects to die for the motherland (199-200).

The soldiers who were killed for the Emperor and the motherland would like to be placed in the shrine and it was to be an honor, for deities and heroes. They thought that they sacrificed themselves for the Emperor and the motherland. Takahashi's third statement is that "separation of religion and politics" is not adopted.

After the end of the Pacific War, the Allied Powers discussed how to deal with Yasukuni Shrine, which they regarded as a symbol of Japanese militarism. The Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (GHQ/SCAP) issued the so-called Shinto Directive, taking a measure designed to separate Shinto shrines from the state and thus put an end to state Shintoism. (200) The adoption of the principle of separation of religion and politics was intended to prevent the revival of the Emperor-centered Shintoism or state Shintoism or militarism in consideration of the fact that Yasukuni Shrine played a conspicuous role in the rise of the country's militarism. As a result, Yasukuni Shrine had to choose

a different way of survival as a religious corporation authorized by the City of Tokyo. (200) Unlike in the period immediately following the end of the war, paying homage performed by the Prime Minister or the Emperor at Yasukuni Shrine faced fresh criticisms amid the spread of the belief that the principle of the separation of religion and politics was an important factor in democracy, on the occasion of the debates concerning the Yasukuni Shrine Bill...for the Prime Minister to pay homage at the shrine on August 15, the anniversary of the end of the war. (201)

On August 15, 1974, Prime Minister Takeo Miki became the first prime minister to visit Yasukuni Shrine. However, faced with criticism that he was violating the Constitution, was compelled to present the excuse. His visit to the shrine was a purely private act not a public act. When Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro announced his plan to pay homage at Yasukuni Shrine on August 15, 1985, Asian countries voiced their concern about his visit to Yasukuni Shrine. The Chinese government protested and announced that Class 'A' War Criminals including Tojo Hideki were enshrined. Japanese Prime Minister's visit to Yasukuni Shrine has been criticized by not only Asian countries but also the U.S.A. and Europe and focused on international attention. At the same time, the problem is a serious issue in Japan, too.

Takahashi's fourth statement is Yasukuni Shrine's objection to the separation of Class 'A' War Criminals. 14 Class 'A' Criminals are enshrined with soldiers and other people who lost their lives for the motherland in Yasukuni Shrine. It is a big issue and some Japanese people have thought the souls of the Class 'A' War Criminals should be placed in another place, but Takahashi describes that it cannot be accepted for the following reasons:

First, it does not accept the legitimacy of the Tokyo Tribunal that judged that the wars waged by Japan were invasions. Yasukuni Shrine's head priest, Matsudaira Nagayoshi, who added the war criminals' names to already completed list of names in 1978, said, "Even before I made up my mind to

become the head priest at Yasukuni, I argued that so-called Class 'A' War Criminals should also be venerated, since Japan's spiritual rehabilitation would be impossible unless we rejected the Tokyo Tribunal." Pamphlets issued by Yasukuni Shrine explain the reason as follows: "More than one thousand Japanese lost their lives mercilessly through a perfunctory trial process led by the Allied Powers.... Yasukuni Shrine calls them Martyrs of Showa, honoring all of them as deities." (204-205) Second, Yasukuni Shrine says that some 2.46 million spirits are enshrined there as one and thus it is not possible to separate some of them from that unified body. It also says that the doctrine of Shintoism requires that a spirit once enshrined be enshrined forever. (205)

For reasons mentioned above, the separation of Class 'A' War Criminals cannot be accepted and they cannot be placed elsewhere. Takahashi's fifth statement is "Korea and the Problem Concerning Class 'A' War Criminals". The problem was raised by not only the Chinese government but also Korea. Koreans have objected against the Japanese Prime Minister's visit to Yasukuni Shrine because Class 'A' War Criminals are enshrined there. However, it cannot be said that the problem I felt in the same way by Koreans as it is by the Chinese. Takahashi describes as follows:

Koreans were regarded as subjects of the Japanese empire, although it can be convincingly argued that they were discriminated against by the Japanese. Japan invaded the Korean Peninsula towards the end of the 19th century and annexed Korea in 1910, making the country its colony following victory in the Russo-Japanese War.... (206) The history of Japan's colonial rule of Korea means that Yasukuni Shrine does not hold the same relevance for the Koreans as it does for the Chinese. (207)

According to Takahashi, during the Pacific War in the 1940s, Koreans were mobilized as enlisted soldiers and civilian attached to the Japanese Army and the Japanese Ministry of Army announced the implementation of the Korean "volunteer"

troops system in January 15, 1938. Approximately 16,830 Koreans were mobilized and military conscription was adopted in Korea. As a result of the Korean “volunteer” troops system, a large number of Korean males were taken away to join the Japanese Army and an increase in the number of Koreans killed in action as enlisted Japanese soldiers. The souls of Koreans killed in the war were enshrined at Yasukuni Shrine and their bereaved families filed a suit asking for the cancellation of the enshrinement of Koreans at the shrine later. Takahashi’s last statement is as follows:

Earlier, during the colonial period, Koreans were forced to pay homage at Shinto shrines built in many places nationwide. In October 4 of 1937, the Governor General of Korea ordered Koreans to swear an oath of loyalty to the Emperor of Japan. Koreans, and particularly Christians, who resisted the order to pay homage at Shinto shrines, were subjected to oppression. (209-210)

Takahashi concludes that “at present, Koreans are engaged in a movement asking for the cancellation of the enshrinement at Yasukuni Shrine of all the 21,000 Koreans killed in the Pacific War. An initiative which may develop into a serious diplomatic issue between the two countries”. (211)

Park and Takahashi express the views on the Yasukuni issue between Japan and Korea. In Park’s statements, both Japan and Korea have argued their suffering as victims in the war, on the other hand, they have hidden their acts as wrongdoers. She says that Japan and Korea have similar spirits to the souls of the people who lost their lives for their motherlands. They have to turn their eyes toward each other country and understand the background of their history, culture, religion and so on. Takahashi describes the spirits of Shintoism in Japan. Class ‘A’ War Criminals are enshrined at Yasukuni Shrine and the separation of Class ‘A’ War Criminals cannot be accepted and they cannot be placed elsewhere.

2.4 Comfort women

The issue of the “comfort women” has been attracting attention for two decades in Asian countries such as Korea, China and other Southeast Asian countries. According to Youn (2008)²⁸, the number of comfort women forced to serve is not clear, but general estimations range from at least 50,000 or 80,000 to 200,000 at the most. The victims were composed of Koreans (51.8%), Chinese (36.0%) and Japanese (12.2%). Youn mentions that the reason why Koreans’ percentage is high is that “the lion’s share of the women taken away for such a purpose were those from colonies and countries occupied by Japan, which means that it was an act of blatant racism as well as ethnic discrimination.” (218) The Korean people are unable to forget the atrocious act by the Japanese military. According to the data by the Genron NPO and East Asia Institute (2014), in the response to the question “what will come up when one another’s countries are mentioned?” South Korean respondents’ answers show their concerns over the conflicts between Japan and South Korea, especially on the “issue of Dokdo” (66.5%) and “comfort women” (55.8%). The issue of “comfort women” occupies the attention of South Korean people. On the other hand, 31.0% of Japanese people have interest in the issue and approximately 70% of them have no interest in it.

Youn (2008) describes that “comfort women were the women forced by Imperial Japan to serve as sex slaves for its soldiers from the Sino—Japanese War on.” (213) The term also called ‘teishintai’ (in Japanese) or ‘jeongsindae’ (in Korean) and refers to the women who were forced to serve the Japanese troops during the Pacific War. She mentions the difference between “teishintai” and “comfort women” as follows:

Teishintai (The Women’s Volunteer Corps) was a name attached to women who were mobilized for labor under the ordinance issued in August 1944²⁹, while comfort women were those who were forcefully taken away by the Japanese Army to serve its troops. Korean victims and the civic organizations supporting them are opposed to any connotation that could be associated with voluntarism decorated under the various names attached to such a group of women, as they were clearly mobilized against their own will, while Japanese

rightists object to any use of a term denoting a possible association with the Japanese Army. (215-216)

The differences between the two terms, 'teishintai' and 'comfort women' are obvious and 'sex slaves' were the very victims of sexual violence against the women. The number of comfort women seems to be from at least 50,000 or 80,000 to 200,000 at the most and were composed of Koreans, Chinese and Japanese. The percentage of Korean accounts for 51.8% of all comfort women.

The issue of comfort women was first raised officially in Korea in the late 1980s and Prior to President Tae-woo Roh's visit in May 1990 to Japan. Korean women's organizations made a timely statement on the comfort women, asking for the Japanese government's formal apology and appropriate compensation. Japanese government describes that when Prime Minister Miyazawa's visit to the Republic of Korea in January 1992, the issue was brought up in the meeting between the Prime Minister and then President, Mr. Tae-woo Roh, in which the Korean side requested strongly that relevant facts be brought to light. Other countries and areas concerned also have shown strong interest in this issue. Why is there a difference in the level of concern between two countries? In this section, the different point of view on the "comfort women" of Japan and Korea will be described.

2.4.1 Statements and Actions by the Government of Japan on the "Comfort Women" Issue

What is the view of the Government of Japan concerning the comfort women issue? Measures taken by the Japanese Government on the issue³⁰ is as follows:

1. The Government of Japan recognizes that the issue known as comfort women is one that severely injured the honor and dignity of many women. The Government of Japan has extended its sincere apologies and remorse to all those women known as comfort women who suffered immeasurable pain and incurable physical and psychological wounds.

2. Although all issues of reparations, properties and claims arising from the war, including the issue of comfort women, have been legally settled, the Government of Japan extended maximum cooperation to the Asian Women's Fund, which implemented "medical and welfare support projects" and provided "atonement money," to offer realistic relief to former comfort women who are now advanced in years.
3. While the AWF was disbanded in March 2007, the Government of Japan is continuing its effort to gain a better understanding of the sincere feelings of the people and the Government of Japan which were embodied in the projects of the AWF. It will also continue its effort to ensure that Japan's views and efforts on the comfort women issue are properly recognized by the international community based on an objective understanding of relevant facts.
4. In the Statement by the Prime Minister issued on 14 August, 2015, it is stated that we must never forget that there were women behind the battlefields whose honor and dignity were severely injured. It is also stated that we will engrave in our hearts the past, when the dignity and honor of many women were severely injured during wars in the 20th century, and Japan will lead the world in making the 21st century an era in which women's human rights are not infringed upon. (MOFA of Japan)

The Asian Women's Fund (AWF) was established on July 19, 1995. The purpose of the fund is to express the Japanese Government's and the people's sincere apologies and remorse to the comfort women. The following statement is "Cooperation for the Asian Women's Fund"³¹:

The Government of Japan cooperated with the AWF in implementing its activities. Atonement projects were conducted in the Philippines, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan and concluded by the end of September 2002. Some of the former comfort women who received the atonement money expressed their

gratitude in various ways. In addition, the AWF implemented activities tailored to domestic condition in the Netherlands and Indonesia as well. Activities in the Netherlands and in Indonesia were completed successfully on 14 July 2001, and in March 2007 respectively. The AWF made it its principle to respect the wish of each of the aged former comfort women in the Philippines, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan where the identification processes of comfort women were implemented by their Governments or relevant organizations. Based upon this principle, the AWF, making use of the money donated by the Japanese people as its resource, provided the former comfort women with the atonement money as a symbol of the feeling of atonement by the Japanese people. Making use of the fund disbursed by the Government of Japan, the AWF also implemented medical and welfare support projects aimed at improving their medical and welfare conditions. When the atonement money was provided successive Prime Ministers, on behalf of the Government, sent a letter expressing apologies and remorse directly to each former comfort woman. In the end 285 former comfort women accepted the letter and atonement money (The Philippines: 211, ROK: 61, Taiwan: 13) (MOFA of Japan).

The Prime Minister, on behalf of the Government, sent a letter which is expressed apologies and remorse directly to each former comfort woman with the atonement money. According to the statement by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, the Government had expressed its sincere apologies and remorse regarding the comfort women issue on various occasions, and made great effort to raise public awareness and gain a better understanding of the comfort women issue. The Government provided all possible assistance to the AWF for its fund raising from the public to express atonement to the former comfort women.

In January 1992, the meeting between Prime Minister Miyazawa and President, Mr. Roh Tae Woo was held in Korea and the Korean side requested strongly that the Japanese side to be brought up to light the relevant fact. The Japanese Government has

been studying these facts by means of individual hearings of former military personnel and others concerned in parallel with a search for relevant documents as well as details regarding of former comfort women. Furthermore, they conducted in the United States and Okinawa. The following survey shows the details of the study.

The institutions covered by the study are the National Police Agency, the Defense Agency, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Health and Welfare, the Ministry of Labor, the National Archives, the National Diet Library, and the U.S. National Archives. People covered by individual hearings are former comfort women, former military personnel, former officials of the Government-General of Korea, former operators of comfort stations, residents in the areas where comfort stations were located, and history researchers and so on. Domestic and foreign documents and publications used for reference are the study reports compiled by the Government of the Republic of Korea collections of testimonies by former comfort women, compiled by those concerned including the Association of Pacific War Victims and Bereaved Families and the Korean Council for the women Drafted for Sexual Slavery by Japan, and also practically all of the numerous Japanese publications on the subject matter were perused. According to the study³², the following results have been brought to light.

1) Background to the establishment of comfort stations:

The comfort stations were established in various locations in response to the request of the military authorities at the time. Internal government documents from those days cite as reasons for establishing comfort stations the need to prevent anti-Japanese sentiments from fermenting as a result of rapes and other unlawful acts by Japanese military personnel against local residents in the areas occupied by the then Japanese military, the need to prevent loss of troop strength by venereal and other diseases, and the need to prevent espionage.

2) Timing of the establishment of comfort stations

As some documents indicate that a comfort station was established in

Shanghai at the time of the so-called Shanghai Incident in 1932 for the troops stationed there, it is assumed that comfort stations were in existence since around that time to the end of World War II. The facilities expanded in scale and in geographical scope later on as the war spread.

3) Areas with comfort stations

The countries or areas where it has been possible as a result of the study to confirm stations existed are: Japan; China; the Philippines; Indonesia; the then Malaya; Thailand; the then Burma; the then New Guinea; Hong Kong; Macao; and the then French Indochina.

4) Number of comfort women

It is virtually impossible to determine the total number of comfort women, as no document has been found which either indicates their total number or gives sufficient ground to establish an estimate. However, in view of the fact, as described above, that comfort stations were operated in extensive areas for long periods, it is apparent that there existed a great number of comfort women.

5) Comfort women's place of origin

The counties or areas from which it has been possible as a result of the study to confirm that comfort women came are: Japan; the Korean Peninsula; China; Taiwan; the Philippines; Indonesia; and the Netherlands. Apart from Japanese, many of the comfort women transferred to the war areas were from the Korean Peninsula.

6) Operation and management of comfort stations

Many comfort stations were run by private operators, although in some areas there were cases in which the then Japanese military directly operated comfort stations. Even in those cases where the facilities were run by private operators, the then Japanese military was involved directly in the establishment and management of the comfort stations by such means as granting permissions to open the facilities, equipping the facilities, drawing up the regulations for the comfort stations that set the hours of operation

and tariff and stipulated such matters as precautions for the use of the facilities. ... It is evident, at any rate, that, in the war areas, these women were forced to move with the military under constant military control and that they were deprived of their freedom and had to endure misery.

7) Recruitment of comfort women

In many cases private recruiters, asked by the comfort station operators who represented the request of the military authorities, conducted the recruitment of comfort women. Pressed by the growing need for more comfort women stemming from the spread of the war, these recruiters resorted in any cases to coaxing and intimidating these women to be recruited against their own will, and there were even cases where administrative/ military personnel directly took part in the recruitments.

8) Transportation of comfort women, etc.

When the recruiters had to transport comfort and other women by ship or other means of transportation, the then Japanese military approved requests for their travel by such means as regarding such women as having a special status similar to its civilian personnel serving in the military, and the Japanese Government issued certificates of identification. In quite a few cases the women were transported to the war areas by military ships and vehicles, and in some cases they were left behind in the confusion of the rout that ensued Japanese defeat. (MOFA of Japan)

(<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/postwar/issue9308.html>: 2016/07/06)

The study found that the comfort stations were run by not only private operations but also Japanese military directly. Regarding recruitment of comfort women, some comforts women were recruited against their own by intimidation, and the administrative/ military personnel directly participated the recruitments. As a result of the study, the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono made a statement on the issue of “comfort women” on August 4, 1993. He said that “the comfort women lived in misery at comfort stations under a coercive atmosphere” and “the Korean Peninsula was under Japanese rule in

those days, and their recruitment, transfer, control, etc., were conducted generally against their own will, through coaxing, coercion, etc.” And also, he announced the following apologies:

Undeniably, this was an act, with the involvement of the military authorities of the day, that severely injured the honor and dignity of many women. The Government of Japan would like to take this opportunity once again to extend its sincere apologies and remorse to all those, irrespective of place of origin, who suffered immeasurable pain and incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort women. We shall face squarely the historical facts as described above instead of evading them, and take them to heart as lessons of history. We hereby reiterate our firm determination never to repeat the same mistake by forever engraving such issues in our memories through the study and teaching of history. (Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono on the result of the study on the issue of “comfort women”³³: (<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/women/found/state9308.html>)

The Government of Japan has expressed its sincere apologies and remorse to the former comfort women on many occasions. As a result, the Government of Japan established the Asian Women’s Fund and provided the atonement money to the former comfort women, so it has argued that the issue of “comfort women” is all settled.

2.4.2 Objections by “Comfort Women”

Yoshiaki Ogata objects to the study on the “comfort women” by the Government of Japan and Kono’s statement on the issue in his report “The Truth about the Question of “Comfort Women”. He has taken a position against the study. Ogata made several statements on the issue.

The first is “comfort women” as licensed prostitutes. The Resolution assertions, claiming “the Government of Japan organized the subjugation and kidnapping, for the sole purpose of sexual servitude, of young women, who became known to the world as

“comfort women from the 1930s to the duration of World War II,” are completely at odds with the historical truth. The truth of the “comfort women” system is that it was only legalized prostitution. In other words, the women were “professionals” and they were engaged in business. The United States Army made clear this point in official records. The second is “the Life of the “comfort women” as Seen in U.S. Army Records, United States Office of War Information. The report shows that “comfort women” are explicitly declared to be “prostitutes.” Although the report describes that some of the brokers committed illegal acts in recruiting comfort women, there were no identified instances of “kidnapping” or “rounding up women” by the Japanese authorities or army. The third is wages of “comfort women”. The comfort women’s “take home” income was an extremely high wage of 750 yen per month and they were making per month between 100 to 250 times what soldiers were. The fourth is “the Korean Government also saw No Problem”. As mentioned above, the “comfort women” system was purely an institution of legalized prostitution. Therefore, the existence of “comfort women” never arose as a political problem for a long time after the independence of Korea. Furthermore, with the rehabilitation of diplomatic relations between Japan and Korea that took place for over 14 years, beginning in 1952, the Government of Korea didn’t even once bring up the issue of “comfort women”. Ogata says that “even since then, however, the Korean Government has continued adopting an anti-Japanese national policy and the Koreans incessantly found fault with the Great Japanese Empire’s rule of Korea even during on-going diplomatic negotiations to improve relations.” (1-2)

On the other hand, Ogata describes that it was in 1980 that terms such as ‘kidnapping’, ‘coercion’, and ‘sexual servitude’ first came to be associated with comfort women, and, thus, became a political problem. The background is that Yoshida Seiji who published a book called *My War Crimes: Coerced Taking of Koreans*, confessed that in 1943, under military orders, on Cheju Island (in Korea) he went with 10 military men in two tracks on a “slave hunt,” to find and take away young girls and mothers with babies. A female Korean reporter of the Cheju Newspaper, Heo Young-seon read his book. When she went to the actual place on Cheju Island to investigate his account, there was nothing that corresponded with reality. In addition, a local Cheju historian by the name of Kim

Bong-ok conducted his own long-term follow-up survey, and as a result he declared that there was no validity to Yoshida's testimony. However, on the Korean mainland, with the publication of Yoshida's translated testimony, the image that "a comfort woman" equaled "a woman taken and coerced into sexual servitude" spread widely. Thus disseminated, of this mythic image, has been of great use for the Korean leadership to play as a convenient political card. Yoshida mentions "anti-Japanese groups making it a political problem."

The people who have been pressing forward, based on Yoshida's confession and so forth, making a political issue of the "comfort woman question" for Korea within Japan, are anti-Japanese civil-libertarian activist groups. They have gone so far as to go "plaintiff hunting" in Korea, looking for Koreans who will sue the Japanese Government for apologies and compensation.

Those seeking an erstwhile comfort-woman and hunting for potential plaintiffs began cooperating with groups like the Korean Association of Victims and Families of War Dead during the Pacific War in November of 1989. In December of 1991, they found three former comfort women and brought suit against the Japanese government in Tokyo District Court, seeking apologies and reparations. Their chief counsel was the anti-Japanese human rights activist and lawyer Takagi Kenichi, who had enthusiastically handled the organizing of the plaintiffs. (4)

According to Ogata, there is no evidence that the Japanese Army was "taking women way by force." The so-called Kono Statement was announced by then-Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono, based on strong demands by the Korean government. In 1993, Japan and Korea were embroiled in difficult diplomatic negotiations. Korean president Kim Young-sam, due to consideration of domestic opinion in Korea, persisted on the issue of the comfort women, strongly insisting that the Japanese government acknowledge that the recruitment of "comfort women" had been nothing short of compulsion. Korean public opinion, hardened by long years of anti-Japanese propaganda, was not about to accept that the fact that the comfort women were actually legal, commercialized

prostitutes. Ogata said that “the origin of the myth that ‘comfort women’ = ‘women forcibly taken off to sexual enslavement’ is due to the previously mentioned confession of Yoshida Seiji, the Asahi Newspaper, and information manipulated by other left-leaning forces—and the posture of the Japanese government, which seem to lack any procedure in responding to the accusations.” Furthermore, within the Japanese system of licensed military prostitutes, the management of the military brothels was undertaken by civilian merchants; the military participation was limited to providing goods for living, provisions, hygiene management, etc. The existence of such an army-licensed prostitution system was common in other worlds, such as the Soviet Union, the United States, France, Germany, and Korea. The Japanese government should have taken measures before Kono announced the statement. The Japanese government demonstrated a weak attitude towards this situation.

2.4.3 Statements and Actions by the Government of Korea on the “Comfort Women” Issue

According to THE TOKYO TIMES (2011), “Japan maintains that the matter was settled by a bilateral treaty in 1965 that normalized relations and Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda said he reiterated that stance during their meeting in the ancient capital in Kyoto. Japanese official have apologized to the victims, who say they still want compensation and prosecution of wrongdoers.” On the other hand, according to The 4th Media (2011), South Korean President Myung-bak Lee urged Japan to make more efforts to address Japan’s colonial atrocities as the two countries seek forward-looking relations. Lee said the following statement during a joint press conference with Japan’s new Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda after their talks (See Figure 6.).

“Japan should make more active efforts to resolve issues” outstanding from Japan’s 1910-45 colonial occupation of the Korean peninsula. The two countries should “move forward” but should “not forget history”. (The 4th Media)

Korea and Japan are also faced with a lasting dispute over a set of islets lying halfway between them, while Japan has been claiming South Korea illegally occupies the sparsely inhabited islands.



Figure 6: A joint news conference

South Korea's President Lee Myung-Bak (R) speaks next to Japan's Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda during a joint news conference at the Blue House in Seoul October 19, 2011.

<http://www.4thmedia.org/2011/10/s-korea-presses-japan-on-wartime-crimes/print/>

Minseon Ku (2015) states “Korea and Japan’s Approach toward the Comfort Women issue” in *The Growing “Discomfort” with Comfort Women between South Korea and Japan*. The paper looks at the importance of the comfort women issue in the bilateral relations³⁴ between 1998 and 2013. The Japanese government has been insisting that it has been expressing its apologies and remorse on many occasions, however, its consistency on the upholding of the Kono Statement is unclear. Prime Minister Abe questioned the coerciveness of the comfort women system in 2007 while allegedly upholding the statement. Next, his position is ambiguous as will be explained later. Furthermore, previous leaders like Keizo Obuchi in 1998, Yukio Hatoyama in 2009 and Naoto Kan in 2010 expressed the apologies or statement regarding history, but they did

not mention comfort women, so Koreans did not accept them. Ku (2015) refers to the Korean government's view. Its demand for apology depends on how salient the issue is domestically. Whether the issue gets raised by the Korean government officially depends on how strong the Korean public's demands is. This was raised during the Roh Moo-hyun and Myung-bak Lee's administrations. During Roh's term, the Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan called for Roh's government to settle the issue, at first, he initially took a passive stance, but he became active in calling for Japan to resolve the comfort women issue from 2003. The government under President Myun-bak Lee was also initially soft on the comfort women issue. On the other hand, the weekly protest outside the Japanese embassy in Seoul was reaching 1000th demonstration and the comfort women monument was established in front of the Japanese embassy in December 2011. (See Figure 6.) It was since then the comfort women became a key bilateral issue including at a summit level. The dispute escalated in 2012 as Lee constantly called for Japan to resolve the comfort women issue, even to the extent of calling for the Japanese emperor to apologize if he wants to visit Korea after he landed on Dokdo / Takeshima. Ku (2015) wrote the current administration in the paper as following:

The current administration under Park Geun-hye, however, has been different from her predecessors as the comfort women issue became a huge hurdle for the bilateral relations right from the beginning of her term. The dispute soon spilled over into the international arena as the South Korean government started involving the U.S. after realizing that the latter was paying attention to Korean-Japanese dispute over the issue. President Park even criticized Japan regarding history in front of U.S .Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, saying that "trust has not been built" as Japan is "repeatedly making regressive remarks on historical and territorial issues." Hence, over the years the comfort women issue has emerged among the different historical issues to become a perspicuous source of Korean-Japanese diplomatic tensions. (4)

Ku (2015) explained why the comfort women issue has received greater limelight than other historical issues and points out three factors: the first point is Prime Minister Abe's plan to revise the Kono Statement, the second point is that the comfort women issue has become a human rights issue, and the third point is that the dispute over the comfort women issue has spilled over to the U.S. Ku (2015) also states the three points. The comfort women issue became a hot potato in Korean-Japanese relations especially since Abe's term from 2013 because Abe revised the Kono Statement. Second, Korea has taken the issue to the international state such as the United Nations, making an appeal for Japan to acknowledge the coercive wartime sexual slavery and also claiming that the comfort women issue is a "universal human rights issue." Korea's pushing to "internationalize" the issue has also to do with its self-perception of Korea's increasing global clout as explained earlier. Third, Japan's right-wing activists campaigned against comfort women monuments in the U.S. and its diplomats contacted McGraw-Hill publishers, asking them to delete two paragraphs regarding comfort women in the world history textbook. At the same time, a comfort women statue, the same as the one in Seoul has also been erected in Glendale, California in 2013, but it was dismissed by a federal judge in August 2014. (p4-5)



Figure 6: Comfort Women statue

South Korean policemen stand guard near Comfort Woman statue in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul (JUNG YEON-JE/AFP/Getty Images)

<http://www.forbes.com/sites/donaldkirk/2016/01/12/experts-blow-hot-air-but-agree-comfort-woman-statue-must-say-in-front-of-japan-embassy-in-seoul/>

2.4.4 The Korean Women’s Movement

The Korean women spearheaded the international effort and moved against the Japanese government’s measure of the comfort women for the comfort women survivors to obtain recognition and compensation. So (2001) wrote their movement like followings:

In 1991, two landmark events galvanized the Korean women’s movement. In August, Kim Hak-sun testified in public about her suffering as a former comfort woman, and in December a class-action suit was filed against Japan by thirty-five Koreans, including three former comfort women. Kim’s personal appearance in Tokyo as a former comfort woman and plaintiff in the lawsuit riveted the attention of both Japan and the world community. On January 11,

1992, a third watershed event occurred, when the Asahi Shimbun reported that Yoshiaki Yoshimi, a Japanese historian, had discovered several official war documents at the Library of the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo. Contrary to Japan's official position up until then, these documents revealed that the imperial army was involved in both establishing and operating the comfort stations. As a result, the Japanese government could not help but acknowledge its wartime involvement in the comfort women issue; and on January 13, it issued an apology. Four days later, Prime Minister Miyazawa formally apologized to the Korean people during his visit to Korea. In March, a South Korean non-governmental organization, The Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan (Han'guk Chongsindaemunje Taech'aek Hyopuihoe, "Korean Council" for short) appealed to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights to investigate the comfort women issue. In December, the Korean Council conducted a nationwide fund-raising drive to help the survivors. In March, 1993, South Korean President Kim Young Sam announced that Seoul would not seek material compensation from Japan for former comfort women, but he urged Tokyo to investigate the issue thoroughly and made public the truth. Kim's policy was designed to stake out a position of "moral superiority" for Korea in forging a new relationship with Japan in the future. The Korean government passed a special bill granting each former comfort women a one-time payment of five million won (approximately US\$6,250) plus an additional monthly sum. Between 1996 and 1997, there were two further Korean fund-raising campaigns in order to counter the temptation of the survivors to accept money from the Japanese Asian Women's Fund. During this period, seven Korean survivors accepted AWF money, causing outrage and sharp criticism among Korean activists. In April 1998, at the request of the Korean Council, the Kim Dae Jung government approved the payment of a further 31.5 million won in support money to about 140 survivors, who were required to pledge not to accept AWF money.

(JPRI: Japan Policy Research Institute:

<http://www.jpri.org/publications/workingpapers/wp77.html> 2013/02.27)

The 1000th rally for comfort women was held on March 7, 2012. According to CNN, Kim Bok-dong, who was a former comfort women (87) has been waiting for an official apology for more than 60 years. Although she is tired and her health is falling, she continues to fight for recognition from the Japanese government for being used as a sex slave by their military during World War II. It is said that there were around 200,000 so-called "comfort women" who were mostly Korean. Many of the former comfort women" passed away, but some are still alive.

Kim, who was a comfort women, describes being moved around half a dozen Asian countries from the age of 14. She said, "I was born as a woman but have never had a woman's life. I was dragged to the foreign army's battles, and my entire life was ruined." (CNN) Kim is part of an NGO called the "Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan," which is fighting for an apology. A weekly protest has been held outside the Japanese embassy in Seoul for the past 20 years. The embassy keeps its blinds shut during the protests and does not comment. Some Japanese prime ministers have personally apologized in the past, but the NGO director believes that it's not nearly enough. The following is the interview to the former comfort women:

"Anyone can verbally apologize. But this is not an issue that can be resolved by saying sorry," says Yoon Mee-Hyang. "This is a crime that was institutionalized by a country, they forced women into sexual slavery over a long period of time. They need to adopt a resolution at the official level and we need to see legal reparations." The South Korean government has stepped up diplomatic pressure recently, but only after a Korean court ruled in August that it was unconstitutional for the government not to help, attempts by President Lee Myun-bak to discuss the issue with Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda have so far yielded no results. The issue of comfort women continues to haunt relations between the two countries. But for the few

comfort women still alive—only 63 are now registered in South Korea—it's an urgent issue that they can't afford to wait for.

(CNN 2012.3.7) <http://edition.cnn.com/2012/03/06/world/asia/korean-comfort-women/>

2.4.5 Criticisms by Korean Intellectuals

In this section, two Korean intellectual criticisms are taken up. Youn (2008) dealt with the two crucial questions on the issue of “comfort women”. The first question is that whether Korean women were forcefully taken away to serve as comfort women. The second question is that whether the comfort stations system consisted of licensed houses of prostitution, which leads to the closely related question of the responsibility of the Japanese government. Regarding the first question, Japanese rightists claims that most of the Korean comfort women were those who left home hoping to get a job or who were victims of swindlers engaged in the trafficking of human beings. They also state that Japanese authorities were not involved in such as act of swindling, and that those women should not be regarded as having been forcefully taken away to comfort stations. She points out the expression of “taking away women forcefully” as follows:

The expression of “taking away women forcefully” should also include such ploys as swindling women by offering jobs at a distant location, human trafficking and even abduction, together with the notion of “armed Japanese troops taking away maidens who were out in the fields collecting wild vegetables, and loading them onto military trucks.”.....In other words the notion of ‘comfort women’ refers to all those women who were forced to serve the Japanese troops at comfort stations operated by the Japanese Army. (219)

Youn (2008) describes the second question “whether the comfort stations system consisted of licensed houses of prostitution, which leads to the closely related question of the responsibility of the Japanese government”. Japanese rightists insist that the comfort stations system organized and used by the Japanese Army was not different

from the licensed houses of prostitution in Japan and its colonies. However, she explains the three types of comfort stations run by the Japanese Army: “the first type was run directly by the Japanese Army; the second was run by private businesses selected by the Japanese Army; the third consisted of existing houses of prostitution used by the Japanese troops.” (220) She concludes her opinion as follows:

Under the comfort stations system, the Army or the government directly operated the stations or directly controlled and supervised their operation...there is no way by which the Japanese government can escape from its responsibility toward the victims of the comfort stations system. (221)

Korean Professor, Yu-ha Park (2011) describes the issue of “comfort women” in *For Reconciliation*. The issue of “comfort women” has remained as a responsibility under the colonial rule. The Government of Japan, together with people of Japan established the Asian Women’s Fund (AWF) in order to express their sincere apologies and remorse to the former comfort women on July 19, 1995. However, Koreans never got to know the fact accurately, and the fact is that Japanese government and the people established the Fund to avoid their responsibility. “Atonement money” was donated to the AWF by the people of Japan and Japanese government for medical and welfare support so they thought this fulfilled their moral responsibility. Why did Japanese government remind Koreans that the fund was not “compensation” but “medical and welfare support”? The background is relevant to the Korea-Japan Agreement in 1965. At that time, Japanese government had finished their “compensation” between Japan and Korea, hence Japan did not think that they needed to provide the compensation to each person. There is a fact that the Government of Korea received “compensation” from Japan, however, they did not give sufficient compensation to each person as they spent it on improving infrastructure for the economic development.

In Japan, on the other hand, some intellectuals indicated that the Government of Japan should have authorized the issue of “comfort women” as a legal crime for retrieving their lost honor. Park (2011) says that Koreans should pay their respects to

the Japanese self-criticism. The choice of Japan which established the AWF is not sufficient. If the Japanese nation had acted on their own initiative officially, they could have avoided the confusion. Korean people understood the fund was established to avoid the responsibility of the Japanese nation, and the fund was the measure not to apologize and pay compensation. Korean media criticized the fund which the Government of Japan established as an “excuse”, an “artifice”, a “stratagem”, a “consolation”, and as “shameless” and “audacious”. In Korea, their support group for the comfort women, “The Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan”, which was established against the AWF in 1997 and they started a drive to raise funds. However, seven former comfort women who received the AWF from Japan, were excepted from the subjects. The Government of Korea regulated “comfort women’s personal willing under a name of the victim support group and wrested the right of receiving the compensation from Korea. It seems to overstep the Government of Korea’s authority. The comfort women who received the AWF “for the money” were criticized by the supporters for the women that were prejudiced against the “comfort women”. Some former comfort women were thankful to Japan when they heard a letter from Japanese Prime Minister at the ceremony of the AWF in 1998. “The Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan” shows bias from stubbornly refuse to understand good faith of the AWF and the Government of Japan at all. Korea infiltrated the essential suspicion and felt animosity against Japan. The reason why Korean adhere to the view is that they have a view of Japan who never apologizes. It is clear that the AWF was not enough for the official apology of the Government of Japan and the compensation was not the legal reparation. It is not wrong for Koreans to demand an adequate apology. However, the people and the Government of Korea should have taken a generous attitude toward some Japanese people who took precautions against Japan’s correspondence by themselves. Park (2011) points out that Korea share some responsibility. Some comfort women were sent by their parents or step fathers due to poverty or promises of career advancement for their fathers.

Japan should pose a problem regarding the management of the postwar compensation. In the meantime, Korea should consider a correspondence of a criticism

and refusal against Japan. At the negotiation of the Korea—Japan Agreement, they discussed the victims and the issue of the compensation to private people, though Japan paid it as “the money of the Independence Ceremony” and the economic cooperation fund. It shows that at that time, Japan did not have an intention of “apology” and “compensation” toward the colonial rule or didn’t want to make the intention clear. Although Japan practically apologized and paid reparations for Korea, the fact was not recognized by Koreans because Japan did not make an intention against their responsibility of the colonial rule clear. On the other hand, the issue of “comfort women” was taken up after the Korea—Japan Agreement. Why? One of the reasons that the issues hidden was that Korea had the patriarchy discriminated by the people. Korea and Japan have to remember that both nations took the victims’ peaceful everyday life. (Translation by the author, Kawamoto)

Park (2011) mentions Japan and Korea’s correspondence on the “comfort women”. Japan accepted that comfort stations were operated by Japanese military and there existed a great number of comfort women who lived in misery at comfort stations under a coercive atmosphere. And the Government of Japan expressed their sincere apologies and remorse to the comfort women. As a result, the people and Government of Japan established the Asian Women’s Fund. The people and Government of Korea says Japan should take not only “moral responsibility” but also “legal responsibility”, the AWF was not enough for the official apology from the Government of Japan and they have not made an intention against their responsibility of the colonial rule clear yet. Korea infiltrated the suspicion and felt animosity against Japan, so they demand the enough more and a perfect apology from Japan. However, the people and Government of Korea need to understand the AWF and take a generous attitude toward some Japanese people who took precautions against Japan’s correspondence by themselves. Both Korea and Japan never forget the “comfort women’s tragedy” and hope for the well-being of survivors.

3 Differences Cultural Dynamics

In this section, the Korean and Japanese cultures are studied and the author researched their characteristics in terms of tradition, religions, and minds. The cultures of each country have unique or special features.

3.1 Korean Culture

Korean culture is affected by Chinese, Japanese, and Western characteristics, and shamanism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism, and Christianity. They have merged them with their experiences of repeated invasions and dark periods, and finally they have established their own unique culture. In Korean culture, the author focuses on “Independence vs. Tradition”, “*Haan* culture in Korea”, and “Korean mind” and considers the problem from various angles.

3.1.1 Independence vs. Tradition

It is said that Korean people have maintained a Korean tradition, valued their family and relatives above everything else, and have deep respect for elderly people. They also have a “group consciousness” like Japan. On the other hand, Koreans are independent and comparative. Many Korean students study abroad and are facing outward, however, Japanese students who study abroad are decreasing and are facing inward. De Mente (1988) describes Koreans in “*The Korean Mind*” as follows:

Many “old Korea hands” say that Korean are not as ethnocentric as their Chinese and Japanese neighbors and are more at ease with Westerners and other foreigners. But they add that because of the lingering influence of generations of conditioning in Confucianism Koreans tend to be ambivalent in their attitudes toward the individualistic philosophy and behavior of Westerners. (411)

Korean people have been standing in a gap between “tradition” and “independence”. Despite their yearning for Americans ways, Koreans think “American style is not

suitable for Koreans” (411) because of so many centuries of conditioning in “selflessness” and “groupism”. And many Koreans try to criticize Americans as being selfish and uncaring. De Mente (1998) points out the Korean characteristic as follows:

One of the many challenges facing Korea is to merge the human desire for self-identity and independence with Confucian-style family and social responsibilities and come up with a happy medium. And little by little Koreans are redefining the meaning of “*tongnip*”, or “independence” to suit their own cultural viewpoint. (412)

Koreans have both oriental and western aspects and make the most of the characteristic for business careers and establish their own lives. Their characteristic is related to the “religion” of Korea.

Although traditional Koreans had believed shamanism, Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism, approximately 25 percent of Korean people are Christians. According to De Mente (1998), foreign Christian missionaries in Korea showed that “Koreans were Confucian in their social life, Buddhist and Taoist in their philosophical attitudes and shamanist in their attempts to ward off and deal with life’s calamities —all without apparent conflict.” (61) In Korea, Confucianism was brought from China, and from 1392 to 1910 (The Yi dynasty) it had been developed over the next five hundred years. Confucianism became the core of Korean culture (60). Tamai and Lee (2002)³⁵ points out Confucianism as follows:

Confucianism is a philosophy that considers proper behavior and human relationships as the basis of the society. In pursuit of ideal moral goals, Confucianism sets forth principles that define “appropriate” manners or attitudes toward other people as well as toward oneself. Confucianism has a strong influence on communication patterns in East Asia. Not only that, in discussing the quick economic development of East Asia, Confucianism has been an unavoidable cultural factor to be considered. (33)

On the other hand, in the early 1800s French priests visited Korea, established churches, and Korea was affected by the Catholic churches. As a result, approximately twenty-three thousand Koreans converted to Catholicism³⁶ and became independent from China. In 1884, an American Protestant missionary—doctor, Horace Allen entered Korea, and “founded the first Western-style hospital and thereafter used his political influence to bring in other Protestant missionaries and established Protestant churches in the country.” (De Mente,1998: 180) De Mente describes the reason why Christianity penetrated into Korean people and the society:

Christianity appealed to many Koreans, especially women, because it advocated human rights, social equality, and other democratic principles. The occupation and annexation of Korea by Japan at the beginning of the twentieth century served as an extraordinary impetus for the spread of Christianity among dissident Koreans. (180) As far as Koreans were concerned, the most impressive elements in Christianity were its teachings that all people are equal in the eyes of a Heavenly Being that all men are brothers, and that universal love should be the foundation of all relationships. This was a starting concept in the experience of Koreans, because it contradicted the very foundations of their society and virtually every tenet of their culture. For centuries they had been taught that order and harmony based on a hierarchical ranking of all people and inferiors fulfilling their obligations to superiors were the foundation for all ethical and moral behavior. A report published by the Korean Institute of Policy Studies on the influence of religions in Korea pointed out that Christian churches were the only place in all of Korea where men, women, the young and old, common people and rich people, and people who were not related to each other could sit together without any restrictions or protocol. (181)

Koreans people had experienced the suffering and tragedy under China and the

occupation and annexation by Japan, so they have been desiring “equality”, “human rights” and “democratic principles”.

3.1.2 *Haan* culture in Korea

Koreans have a unique traditional collective sentiment, “*Haan*”. Min (2009)³⁷ describes that it “may be defined as a pathos, a chronic mixed mood of missing, sadness, suppressed anger, feeling of unfairness, or everlasting woe”, and “*haan* is translated into English as grudge, rancor, spite, regret, lamentation, grief, or hate in the Korean–English dictionary”(14). Their feeling comes from the tragic collective national history such as “war”. Min (2009) states “*Haan*” as follows:

The *haan* of the national level has been traced to when old kingdoms of Korea in Manchuria, Koguryo, from which the name of Korea is derived, were lost. *Haan* has been related also to past, repeated invasions and exploitation of aggressive neighboring countries. In particular, Japanese colonization and exploitation caused *haan* in many ways: *haan* of draftees, atomic bomb victims, comfort women leaving home country, and forced immigration to foreign countries. During the Korean War, *haan* developed due to killing, family separation, leaving home, and loss of property. Through their long period of endurance and forbearance due to unfair external violence, Korean’ suppressed and accumulated anger and feeling of unfairness has been transformed into a collective and/or personal *haan*. *Haan* has been transmitted from generation to generation of Koreans. Many Korean intellectuals have discussed, the history of *haan*. Therefore, the word “*haan*” is considered to be a key word to the understanding of Korean culture. (15)

When Park Geun Hye was inaugurated as Korean President in 2013, she announced that Koreans would never forget Japanese acts and have 1000 years-standing grudge against Japan. Their feelings of suffering from Japan will never fade away. This context of their feeling of ‘*haan*’ is considered repeated invasions by China and Japan. According

to De Mente (1998), in 109 B.C. Wiman Choson (Korea) was invaded and captured by the Han Chinese emperor Wu-Ti (known as the Martial Emperor). Chinese rule lasted for four hundred years and three larger kingdoms such as Koguryo (37 B.C. -A.D. 668), Paekche³⁸ (18 B.C.-A.D. 660), and Shilla (57 B.C-A.D.935) were consolidated. As a result, Korea was affected by Chinese culture:

After the conquest of Korea by China, large number of Chinese administrators, artists, craftsmen, and scholars took up residence in NangNang, near present-day Pyongyang turning the city into a thriving center of Chinese culture. The three consolidated kingdom adopted the Chinese style of government, which was based primarily on Confucian principles, and eventually the Buddhist religion as well. Most of the cultural institutions introduced into Korea from China were “Koreanized,” then passed on to Japan, where they played a key role in unifying and civilizing that country. (103)

De Mente (1998) points out that Korea was again invaded by the Manchus when they began the military action to conquer China in 1627, and Pyongyang and Seoul were captured by Manchus in 1636, the Manchus made Korea a vassal state. Manchus conquered all of China and established the Ching dynasty in Beijing in 1644. Choson court's closed Korea's doors to all of the outside world except China, and isolated itself from the Western world from 1637 until 1876. In this period, Korean identity was constituted as “a proud, dogmatic and closed society”. A Korean historian Sik Lee Chong pointed out “ Korea was also to remain a tributary of Ching-dominated China until 1894-95, when Japan attacked China—the Sino-Japan War—and forced the Chinese to give up their interest in Korea”. After Korea's closed doors period, “there were increasing demands from intellectuals that the system be reformed and the country opened up to the outside world”. (p.111)

Koreans have contradictive aspects such as strong nationalism against Japan and the U.S. and flexibility outside economically. Korea and Japan were put in different conditions. According to Kimura (2001), Korea was a tributary of China (Ching) and it is

said that during Choson dynasty “Sadaejuui” or “flunky” developed and Koreans’ awareness has changed. In Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, “Sadaejuui” means “loving and admiring the great and powerful,” or “dealing with the great”, or “serving the great”. Koreans used the special terms, “great power (China)” and “a minor power (Korea)”. A minor power could not contend with a great power, so Korea had to conclude a pact with a great power. However, they had discord in their experiences and it caused development of resistant nationalism as well as a sense of failure among them. Furthermore, Korean people had Petit Sinocentrism put into their mind. The important things of Korean nationalism were a pride of their nation and their minor power, therefore, they needed a cooperation of the great power. Koreans were able to cope with both “holding up their pride for nationalism”, “a minor power” and “necessity of support from a great power”.

Korea was annexed and ruled by Japan until 1945. De Mente (1998) describes the period:

During that period the Japanese made an extreme effort to totally eradicate the national identity of Koreans by forcing them to adopt Japanese names, learn and speak only Japanese, consider themselves Japanese nationals, and be loyal to Japan. In a clandestine move to prevent this from happening, a number of Korean scholars began promoting *munhwa undong*, or “cultural nationalism,” which emphasized continued use of the Korean language and the traditional Korean way of life. (206)

De Mente (1998) says that “Koreans have always had a deepseated sense of common racial and cultural identity that transcended artificial borders, and this sense of common identity has been tempered with and strengthened by repeated attacks from foreign enemies”. In fact, Korean nationalism is much stronger than any other countries and a sense of “*haan*” penetrated into Korean people and culture. Koreans have had strong feelings against Japan. They had thought that China is a great power for them, Korea was a tributary of China, and was put Petit Sinocentrism into Korean mind, however,

Korea was annexed and ruled by a small country, Japan and experienced the indignity during the suffering period. It seems to be difficult for Koreans to fade away the feeling of *haan* against Japan even now.

3.1.3 Korean Mindset

The Korean people have a unique character and personality from experiences of the history influenced by China, Japan and Western countries. Their culture is different from any other Asian countries such as China and Japan. This section focuses on characteristics of the Korean mindset. First, Korea has a “shame culture” as the cultural characteristic of Japanese. Both Japan and Korea were influenced by Confucianism, whose important elements in moral behavior is saving face. According to De Mente (1998), “People in shame cultures try to avoid causing emotional pain to others and being subjected to such pain themselves—pain that is caused by being looked down on by others, by being embarrassed, by being disgraced in the eyes of others” (27). Koreans try to meet expectations of those around those, such as family, the father, relatives, and the friends and associates to avoid losing their reputation. On the other hand, the western or Christianized countries have “guilt cultures” and it means “sin culture”. De Mente (1998) points out “guilt” and “shame” as follows:

While Christianity peddles guilt and Confucianism purveys shame, there is a fundamental difference in the effects of the two sanctions. Shame-centered people can get by with all kinds of “immoral” conduct and not suffer any pangs of shame as long as it doesn’t become known to others. In shame cultures, it is not doing that is shameful so much as getting caught. Among the many things that people in “*changri*” (shame) cultures can “morally” do that are considered immoral in. Christianized guilt cultures is treat people as inferior, take financial advantage of people, conceal the truth, use devious tactics (28).

Some Koreans are influenced by not only “shame feelings” but also “guilty feelings”, because 20 to 25 percent of Korean today are Christians. However, the people who were

born and raised in Korea, think that Korean is first and Christianity is second. Koreans have been more influenced by the “shame culture”. It has been Koreans’ traditional culture and influenced Korean people and culture for a long period.

The second characteristic is “groupism”. Koreans had passed through various vicissitudes of fortune by repeated invasion over a long period. In this situation, they were influenced by common beliefs, aspiration, and danger and “*chung*” or “group consciousness” was developed (“Chang” means “loyalty”.) “Group consciousness” shows the emotional and intellectual homogenization. De Meate (1998) stated that “In areas where the emotional and intellectual fusion of Koreans was incomplete, powerful sanctions were brought into play to force people to behave in the same way even if they did not think in exactly the same way”. Group consciousness made Korean accept people and introduced the most powerful psychological factor by Korea’s eliet ruling class. From 1400 to 1900, “the concept of group consciousness was embedded in Korean people deeply, however, Korean are no longer compelled to think and act alike for political or moral reasons”. (77) With passing time, their opinion and behavior has changed and varied, while the feeling of courtesy, dignity, respect, pride, and ambition, “*chung*”, or group consciousness has continued to become the custom. De Mente (1998) describes Koreans’ cross-cultural cases as follows:

Foreign diplomats and business people involved with Korea must deal with *chung* in almost every encounter which often means repressing their tendency to concentrate on and depend on the individuality of their contacts. In most cases Koreans are still not free to act as individuals because the effects of centuries of conditioning to think and behave in terms of group interests continue to permeate their culture. Acting on their own is tantamount to disowning their group and virtually assuring that they will be severely criticized if not ostracized (77).

Westerners are self-centered people, so at first they thought Koreans were irrational and inhuman, however, the fact is that “a substantial degree of *chung* is absolutely essential

for the smooth functioning of any society and represents an advanced state of social maturity that is sorely and conspicuously absent in the United States and many other Western countries” (77). There is a big gap between individualistic Western people and group-based Korean people whose strong feeling such as superior or unchangeable pride.

Third, Korean people have valued “harmony (*hwa* in Korean)” as well as “group consciousness”. Harmony is one of the typical Korean indigenous shamanistic cultures. “Harmony was achieved through the repression of individualism and the supremacy of collectivism or groupism.” (136) Koreans have lived and worked within particular groups such as families, collectives, associations and others, so they acquired thinking of acting to avoid conflict and friction. However, as the situation has changed with the times, “harmony” was weakened and Koreans became to learn how to think and act as individuals. On the other hand, “harmony” is taken a second look and Koreans pride on the culture of “*hwa* (harmony)”. It has an influence on the economic powerhouse. De Mente says that “Conditioning in group behavior and passive obedience to authority was historically such a large part of the lives of Koreans that a great deal of it lingers on in the average Korean mind-set”. (138) This culture is helpful for building up the relationship between harmony and authoritarianism in the business place. He points out “the hierarchical relationship in the typical Korean culture in which their attitudes and behavior are determined by their place on the vertical ladder of sex, age, authority, and seniority”. (138) Korea has the culture of “harmony” which is influenced by “group consciousness” among families or society, while they have a vertically-structured society or a hierarchy in which people are controlled in a large organization or institution and people of the lower groups do not have decision-making authority.

Fourth, Koreans pay attention to “rank”, which defines social status, hierarchy, and title. It is based on gender, age, class, education, and official position. The seniority system is one of the ranks. Koreans think a great deal of “titles” and address people using the titles such as “*ssi*” and “*seobang*”. “*Ssi*” means a generic term, and “*seobang*” is similar to “*ssi*”, but *seobang* is lower than *ssi* on the respect scale. Thus, Koreans distinguish the title by the social and professional ranking. For example, every place such as rooms, cars, tables has a “head” and a “foot”. The “head” means the top, highest

or upper ranking people, and the “foot” seat is the opposite. Koreans use the titles of “*paksa*” and “*seonsaeng*” as follows:

“*Paksa*” is the title used for anyone who has a Ph.D. and is used routinely when addressing professors and other professionals. Whether used to address people with doctorates or others, the term has a strong nuance of both respect and flattery. Not using the term to people who have a doctorate degree is likely to be perceived as arrogance and taken as an insult. (40)

Korean use “*seonsaeng*” which means “teacher” and it is used for “senior” or “elder people” with politeness. It is important for Korean people to distinguish “title” and “ranks” clearly. The “head” and “foot” culture comes from the vertical human and hierarchical relationships. On the other hand, Koreans regard “harmony” in a society or group as important. In addition to the above cultural value, the feeling of “*haan*” is the identity of Korean people influenced by repeated invasions and wars. As a result, they have accepted Christianity and desired the independence, freedom, their own culture, and identity.

3.2 Japanese Culture

This section describes Japanese culture such as religion and Japanese spirit.

3.2.1 Religion: Shinto, Buddhism and Confucianism

Japan’s traditional culture has been influenced by three main religions—Shintoism, Buddhism and Confucianism. There are numerous Japanese people who believe in religion and have faith in Shintoism or Buddhism. The Agency for Cultural Affairs Government of Japan (2015) shows the ratio of adherents of each religion is follows:

- Shinto : 48.0 % (91,260,343)
- Buddhist: 45.7 % (86,902,013)

- Christian 1.6 % (2,947,756)
- The others 4.8 % (9,066,141)

(Religious Statistical Survey³⁹: 2013, 12, 31)

This data attracts our interest because the population of Japan is 120 million, but the total number of the data is 190,176,262 (approximately 190 million). The reason is that many Japanese belong to both Shinto and Buddhism. For examples, some Japanese people visit Shinto Shrine on the New Year's Day, newborn infants are taken to the shrine, or some couples have weddings there, while they hold funerals for the dead or Buddhist altars are placed in the home. Sugiura and Gillespie (2004)³⁰ describe Shinto –Buddhist synthesis as follows:

In Japan long ago, Buddhism, which came from abroad, and Shinto, which is a folk religion, occasionally came together in a synthesis. Because Buddhism is not a theistic doctrine and Shinto principally worships nature, there were no contradictions in synthesizing them. This is called *shinbutsu-shugo*. This tendency continued for a long time after Buddhism was introduced in the sixth century, with Shinto shrines supporting the instruction of Buddhist temples. When Japan began to function as a modern nation state in 1868, *shinbutsu-shugo* was prohibited because the government set a policy of strengthening Shinto. But now, it is quite common to set up both Buddhist family altars and Shinto family altars in the same house or to have weddings with Shinto rituals and funerals with Buddhist rituals. (174)

It is said that Japanese people often have “No religion”. According to Agency For Cultural Affairs Government of Japan, 72 percent of Japanese people do not have faith in religion, have no religious beliefs or have no interest for them, on the other hand, 28 percent of them have faith. However, 66 percent of the people answer that religious sentiment is important. They recognize that the religions such as Shinto and Buddhism have taken root into the Japanese daily life as “custom” rather than having faith in religions.

Buddhism was introduced to Japan in the middle of the sixth century. At this time, Japanese were “Shintoists”. Sugiura and Gillespie (2005) says that “Shinto, literally the way of the gods, is the Japanese religion from ancient times, centering on the ideal of Japanese intimacy with nature and ancestor worship” (161). They say that all things on earth were brought forth, the gods ruled over them, and the gods existed in nature. Japanese sensibility is based on Shinto and people in Japan have felt their cultural identity in Shinto. They describe that “Shinto meanwhile supported the Emperor system in a religious sense, and even now its ancient customary practices remain as the religion of the Imperial Family”. On the other hand, from 1185 to 1333 (Kamakura Period), many Buddhist leaders deepened its philosophy and bukkyo (Buddhism) made the teaching of it such as “saving the weak” clear. In this period, some priests who were taught in China introduced “Zen Buddhism” to Japan, and penetrated into Japanese people as the religion of “samurai (warrior)”. Sugiura and Gillespie (2005) points out Buddhism, “At present, a culture in Japan that has Buddhism as its backdrop has laid roots deeply in the lives of the people and, together with Shinto, forms the spiritual culture of the Japanese people”. (170) De Mente (2004)⁴¹ also states the influence of Buddhism in Japan as follows:

In the decades following the arrival of Buddhism, there was considerable contention between Shintoism and Buddhism, but eventually Buddhism, which was a far more detailed and comprehensive approach to life, won out. Thereafter, Shintoism was to play a minor role until it was reinstated as the national religion at the beginning of Japan’s modern history. (44) One of the key reasons for the power of Buddhism was that its whole philosophy was based on the search for a universal truth which applied to everybody and to everything at all times—instead of emphasizing specific beliefs, doctrines and dogma, as other religions did. Buddhism did not teach the existence of a god or a devil, holding instead that all confusion and suffering was caused by blind desire, and that the way to enlightenment was to renounce all lust and attachment. Over the next 800 years, Buddhism was Japanized. Numerous

sects, including Tendai, Shingon, Pure Land, Nichiren and Zen, evolved the grew into major branches. But all of the sects were similar, and developed characteristic that were strictly Japanese. Among the characteristics that have been identified with Japanese Buddhism are a practical morality, an emphasis on human relations, reverence for ancestors, worship of the individual sect founders, an emotional rather than a rational view of the world, and accepting things as they are. (45)

Confucianism was adopted by the Tokugawa Shogunate (1603-1867) in Japan and it teaches how to consider proper behavior and human relationships. It influenced private schools. In the Meiji government (1868-1911), Confucianism was used to build a nation with the emperor as its supreme authority. Confucianism values loyalty such as the relationship between the emperor and the people, or father and son. Tamai and Lee(2002) say, “Although there is a tendency to attribute Asia’s economic success to the mora qualities of Confucianism, the shapes and forms of Confucianism in the society have become very vague at their edges, and there is no denying that the role of Confucian vague is on the decline”. (34)

Benedict (2011) points out Japanese religion as follows:

The decisions that the Meiji Government make about religion were even stranger than the ones about politics. However, they were using the same idea about everything in its place. The state’s role was to control religion that was related to the symbols of national unity and superiority. Everything else was lest as a personal choice for the people. The part of religion that was controlled was called State Shinto. State Shinto in the schools became the history of Japan from the age of the gods and worship of the emperor. It was supported and controlled by the government. People had freedom in all other areas of religion, and even parts of Shinto, as well as Buddhism and Christianity. (61-63)

Japan adopted the moral, cultural identity, the foundation of the Japanese sensibility into their daily life, loyalty, human relationships, consideration on an individual and political level through the religions. Although Japanese people have “No religion”, they have adopted some points from the religions which is suitable for their culture.

3.2.2 Japanese Community and Society

This section describes the characteristic of Japanese culture in the society and community, such as *Honne* and *Tatemae* (honest feeling and official stance), order and hierarchy, *Wa* (harmony), and *Haji* (Shame).

It is said that Japanese people’s honest feelings and superficial words are difference, so people from other countries are flurried especially international business places. In Japan, people have lived in a small country because of the geographical and historical condition, and they have thought a great deal on human relationships, peace and harmony. They have their own society, community and group, and they used there to live. If they feel that their expression of “*honne*” (honest feelings) makes other people angry or hurt, “*tatemae*” (official stance) will keep peace and harmony among them. Davies and Ikeno (2002) quoted the following sentences from Honna and Hoffer (1986):

These two words are often considered a dichotomy contrasting genuinely-held personal feeling and opinion from those that are socially controlled. *Honne* is one’s deep motive or intention, while *tatemae* refers to motives or intentions that are socially-tuned, those that are shaped, encouraged, or suppressed by majority norms. (115)

One of Japanese characteristics is to suppress their feelings and emotions in public, groups and community. Why do Japanese people use “*honne*” and “*tatemae*”? Some reason are considered in their culture. The first reason is that not to express one’s real feelings and intentions is a virtue. Next, taking “*tatemae*” is able to maintain “*wa* (harmony)” and create a comfortable atmosphere. Davies and Ikeno (2002) states “*honne*” and “*tatemae*”, “*honne* is used in one’s personal space, but *tatemae* is used in more public

forums such as business meetings, which are often rather ceremonial occasions, because *tatemae* agrees with commonly accepted social standards” (116). It is not difficult for the people in Japan to switch “*honne*” and “*tatemae*” because they have grown up with the two concepts. However, non-Japanese people are flurried in this communication style. Davies and Ikeno (2002) points out Westerners’ view point of the concepts:

Generally speaking, Westerners feel that acting and speaking in accordance with one’s innermost beliefs and convictions (*honne*) is a matter of personal integrity, whereas the Japanese tend to view the discrepancy between *honne* and *tatemae* as simple reflecting the way society works. In other words, individuals may hold their own personal views, but in the interests of group harmony, they should not express these views if they conflict with the opinions of others, and this is not seen as hypocrisy. In English, however, the idea of hypocrisy is reflected in the expression “to be two-faced”, which means to be sneaky or underhanded, and this has strongly negative connotations for most people in the West. (117-118)

In Japan, people have thought and learned that taking “*tatemae*” is a virtue. However, Westerners think it is sneaky, underhanded or negative connotations. The dichotomy between “*honne*” and “*tatemae*” can cause confusion and misunderstanding in intercultural affairs.

One of the most unique characteristics in Japan is a vertically-structured society which came from the hierarchical culture. Japan has maintained a strong class and caste society during the whole history. Japan learned things from China in the 17th century, after that, it made an arrangement to adopt it to the Japanese surroundings. Benedict (2011) says that “Inequality had been the rule of people’s lives for hundreds of years, and acting based on hierarchy is as natural to them as breathing.” (37) During the Tokugawa Period, there were four castes (*Shinokousho*) in Japan: the samurai (*shi*), the farmers (*no*), the artisans (*kou*), and the merchants (*sho*). The Tokugawa divided the social class and ruled everyone’s behavior. Japanese often say “*bun souou ni furumau.*” It means “to

take one's proper station". This idea comes from "a vertically-structured society" and hierarchy. Benedict (2011) points out this idea as follows:

They rely on order and hierarchy, while we have faith in freedom and equality, and there are completely different way of thinking. Japan's hierarchy is an important part of her whole idea of man's relation to others and of man's relations to the State. (35) The Japanese always think about hierarchy when they order their world. In the family and in personal relations, one's age, generation, sex, and class tell a person how to act. In government, religion, the army, and industry, area are carefully separated into hierarchies. Neither the people in higher position nor those in lower positions can go outside of their assigned roles. As long as people stay in their 'proper station,' everything is fine. (65-67)

This hierarchy exerts an influence on a government, society, community, companies, and even schools and universities. "*Nenko joretsu* (a seniority system)" or "*Senpai-Kohai* (Senior—Junior)" are commonly used in their society. In Japan, employees' promotion is still based on the number of years they have been with the company or organization. That is a seniority system. Japanese people have valued "*wa* (harmony)" above the individual and have been conscious of groupism strongly. As mentioned above, they have lived in a small community and thought a great deal of human relationships. Whereas, they have to live in a vertically-structured society. Sugiura and Gillespie (2005) states the history of "*wa* (harmony)":

Shotoku Taishi, who in 604 A.D. compiled Japan's first constitution—called the Seventeen-Article Constitution—wrote in Article I, "Harmony is to be valued." Together with the absolute authority of the Imperial Household and fair and unbiased government, *wa* is the idea providing the constitution's nucleus. The document was compiled on Confucian and Buddhist fundamentals, and it later formed the intellectual foundation for Japan's

national laws. In those days, rice agriculture was the basis of the nation's economy, and *wa* was considered the most important element for the very important cooperative word required to cultivate and harvest rice. (31)

People in Japan think “*wa*” is important to prevent confrontations. Their feelings are based on the historical and cultural background. In the same way, there is a group-oriented value, “group harmony”, in their society. According to Davies and Ikeno (2002), group consciousness created their own social behavior and it became the base of harmony as well as the society in Japan. (195) Furthermore, the people always try to avoid direct competition through their life. The system of hierarchy restricts the direct competition with each other. Benedict (2011) explains the measure to avoid competition. In the society, there are many go-betweens to prevent confrontation (107), and they get involved in negotiation marriages, offering services, leaving a job, and setting up many other everyday matters instead of the person concerned. The development of “*honne* and *tatemae*” has an influence on groupism and human relationships.

3.2.3 Japanese Mindset

The Japanese care too much about the public attention because they have lived in a small country or community. They are always afraid of other's eyes and mouths, rather than god or Buddha. They do not want to be embarrassed in front of the public, society or group. It is called “shame culture.” Ruth Benedict (2011) explains “True shame” culture in Japan in *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*:

True shame culture use criticism from the outside to make people behave well, rather than using the idea of sin, as in guilt cultures. Shame is a reaction to what other people think about someone. The Japanese say that someone who does not follow the rules of good behavior or understand the results of actions should feel shame (*haji*). They say that shame is where virtue comes from. Because shame is so important in Japan, every man watches how other people judge his actions (147).

It is true that Japanese people consider “shame” is important. In Japanese language, there are some expressions using “shame” or similar words: “knowing shame”, “not knowing shame”, “save face”, and “lost face”. “Face” means honor in this situation, not a part of one’s body, but “save face” expressed “avoid shame”. De Mente (2004) says, “The primary goal of the Japanese was to avoid *haji*, “shame”, and “feeling of shame,” and avoiding shame meant behaving in the manner that had become customary and accepted in Japanese society.” (223) “Shame” culture has influenced the moral foundation of Japanese society.

Benedict (2011) chose the word, “*Seijitsu*” or “*Makoto*” (sincerity) which shows a moral virtue in Japan. The word includes various orders. She says, “If the heart is not sincere, then one’s words and actions, however good, are just a show and have no meaning, and if the heart is sincere, a person can do anything.”(141) In Japan, people are demanded to be equivalent to each other and everything sincerely. Benedict (2011) also points out “sincerity” as follows:

A basic meaning of ‘sincerity’ in Japan is that it is the passion for following the Japanese code and the Japanese spirit. “*Makoto*” is used to praise people who are not always trying to get things for themselves or make a profit. When people lend money to make a profit, it is said that they do not have ‘sincerity.’ It is also used for the man who is free of passion, and this shows the Japanese idea of controlling oneself. A Japanese person who is sincere is never in danger of insulting someone he does not want to anger. This shows the idea that a person is responsible for the results of his actions, as well as the action itself. Finally, one also has to have *makoto* to be a leader because one can use one’s skills effectively and be free of inner conflict. These three meanings, and others as well, show simply how a man can be effective and not in conflict only when he is carrying out the code. (143)

In the Japanese minds, they have a feeling that they would not like to make

someone feel uncomfortable. They always maintain a harmonious balance with society, other people and other countries, and to act or behave sincerely in order to avoid not only conflict but also shame.

4. A Comparative Study of Korean and Japanese Culture

In the preceding section, the characteristics of Korean and Japanese cultures are examined. In this section, the two cultures are compared and verified, then the differences and similarities are pointed out.

It was described in the preceding section that Korea was influenced by some religions such as Confucianism, Buddhist, Taoist and shamanist and the people have adopted them into their social lives and philosophical attitudes aptly. Furthermore, approximately 25 percent of Koreans are Christians, hence, they have a unique character. One of the cultural characteristics is a shame culture, which is influenced by Confucianism. "Saving face" is an important element in order to avoid losing their reputation. "Groupism" (group consciousness) is also a characteristic, and it shows the emotional and intellectual homogenization. They tend to behave in the same way due to powerful sanctions. In the culture of group consciousness, Koreans have thought that they needed to avoid conflict and friction, hence, they have valued "harmony" to find a good relationship. The characteristics came from the hierarchical relationship, which determines their place gender, age, authority and seniority. The seniority system is one of ranks, which are based on class, education and official position as well as age and gender. This customs remains deeply rooted in their society at present.

In Korea, one fourth of people are Christians and they are affected by the Catholic churches. They became independent from China in the 1800s. The reason why many Koreans adopted Christianity is that they had desired human rights, social equality, and other democratic principles, especially for women. Korean people had serious experiences under China, and the annexation by Japan for a long period. One of the typical Korean emotional expressions is "*Haan*". The feeling was influenced by the tragic national history such as war or invasion. In particular, Japanese colonization and exploitation caused the feeling of "*haan*". Koreans had endured unfair external violence for a long time. As a result, they dwelled the feeling of "*haan*" in their mind, and will never forget Japanese acts such as an invasion or annexation. O (1992)⁴² said, "*Haan* is not only a feeling of grudge but also a feeling of vexation. When they cannot achieve their goal, they feel the emotion inside". (178) It is said that Koreans have strong nationalistic

feelings against Japan. The words, “Sadaejuu” and “Petit Sinocentrism” have an important term of Korean nation. China is one of the biggest countries and Korea had belonged to China for several hundred years, hence, in Korean mind, Petit Sinocentrism was etched. However, Japan which is a small county, annexed and ruled Korea, furthermore, Korean people were suffered from the Japanese military. Koreans, who have strong nationalism and identity, have experienced the indignity of being annexed and ruled by a small country.

Koreans were influenced by China, Japan, and Christianity, so they have two aspects such as independence and tradition. They maintain their own tradition and culture, and value their family and relatives. Koreans have deep respect for elderly people, and oriental feelings such as selflessness and group consciousness. Whereas, they are independent, envious and have their own opinions. Korea has a gap between oriental and western aspects. They are very flexible and adaptable, hence, they think that they need to have proper ways of thinking in not only their country but also international business places.

On the other hand, Japan has a particular traditional culture, too. Japan is influenced by Shintoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. A special feature is that many Japanese believe in both Shintoism and Buddhism. For example, they visit Shinto shrines on days of celebrations or visit temples after the death of a relative. It is often said that Japanese have no religion, however, they have honored their ancestors or the dead for a long period. The religions have infiltrated into Japanese minds or custom. Furthermore, Shinto supported the Emperor system in a religious sense. Whereas, Confucianism, which was adopted by the Tokugawa Shogunate teaches Japanese proper behavior and human relationships. The three religions have influenced Japanese culture, mind, and human daily lives.

The most characteristic culture in Japan is “*honne* and *tatemae*”, hierarchy, harmony and shame culture. “*Honne*” means honest feeling or real intentions, and “*tatemae*” is official stance. The Japanese have valued “*tatemae*” in order to preserve harmony, relationships in a group or society, and would like to avoid conflict. They have cultivated creating a comfortable atmosphere for a long period of time. However, many

people from other countries, such as Westerners are flurried because honest feelings or intentions and official stances are different. Even when they negotiate with the foreign people on business they take their own culture or custom into the international places. It can cause conflict and misunderstanding between Japan and other countries.

Next, a vertically-structured society is one of the Japanese characteristics like Korea. The Tokugawa divided the social class, such as “four castes (Shinokousho)”, and ruled Japanese behavior, as a result, they had acted based on hierarchy and inequality and had been ruled on their everyday lives for hundreds years. A government, society and community was influenced by this hierarchy. Especially, in Japanese companies, a seniority system (Nenko joretsu) is shown clearly. The employees’ promotion is based on the length of their service or age. Recently, some companies have introduced merit-based system, such as performance-based pay and promotion regardless of age like the United States, however, it is difficult to become established in Japan because of the seniority system, harmony and group consciousness that have been valued for a long time. There are some improper relationships between the superior and the subordinate: for example, the subordinate should follow their superior’s instruction or order, and they are always “yes-man”, or cannot say “no”.

Another interesting characteristic in Japan is “shame culture”. Shame means a painful emotion resulting from an awareness of guilt or inadequacy and a state of disgrace. Japanese often say, “Do not put the company, ancestors, family, or parents to shame.” They are always afraid of other’s eyes and public, though. The word “save face” means “avoid shame”. And also, Japanese are always worried about other people’s opinions or criticisms, whereas, they do not try to consider their behaviors by themselves. In their everyday life, they are thinking how other people judge their behavior or actions in the society, community, or schools in which they belong to. This culture comes from group consciousness and harmony.

Furthermore, Japanese always require “sincerity” to others in everyday life or business. They think that all people do something with sincerity which shows a moral virtue. Recently, numerous people from other countries experience the feeling of hospitality, “*Omotenashi*” and are surprised at the Japanese behaviors. When

salesclerks show shoes at the shop, they kneel down to the floor. They value the feeling of sincerity or *omotenashi* and it is one of the most important cultures in Japan.

The differences between Korean and Japanese cultures are shown in the preceding section. The feeling of “*haan*” came from repeated invasions by China and Japan. “*Sadaejuui* (flunky)” and “Petit Sinocentrism” are the key words when Korean culture is described. Korea had belonged to China for several hundred years. Korea thought China had great power, whereas, Korea had a minor power and Petit Sinocentrism. On the other hand, Japan, which is a small neighboring country, annexed and ruled Korea for several decades, hence, why Koreans felt humiliated during this period. They say that they will never forget the tragic experiences forever and never erase “*haan*” against Japan in the near future. This feeling still remains in the Korean minds firmly.

Another difference is that 25 percent of Koreans are Christian. In Japan, there are less than one percent. They became independent from China and desired human rights, social equality and democratic principle. In this situation, many Koreans adopted Christianity easily. They have two aspects such as independence and tradition. It is said that Koreans are flexible and adaptable. They have oriental feelings such as selflessness and group consciousness, whereas, they make a judgement clearly and hate ambiguity. O (1992) describes that some scholars says that Korean people had to make a clear judgement to live in the Korean Peninsula for a long time.

Some similarities are shown in the two countries, too. The cultures in Korea and Japan have been influenced by Confucianism and Buddhism and adopted into their social life and philosophical attitudes aptly. A peculiarity common similarity in the two countries are hierarchy, group consciousness and harmony, hence, they have valued traditions, cultures, and respect for elder people. The group consciousness shows the emotional and intellectual homogenization, and avoid conflict and friction in the society or community. As a result, they need to establish a good relationships to keep harmony. Furthermore, they have typical cultures such as shame culture or saving face. It means avoiding losing their fame, make a good impression or showing off.

As stated above, it is clear that there are similarities in Korean and Japanese cultures, and many common features from the two countries are shown. However, it is

said that Korea and Japan are nations both close geographically and distant politically. They need to understand each other culture and history, and find a good relationship between them in the near future.

4 Important Factors Influence in the Relationship between Korea and Japan

Japanese and Korean historical encounter in the section 1-2, and differences and similarities in cultures between the two countries in 1-3, were studied. In this section, the actions and measures influenced by each culture are inspected, and important factors of the conflict between Japan and Korea are found out through their cultures.

The first conflict between the two countries is the historical textbook controversy. Korea protests that the textbooks were decided to be officially authorized by the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology in 2001. This screening process developed into not only the history education controversy but also the diplomatic problem. The problem which Korea pointed out is that Japan justified their colonial rule and equivocated “aggression / invasion”. The Japanese government did not explain the point, “aggression / invasion” to Korea clearly. Chief Cabinet Secretary Kiichi Miyazawa (1982) said that Japan would pay due attention to these criticism and made correction at the Government’s responsibility.” In 2001, the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda expressed the deep remorse and heartfelt apology to the Asian countries, however, he stated that Japanese government should not define specific historical perspectives and outlooks. They only indicate the obvious mistake or a lack of balance, and require the editors to amend them. The Korean system is different from the Japanese one. School textbooks are edited and authorized by the Korean Government, hence, they did not think that the explanation of the Japanese government was sufficient and Korea did not satisfy their statement. On the other hand, Fukuda did not refer to the government’s responsibility, and his statement is not clear and direct. Sin said that Japanese government stated that they had taken “necessary consideration” to neighboring countries, but the words are ambiguous and the definite standard is not clear. On the other hand, Korea cancelled or postponed the interchange and events with Japan, because Japan did not accept the proposed amendment on the historical textbook from Korea. The Korean government took a closer look at the Japanese historical textbook issue, and took a strong and clear attitude towards Japan. Their actions were boycott of Japanese products, burning a Japanese national flag, and the public protest demonstrations by the civic organization.

The conflict has continued between the two countries, whereas, a new movement appeared among civic organization. Some scholars think that solving the problem on the Japanese historical textbook should be searched and they need to make a common historical textbook for each other. Furthermore, the government of the two countries have provided supports for historical dialogue between historians and history teachers who endeavor to get over the ongoing issue. Actually, the Korea-Japan Meeting Commission for the Joint Study of History was held.

Second, a territorial confliction on Takeshima / Dokdo hinders the development of the relationships between Japan and Korea. According to the data of the Genron NPO and East Asia Institute (2014), 66.5 percent of Korean people take up the territorial dispute, whereas, 36.7 percent of Japanese do it. Korean people think that the issue has been the most important not only in their country but also in their mindset. In 2012, South Korean President, Myung-bak Lee visited Dokdo and established a stone monument. The relationship between two countries got worse after that. The previous day, one Korean soccer player held a sign which reads “Dokdo is our territory” after his Korean team’s victory over Japan at the London Olympic 2012.

The first conflict over Takeshima/Dokdo is that the President of the Republic of Korea, Syngman Rhee issued a declaration on maritime sovereignty and he established the “Syngman Rhee Line” in 1952. Whereas, the Japanese government protested the declaration and the line. The two countries assert their recognition on the island through various documents. The Japanese government states that Takeshima is Japan’s territory and based this on international law in a calm and peaceful manner. Their policy is that the territorial issue should be to take a measure of a peaceful settlement and entrust it to the International Court of Justice. Japan tended to avoid communication with the Korean government directly and sought a peaceful solution through the go-between, “International Court of Justice”. Japan would make an approach to Korea and sent some note verbal to them, however, the Korean government rejected the proposal. On the other hand, the Korean government stationed permanent security personnel on Dokdo, constructing lodgings, a monitoring facility, a lighthouse, and port and docking facilities. Furthermore, in 1954, a patrol vessel of the Maritime Safety Agency (Japan Coast

Guard) near Takeshima was fired on from the island and they have pushed ahead with a construction plan of a berthing facility and done military exercises. Japan protested against the Korean actions strongly. As aforesaid, the Korean actions are the direct and strong attitudes against Japan. And they refused the Japanese approach and took strong action. Japan has asserted that Takeshima is Japanese territory, whereas, South Korea has been exercising its sovereignty over Dokdo. The reason why the Korean government and people have taken strong actions against Japan is that the view of the territorial issue is different between the two countries. Korea thought that Dokdo is not merely a tiny island in the East Sea and it is the symbol and identity of Korean sovereignty. On the other hand, Japanese think Takeshima is territorial controversy, hence, Japan always express a strong protest against the Korean government, though, Japan takes the peaceful position to avoid conflict.

The third issue is Yasukuni Shrine. The shrine is the place where people pray for the souls of all those who had fought for Japan and made ultimate sacrifices. Some Japanese prime ministers have visited the shrine before. Furthermore, some government ministers visit there on August 15th, the anniversary of the end of the Pacific War every year. Whenever the Prime Ministers visited the shrine, their actions became the focus of international attention in not only Asian but also Western countries. According to the data of the Genron NPO and East Asia Institute (2014), 70 percent of the South Koreans did not accept Japanese prime ministers' visiting Yasukuni Shrine. The greatest cause of their criticism and anger is that Class A, B and C criminal are enshrined there, hence, they think as long as Japanese prime ministers and cabinets continue to visit the shrine, they will not confront history directly and deny the past and glorify colonial rule, militarism, and a war of aggression. Moreover, the Korean government and people say that Japanese should face real history and they must not distort the historical facts.

Japanese culture has been influenced by Shinto, hence, their sensibility is based on it and the people have felt their cultural identity in Shinto. The culture and tradition came from respecting and worshipping the deceased. In brief, Yasukuni Shrine is an example which represents the genuine Japanese culture and identity, and Shinto cannot

be inseparable from the Emperor because the religion has a deep relationship with the Japanese imperial family. A former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has visited Yasukuni Shrine several times and he said that the purpose was to express respect and gratitude to the persons who passed away during the wars, furthermore, thanks to the people, Japan is able to maintain a peaceful world now. He argued that he made the visits as an individual citizen, not in an official capacity or as a prime minister. He also stated that Japan caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of Asian countries through the colonial rule and aggression. He expressed his feeling of deep remorse, heartfelt apology and expresses the feeling of mourning for all victims. Japanese government, the prime ministers and cabinets have thought that they stated an in-depth apologies to Asian countries, however, the Korean government and people thought that the Japanese apology was not sufficient, and Korea has demanded Japan not to visit Yasukuni Shrine directly and strictly. On the other hand, the Japanese government has argued that the Korean demand is an interference in the domestic affairs of another nation, however, some prime ministers and cabinets have withheld from visiting the shrine on August 15th. The Japanese government tends to avoid confliction and tries to maintain a good relationship between the two countries.

A Korean scholar, Park (2011) pointed out that his visiting to Yasukuni Shrine seemed to lead to militarism and he should consider Japanese minds as well as Korean and other Asian people's mind. His action was facing inward, not outward, hence, Asian people could not accept his act. One interesting fact is that Seoul National Cemetery⁴³ is the place which the soldiers and the spirits of dead soldiers who lost their lives for protection and development of Korea are enshrined like Japan. In both countries, they respect and praise these dead soldiers who fought for the nations. However, Korean people think Yasukuni Shrine and Seoul National Cemetery are different, because the view of the people are that Japanese are wrongdoers, whereas, Korea is a victim. In their mind, this structure will not be changed in the near future. On the other hand, Park (2011) stated that Koreans is wrongdoer in the Vietnam War passively. This fact is known to Japan. Park said that Japan and Korea concealed the facts during the wars. They should face the fact and real history with each other and understand the history.

The fourth confliction is “comfort women”, and 55.8 percent of Korean people have an interest on the issue. There are two points of view. One is that comfort women were forced by Imperial Japan to serve as sex slaves for its soldiers and more than 50 percent of the comfort women were Koreans. Another is that they were licensed prostitutes, professionals and engaged in business. In other word, there was nothing that corresponded with reality. However, Japanese government investigated the issue and they accepted that there were comfort women who were forced by Imperial Japan indubitably and they severely injured the honor and dignity of them. Hence, the government has extended its sincere apologies and remorse to all comfort women who suffered immeasurable pain and incurable physical and psychological wounds. After that, the Asian Women’s Fund was established in 1995 in order to express the Japanese Government’s and the people’s sincere apologies and remorse.

On the other hand, Korea has protested against Japan strongly. The Korean government and people do not think that Japan’s actions are enough and the Japanese government should adopt a resolution at an official level. Korea took action establishing a Comfort Women statue not only in front of the Japanese embassy but also in China and the U.S. and Korean people demonstrate near the Japanese embassy every week. The comfort women have been waiting for an official apology for more than 60 years. Moreover, Korea has been expanding the issue to international places as a “universal women rights issue”. After Ms. Geun-hye Park was inaugurated as Korean President, she visited the U.S. and had a talk with U.S. President Obama. In the conference, she informed on Japan to him and her diplomacy was called “Talebearer Diplomacy”. The U.S. government said that she has been attached to Japanese historical recognition.

Korea will never forget and forgive the colonial rule by Japan. It is not easy for Korean people to heal the emotional wound in the near future. As long as Korea have feelings of *Haan*, Korean anger will not subside. The background of the Korean action or feeling are relevant to “*Haan*”, “*Sadaejuui*”, and Petit Sinocentrism, which came from the repeated invasions. Korea and Japan have very similar cultures, however, historical recognitions are different. Park (2011) pointed out that Korean people have understood that the Asian Women’s Fund was established in order to avoid their responsibility.

Korean government needed to disclose the fact of the Fund to Korean people in detail. Korean and Japanese scholars have studied history together in two countries and a civil group have worked for the cultural exchange between South Korea and Japan for a long time. They have to face the truth that in order to establish a good relationship between the two countries, they need to understand each others points of view.

Chapter 2 Fieldwork (Contact and Conflict)

1. Comparative Study of Communication Styles in Korea and Japan

1.1 Cross-cultural Communication Patterns: High / Low Context Culture

It is generally recognized that people from different countries communicate in different ways. Edward T. Hall's theory of "High/Low context culture" makes these differences clear and definite. The context relates to the framework, background, and surrounding circumstances in which communication or an event takes place. (College of MARIN)⁴⁴ Hall (1996: 91) indicated that "a high-context (HC) communication or message is one in which most of the information is either in the physical context or internalized in the person, while very little is in the coded, explicit, transmitted part of the message". On the other hand, Hall said that "a low-context (LC) communication is just the opposite; i.e., the mass of the information is vested in the explicit code". (91) Nishimura, Nevgi and Tella(2009) quoted in *High-versus Low-context culture*, "in HC cultures, communication style is influenced by the closeness of human relationships, well-structured social hierarchy, and strong behavioral norms". They describe HC culture as follows:

In a high context (HC) culture, internal meaning is usually embedded deep in the information, so not everything is explicitly stated in writing or when spoken. In a HC culture, the listener is expected to be able to read "between the lines", to understand the unsaid, thanks to his or her background knowledge. (785)

High-context cultures including Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and South America, are indirect, ambiguous, harmonious, and reserved.

On the other hand, a low-context (LC) cultures include the US, Germany, and other northern European individualistic cultures. (Merkin, 2009: 2) Nishimura, Nevgi and Tella (2009) points out LC:

In a low context (LC) culture, meanings are explicitly stated through language. People communicating usually expect explanations when something remains unclear. As Hall (1976) explains, most information is expected to be in the transmitted message in order to make up for what is missing in the context (both internal and external). An LC culture is characterized by direct and linear communication and by the constant and sometimes never-ending use of words. Communication is direct, precise, dramatic, open, and based on feelings or true intentions. (785)

Nishimura, Nevgi and Tella (2009) showed a table of High/Low context by culture, which were quoted in Hall and Hall (1990). According to the table, Japan is at the top of the list of high context cultures. (786) Nishimura, Nevgi and Tella quoted Lewis (2005: 68), who described the “Finish values/communication dilemma”. The table shows that Asian values includes hierarchies, fatalism, male-dominated work ethic, inequality and an exploited environment, on the other hand, communication styles include introversive, modesty, tacitness or silence, a lack of interruption, distrust for big outspokenness, diplomacy before truth, and little body language. Hall and Hall (1990) place Japan at the top of the list of HC cultures, too. They state Japanese communication style as:

Indeed, Japanese communication style has all the characteristics of HC cultures, such as indirect and digressive communication, use of few words, reliance on contextual cues, avoidance of the use of personal names, respect for long silences, and waiting politely until the other person has stopped speaking before taking turns. When conversing in Japanese, people have to listen carefully to their interlocutors to find the context and elicit the meaning beyond the words. (790)

South Koreans have been known to have a high-context culture with extensive amounts of understood information and an emphasis on relationships, too. Thomas (1998) argues their communication style, “South Korea is considered a high-context

culture by all writers, and this assumption suggests that South Koreans value the community more than the individual, emphasize personal relationships, and use a number of face-saving strategies in doing business.” (10) Merkin (2009) studied comparative communication patterns between Korean and American. She pointed out Korean communication patterns:

Past research indicates that Koreans create ambiguous messages to obscure their meaning (Lim & Choi, 1996). ... In addition, indirect communication is likely to appeal to Korean citizens because they tend to value Confucianism which emphasized harmony and egalitarianism. Not taking a stand and obscuring one position on an issue that helps others save face and is, therefore, a preferred communication strategy for Koreans (Park, 1993). Part of the reason Koreans engage in high context communication is reflected in their deeply rooted Confucian values and ideology which includes allowing all participants in communication to save face if possible (Lim & Choi, 1996). (2)

However, Thomas (1998) found out another characteristics of South Koreans in his survey.

Although South Korea does fit the high-context profile, South Koreans' communication styles vary from other Asian high-context countries. South Koreans appear to be more direct and straightforward in their communication styles than, say, the Japanese. (29)

Two aspects are seen in South Koreans. Despite having a high-context culture, they have characteristics of a low-context culture such as “direct” and “straightforward”. It is said that Koreans and Japanese cultures are similar because they have high-context cultures. However, Koreans are more direct than Japanese. The reason is that Japanese tend to keep a distance, while Koreans prefer zero distance. Japanese always use “*honne*” (honest feelings) and “*tatemae*” (official stance) to keep psychological and physical

distance with others, and they create situations of ambiguity with temperate distance. On the other hand, Koreans approach others with honest feelings. (Gengotoiu Kankyou, 104)

1.2 The Features of Korean Communication Styles

Korea has a high-context culture like most Asians including Japanese, Arabs, and Mediterraneans. Koreans are indirect, meticulously and avoid confrontations, and have features such as “harmony”, “group conscious”, “shame culture” and “selflessness”, whereas Koreans have flexibility outside economically and feel comfortable with “zero-distance”⁴⁵ negotiations. Many Japanese people feel that as Korean culture is unique and different as they easily get excited, forceful, passionate, and talkative. In this section, several features of Korean communication style are described. First, according to De Mente (1998) in *The Korean Mind*, “this linguistic development came about because in Korea’s inferior-superior-ranked society giving a superior person a negative answer, an incorrect answer, or a disturbing answer could have very serious consequences.” (268)

In Korean language, there are simple, clear-cut words for “yes” and “no”—“*ne*” and “*anio*”— “saying “no” outright is still considered impolite by older generations—an attitude that can cause no end of problems to foreigners who are not turn in to Korea’s cultural communication channels.” (269) Koreans tend to avoid saying “yes” and “no” clearly (*ne* and *anio*). De Mente (1998) points our three primary words for “yes” in Korean:

Ye, which is used when addressing superiors; *ne*, which may also be used when addressing equals; and *kurae*, which is used when addressing inferiors and has the connotation of the English word “right.” But *ye* or *ne* does not always mean as unqualified “yes” in their Korean context. In many cases *ye* and *ne* do not mean agreement. Instead they mean “I hear you,” or “I understand what you are saying (but).” If, for example, you ask if someone can do something by a certain hour or day and he says *ye/ne* (or *kurae*), it does not necessarily mean he will do it. All too often, such response are meant only

to keep things on a pleasant, harmonious level, to avoid upsetting the other person's feelings. (269)

It is important for Koreans to avoid discord and save the face of both parties, hence they avoid saying "No" and the words "*ye/ne*", which include circumlocutory meanings. Westerners need to understand their context.

Second, some matters are given more priority by Asian people or Westerners. For example, Westerners opt for short-term goals-immediate advantages, quick profits, instant satisfaction, and so on. Everything goes quickly and they are prompt in their decisions. On the other hand, Asians "take a long-term view, approach things slowly, often by circuitous routes, and are satisfied with making progress in small incremental steps." (37) Whenever they make a decision, they need to consult with their superior, so it takes a long time to decide something. They are always circumspect in coping with a problem and making a decision. De Mente (1998) points out that "Asians have traditionally preferred to accumulate every shred of information possible, study it thoroughly over a relatively long period of time, and then devise strategies that take all possible contingencies into account." (37) In brief, they get everything ready and step ahead carefully.

De Mente (1998) mentions "sincerity" as one of the Korean attributes:

Of course there are now numerous exceptions to this traditional form of Asian behavior, but many of the attitudes associated with this mind-set remain vital factors in everyday life in Asia and are especially conspicuous in personal management and other areas of business. In Korea, for example, one of the most important attributes that employers look for in job applicants is expressed in the term *chinshim*, which literally means "true heart" and is the Korean word for "sincerity." (37)

"*Chinshim*" in Korean is different from "sincerity" in English language and includes many meanings. In Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (2000), "sincere" means "(of

feeling, beliefs or behavior) showing what you really think of feel”. And it is used in a rather casual manner in its typical Western context. (37) De Mente (1998) explains “*chinshim*” as follows:

In contrast, *chinshim* in its Korean context refers to the philosophical beliefs, including spirituality, general attitude, and overall characters, of an individual. People with a “true heart” are those who can be trusted to behave according to the highest social and ethical standards, which includes being unselfish, scrupulously honest, loyal to their superiors, hard-working, and willing to make extraordinary sacrifices to achieve more than what they are asked and expected to do. (37)

The word, “*chinshim*” has meaning of not only attitude in the society but also philosophy and spirituality. It has been infiltrated into their mind deeply for a long time. Furthermore, Koreans have “sincerity radar”, which is that “when the meetings are casual and are not expected to lead to any kind of relationship, Koreans automatically measure the “*chinshim*” of every person they meet”. (37-38) Westerners have to read between the lines when they would like to establish relationships with Koreans.

Third, the Korean economy has grown remarkably and now the rate of Korea’s economic growth is far better than Japan. How do the Koreans negotiate with other countries? De Mente (2012) indicates that “negotiations” in Korea are a microcosm of the culture in action and in a typical Korean scenario, the heads or senior executives of two corporations meet and agree that the companies will do business with each other.” (237) He explains Koreans’ bargaining skill as follows:

Koreans are skilled negotiators. While more open-minded and flexible than the Japanese and Chinese, they generally regard compromise as a form of weakness, and when bargaining they prefer to begin with a go-for-broke approach, drawing back only at the last moment if they meet insurmountable resistance. When they do meet resistance, Koreans typically alternate

between confrontation and compromise, in an effort to achieve their goals in small increments. (237)

Koreans use different techniques of negotiation as they see the situation. However, Westerners sometimes are flurried because of the Korean custom of not saying no clearly or directly. De Mente (1998) says, "Among the expression that are commonly used in place of 'no' are 'we will study it further,' 'we must consult with our top management,' or the old standby, which means 'we'll see' or 'we'll think about it.'" (237) Their attitudes can cause delay of the way around the problem. De Mente (1998) points out the solution, "To develop personal relationships to the point that Koreans can overcome their paranoia and respond with confidence". (237)

De Mente (1998) mentions two aspects of the negotiating behavior of Koreans. One aspect is that:

One aspect of the negotiating behavior of Korean managers and executives that often confuses foreign businesspeople is their habit of suddenly switching their position 180 degrees without any warning or explanation—something that is common in all authoritarian, hierarchical societies. The rationale behind this kind of behavior seems to be that the people involved will maintain a certain position up to the point where the threat of its backfiring appears imminent and then reverse themselves as a protective measure. Reversals of this kind may be prompted by the Koreans' recognizing that the opposing party is on the verge of breaking off the engagement or when a new element is introduced that somehow puts them in jeopardy. This kind of Korean behavior is difficult for outsiders to understand and accept because it often appears to be totally arbitrary and purposely disruptive. It is an arbitrary approach, but it is a serious one. The Korean negotiators are, in effect, gambling that the other party will fold and they will win. (238)

Another aspect is influenced by traditional Korean culture. The measures

employed in their negotiation depends on whether they have an established relationship or not. They are cautious about those outsiders who they are not familiar with, but once they have an established relationship, they are open-minded and flexible. They adjust the use of “distance” and “zero-distance” negotiation according to this relationship.

When negotiations are not going well, Koreans take action the following:

Koreans decide to cut their losses and get out, they may resort to *danyomhada*, which literally means something like “cutting one’s mind” but is used in the sense of “throwing in the towel.” They are more likely, however, to spring a surprise move of their counterparts known as *sunsu chida*, which means something like “first to draw” or “first to stride” and refers to a sudden maneuver designed to win a major point or put your opponents in a position where they have no more room to maneuver. (238)

1.3 The Features of Japanese Communication Styles

Westerners and non-Japanese speakers often say that Japanese people express themselves indirectly and ambiguously in their society. However, in not only within Japanese society as this attitude can cause misunderstandings or misconceptions in international surrounding where a communication gap is felt by other parties.

First, Davies and Ikeno (2002) points out the origins of “*aimai*” (ambiguity). Japan is an island country, so Japanese culture developed in relative isolation and Japan was not invaded by other countries. As a result, people had lived in a small community and are all acquainted well each other. “The concept of Harmony, or *wa*, became an important factor in Japanese life, helping to maintain relationships between members of close-knit communities.” (10) Furthermore, Davies and Ikeno (2002) mention rice agriculture:

People had to cooperate in this society because they could not grow rice without one another’s help, and if they worked together, they were able to grow more food. There developed a kind of “rule of the unanimous,” and people

tended not to go against group wishes for fear that they would be excluded from the community (*Murahachibu*, or ostracism). If people sacrificed themselves and worked for the group, the group supported them, so they made their own opinions conform with their group's objectives and felt a comfortable sense of harmony. Natural communication often occurred without spoken words, and people followed their elders because they had more experience, wisdom, and power. In order to live without creating any serious problems for the group's harmony, people avoided expressing their ideas clearly, even to the point of avoiding giving a simple yes or no answer. If a person really wanted to say no, he or she said nothing at first, then used vague expressions that conveyed the nuance of disagreement. People's words thus came to contain a variety of meanings. (10)

This attitude of Japanese "*aimai*" can make people from other countries irritated. For example, when asked "Which would you prefer, Japanese or Korean food?" Many Japanese often say, "Either is OK" or "(It doesn't matter what) anything is OK?" Davies and Ikeno (2002) pointed out this ambiguous attitude as follows:

This is a reserved and polite answer, but it often causes the host or hostess trouble. In fact, the word that Japanese most often have difficulty in using is no and their use of vague denials also results in criticism. Ambiguity is one of the biggest problems in communication between Japan and other nations today, resulting in a great deal of friction and misunderstanding. (13-14)

Of course, Japanese people can intuitively read the mind or intentions among others in their community, group or society. However, it is difficult for Westerners and non-Japanese to do so because they communicate with others through more direct language.

Second, "*chinmoku*" (use of silence) is one of the typical Japanese communication styles. They use few words in front of public. For example, when students study at school, they seldom ask the teacher any questions in the class. When having some questions,

they go to the teacher and ask them after class or privately. There are similar cases in business negotiations, especially international venues places. Westerners discuss issues aggressively ask many questions at the meetings or conferences, whereas Japanese business people do not try to ask any questions or to voice their opinions. Although foreign clients require the results or personal opinions from Japanese counterparts, they just say, "I cannot say my own opinion / decision now. I will talk about the issue at our company or ask our boss". They use "our" not "my" because they think they belong to the company. Westerners are usually irritated with these attitudes because western businesspersons cannot understand what their Japanese counterpart thinks about the issues of the negotiation.

However, "*chinmoku*" is not negative communication style in Japanese society. It has been said that "silence" is a virtue from a long time ago. Davies and Ikeno (2002) explained "*chinmoku*", "Silence, or *chinmoku*, in particular, can be viewed as a communicative skill, not just a form of emptiness between spoken words." (51) And they quoted Tannen's (1987) note, "Silence can be a matter of saying nothing and meaning something." Davies and Ikeno (2002) says, "These causes can be classified into two main categories: historical factors and the dominance of group consciousness in Japanese life". (51) There are two words that express Japanese attitudes in non-verbal communication known as "*haragei*" and "*ishin denshin*". These terms in Japanese demonstrate the importance of tacit understanding where reading intentions is paramount in Japanese communication.

Davies and Ikeno (2002) indicate two points of view on "*chinmoku*". One is Zen Buddhism and another is group consciousness:

Zen Buddhism is thought to have had a great influence on the development of these attitudes toward silence in Japan. The goal of Zen practice is not stated explicitly but is understood only at a deeper intuitive level within learners themselves through constant practice, which puts emphasis on meditation, quietude, and emptying one's mind. Zen training is designed to teach that truth cannot be described verbally, but can exist only in silence.

(52) Another reason why the Japanese often become silent among other people is group consciousness, which is symbolized by the saying “The nail that sticks out will be hammered down” (*Deru kui wa utareru*). In Japanese society, where people usually identify themselves primarily as member of certain groups, not just as individuals, silence has played a very important role in creating harmony and in avoiding direct conflict.... Many people in Japan think that it is better to say nothing than cause misunderstandings or trouble. Silence in Japanese communication is also related to a strong consciousness of social hierarchy within the group and in society at large. (52-53)

Japanese people are always conscious of their own position and stance among their groups in order to avoid conflict there. Davies and Ikeno (2002) describes the functions of “*chinmoku*” in *The Japanese Mind*. According to their view point, Japanese displays positive as well as negative aspects to the functions of silence. When they are silent, it doesn’t always mean that they have no idea, ignore, or have no interests. Davies and Ikeno (2002) explains the function of “*chinmoku*” in detail:

Silence is commonly thought to indicate thoughtfulness or hesitation in trying to find a good way to communicate smoothly; therefore, even though people have something to say, they may not express everything that they have in mind and may leave their true intentions unspoken. This kind of silence is known as *enryo-sasshi* (i.e., reserve and restraint). In high-context Japanese culture (Hall, 1970), direct verbal expression, especially negative forms of communication such as anger, hate, refusal, disagreement, and defiance are avoided. (53)

Many Japanese do not say “no”, because they would like to maintain a good atmosphere. They always feel and read the atmosphere of the situation, members, group and society. Davies and Ikeno (2002) indicates other points:

Silence thus functions as a kind of lubricating oil to create smoother communication because it can help to avoid hurting others and contributes to a peaceful and harmonious atmosphere, allowing people to overcome difficult situations in a calm and unhurried way. ..., actions or judgements tend to be delayed, so it often takes too much time to clarify the facts and solve problematic situations. The Japanese may also be silent not only to avoid conflict with others but also to hurt someone or to keep them at a distance. When people feel angry or are in disagreement with others, they may not directly express their feeling but often just keep silent and ignore the other person. (54-55)

In the international business arena, Japanese businesspersons do not say their own opinions, and they cannot make important judgements at the table. They return to their companies and talk about the issue, after that they inform their decisions by fax.

Third, not only Japanese people but also Westerners always say that Japanese are weak in negotiations with foreign people as well as in diplomatic negotiations. The Japanese's expressions are ambiguous and indirect, so their actions and judgement tend to be delayed. As a result, it can take too much time to solve problems and it postpones resolutions. De Mente (2004) points out, "This challenge is made still more complicated by the fact that a great many concepts in Japanese do not have exact English-language equivalents, just as there are many English words with no precise Japanese equivalents." (173) He explained that "a perfect example of this problem is the English word "negotiation" and its nearest Japanese equivalent, "*kosho*" (coming out fighting). (173) De Mente (2004) states the difference between "negotiation" and "*kosho*" as follows:

The cultural nuance of "negotiation" is relatively neutral. It simply means that two or more parties talk over a matter until they reach agreement. Verbal battles may be fought during negotiations, but the concept of negotiating does not require or imply such battles. Generally speaking, Westerners see negotiating as a civilized way of reaching agreements that are fair and

mutually beneficial. Business people go into negotiating sessions armed with facts that they attempt to present in a rational, straightforward manners. “Negotiation,” as such, is not an inflammatory word. (173)

As aforesaid, Westerners are richly experienced in negotiations and grasp the real meaning of them. “Negotiation” is not a fighting scene, but it is civilized method and the place where they try to choose a path to agreement.

On the other hand, “*kosho*” is different from “negotiation”. De Mente (2004) refers to the difference between “negotiation” and “*koshō*”.

In its normal Japanese context, *kosho* conjures up images of conflict, of using all sorts of devious strategies, of fighting a battle in which there is a winner and a loser.... The Japanese tend to view negotiating with Westerners as a battle because they see a great deal of the typical behavior of foreigners as aggressive and predatory and designed specifically to take advantage of other people. And, of course, there are enough historical precedents to give credence to this Japanese belief, so it is important for the foreign side to avoid any signs of trying to verbally or physically overpower their counterparts.... In their *kosho* “battles,” the Japanese typically use a passive-aggressive-cooperative approach. They generally come into negotiating sessions in a passive, receptive mode; listening and asking questions to draw the other side out. This strategy often leads Westerners, particularly Americans, to believe that they are really making progress, with the result that they reveal their weaknesses as well as their strengths, and put themselves at a serious disadvantage. (173)

“*Koshō*” becomes a fighting battle for the Japanese, however, their attitudes can have the opposite effect to what was intended resulting in one-way communication. De Mente (2004) describes another strategy of Japanese negotiators as follows:

Another strategy of Japanese negotiators is to be cooperative and good-natured right up to the point where it seems that an agreement has been reached, and then suddenly they become rude and critical, a ruse that almost always shocks the foreigners and throws them off-balance. By this time, the foreign negotiators have already stated congratulating themselves; their defenses are down, and they are extremely vulnerable to accepting less than what they thought they had achieved in order to prevent the whole effort from being a failure. (174)

And also, De Mente (2004) points out Westerners' viewpoints of the way of the Japanese employ *kosho*:

It is also common for Japanese negotiators to use the “good cop, bad cop” approach, with the bad cop—usually a low-ranking manager—asking all of the controversial questions and putting the other side on the spot.

Generally speaking, Westerners going into negotiations with Japanese for the first time almost always underestimate them. By Western standards, Japanese negotiators may not look smart, act confident, or appear aggressively capable, but this characteristic cultural behavior is misleading. The nature of their culture makes it imperative that the Japanese become very clever at masking their feelings, their knowledge and their experience, and their skill in manipulating people to get what they want. (174)

Japanese do not seem to negotiate with foreigners using the feeling of “*honne*”. So they have to mask their intentions to avoid and think that “*kosho*” is a battle for them. Negotiations and “*kosyo*” are different in Japanee. However, the Japanese government adopts a weak attitude (*yowagos*) against foreign countries when negotiating. They value “harmony” which has been adopted in their community and society. In this manner, they manage to avoid confrontation with especially South Korea and China because of historical issues, and they always try to put off sensitive issues or take an ambiguous

attitude.

2. A Mission Contents at the Vessel Traffic Service Center of Japan and Korea

2.1 VTS Centers in Busan (Korea)

Busan is one of the major ports in Asia and it is a hub port providing diverse transport services. Approximately 200 vessels, which are not only domestic vessels but also foreign vessels, are coming and going through the port. Ryoo (2015) says that “In 2004 Korea became the world’s largest ship builder, with most ships being built in the port cities of Busan (See Figure 7.) and Ulsan”. The Korean government recognizes that the VTS centers become very important for the traffic at sea. There are 15 VTS centers in Korea—Busan (See Figure 8.) , Incheon, Yeosu/Gwangyang, Masan/Jinhae, Ulsan, Donghae Mokpo, Pohang, Jeju, Daesan, Gunsan, Pyeongtaek, Busan New Port (See Figure 9.) , Wando, and Jindo. The mission of the VTS Centers into provide information for safe navigation. The directives of the VTS Centers are for ship movement service systems and to provide necessary information or advice for safe navigation using Radar, AIS⁴⁶, VHF, or CCTV⁴⁷ to promote the safety and efficiency of ship movement and to protect the environment.

This is done within a scope which does not violate the right of the masters but does not absolve them from the obligation to observe the port and navigating ship movements through the channels. This raises the efficiency of port management and as a result, the distribution becomes smoother and the VTS comes to contribute to the national economic profit. (Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries Vessel Traffic Services Center)

The VTS Center’s role is that “the VTS center operates navigation service for vessels in order to increase the overall effectiveness and safety of port through preventing potential pollutants caused by managing congestion, increase of dangerous cargo”. (VTS Center) The center’s primary function is to “provide” timely information, such as the surrounding circumstances or vessel traffic status in the VTS area, so that the mariners can make reference in order to make a navigational decision. The port provides management and customer service — “substantially raising the efficiency of port management and

increasing the convenience for the users by providing good information promptly, and establishing a navigation order it by observing the movement of the ships”. (VTS Center)

The management of the vessels’ safety is as follows:

- Preventing any accident by providing timely navigational information for incoming and outgoing vessels.
- Establishing a navigation order within a particular area
- Preventing any off-course vessels within the harbor limit or giving advice/instruction to over speeding vessels (VTS Center)



Figure 7: Position Notification Line of Busan Port

(Busan Port: <http://www.vtskorea.info/Service.do?id=sub0101>)



Figure 8: Busan VTS Center and the view from the center Taken by Kawamoto, Emi.
May 20, 2013.





Figure 9: Busan New Port & Operation room

Busan New Port, Operation Room and The view from the center Taken by Kawamoto, Emi. December 4, 2013.

2.2 Kanmon Kaikyo VTS Center in Japan

There are seven VTS centers in Japan; Tokyo, Nagoya, Ise, Osaka, Bisan-Seto, Kurushima, and Kanmon Kaikyo.(See Figure 10.) The VTS centers belong to Japan Coast Guard. One of these centers is the Kanmon Kaikyo Traffic Service Center. The Kanmon Kaikyo is a narrow strait and the shape is a serpentine curve (S-curve) and sharp bend (See Figure 11.). The narrowest navigable width is approximately 500 meters. Furthermore, the tidal current sometimes exceeds 9 knots. According to Marine Accident Inquiry Agency (2003), “Kanmon Kaikyo sees the passage of more than 600 vessels a day, including foreign-flag vessels which use the channel as a gateway to economically developing East Asia, such as China and Korea, making the strait a vital artery for maritime traffic”. (1) Because of the difficulties in navigation, many kinds of accidents have occurred including 10 collisions involving 20 vessels and 4 groundings involving 4 vessels. (1)

Kanmon Kaikyo Vessel Traffic Service Center, “Kanmon MARTIS”⁴⁸ has the mission to maintain and improve safety and efficiency of vessel traffic in the Kanmon Strait. According to the “Kanmon MARTIS” User Manual, the operational concept of the

center is as follows:

Kanmon Kaikyo VTS Center maintains and improves vessel traffic safety of the Kanmon Strait by

- ① collecting, verifying and monitoring vessel traffic information by sensors such as RADAR, ITV, AIS and VHF radiotelephone,
- ② providing information which is necessary for safety of vessels,
- ③ providing navigational advice to vessels when it is considered necessary to avoid imminent danger and possibility of violation of traffic rules,
- ④ instructing vessels to stand by outside of the navigation passage in cases of restricted visibility and other cases specified by the Act on Port Regulations.
- ⑤ providing tidal current and large vessel traffic information (1-2)
- ⑥

Next, the Kanmon Martis provides information within its service area:

Any information which Kanmon MARTIS considers necessary for a vessel of over 300 tons gross tonnage (hereinafter referred to as a “specified vessel”) which is navigating in the VHF stand by area.

- a) information of the navigational rules applied in the VHF stand by area in the Kanmon Strait, when it is found that a specified vessel is likely to navigate not keeping to navigational rules applied
- b) information of an occurrence of any impediment to safe navigation of a specified vessel such as a sunken vessel, functional disorder of aids to navigation etc.
- c) information of a sea area where a vessel has difficulty to navigate safely such as an area where any construction or work is underway, a very shallow water area, etc., and in case that a specified vessel is likely to close in extremely on that area.
- d) Information of a vessel, which has difficulty to keep out the way for other vessels and it likely to cause a serious peril to safe navigation of a specified vessel
- e) Information of a specified vessel which is found to close in extremely on any other

specified vessel

- f) any other information which is considered necessary for a specified vessel (9-10)

The VTS center has important signal stations such as Hayatomo Traffic Signal Station, which shows the signals by a lighting signal board, and tidal current signal station in the Hayatomo Seto (12-13).



Figure 10 : There are seven Marine Traffic Information Services (Vessel Traffic Service Center) in Japan. (<https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/>)



Figure 11: This map shows Radar Service line and Reporting line in the Kanmon Passage.

(Kanmon Kaikyo VTS Center:

<http://www6.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/kanmon/toukei/jizen/map3.htm>)



Figure 12: Kanmon Kaikyo Vessel Traffic Service Center Taken by Kawamoto, Emi.

October 24, 2015.

3. Questionnaire Survey

In this section, the method and results of the survey are described. The objective of this survey is to research the actions and procedures of the Vessel Traffic Services operators in Japan and Korea in abnormal situations. The contents and expressions of the questionnaire were ascertained by the Kanmon Kaikyo VTS officers in advance.

3.1 The Method of the Survey

The survey respondents were 18 operators in the Kanmon Kaikyo VTS Center in Japan, and 17 in the Busan VTS Center and 16 operators in the Busan New Port of South Korea. There were approximately 40 operators in the Kanmon Kaikyo VTS Center. However, only the chief supervisors and the advisors answered the questionnaire because some of the operators had little experience at that time. The author handed the questionnaires to the operators in December 2013, and collected 17 questionnaires on February 26 in 2014. The author handed the questionnaires to 17 operators in the Busan VTS Center and 16 in the Busan New Port from December 2 to 4 in 2013 and Professor Park Young-soo (Korea Maritime and Ocean University) collected 23 questionnaires. The author received them on January, in 2014. Multiple responses are shown in the answer sheets because the author did not explain the questionnaire sufficiently, hence, some operators checked multiple numbers.

3.2 The Result of the Survey

(1) You warn a foreign vessel A which is running into danger, but the crew members ignore your message or no reply. How do you correspond with them?

(危険な方向に向かっている外国船 A に警告をするが、乗組員が無視をして全く応答がない場合、どのように対応しますか。)

1. You provide information on the vessel A to other vessels in the vicinity of her.
(周囲の船舶に外国船 A に関する情報提供をする)
2. You continue calling her until she answers.
(応答するまで交信し続ける)
3. You provide information by another measure such as a FAX, telephone, or others.

(他の手段 (FAX、電話等) で伝える)

4. Others. (その他の対応)

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | No answer |
|-------|----|---|----|---|-----------|
| Korea | 14 | 1 | 13 | 0 | 0 |
| Japan | 7 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 0 |

Chart 1: Question 1




Chart 2: Comparative action of Question 1

More than half of the operators in Korea answered that “they would provide the information on Vessel A to other vessels” or “providing information by other method such as fax or telephone”. On the other hand, less than half of Japanese operators chose No. 1 and No. 3 but 4 of them answered No. 4 (Other.). Some of comments include “at first, they call vessel A, and then they contact other vessels”, “using AIS”, and “calling all vessels using on 16 channel”.

(2) Although you have provided “Warning” or “Advice” to a vessel, she answers “I understand” or “No problem”, but she does not comply with your message. How do you correspond with her?

(管制官が勧告や警告を出した際、“Roger.”, “I understood.”, “No problem!” と返答するものの、全く従わない場合どのような対応をしますか。)

1. You inform her that her action is not correct until she understands your intention.

(意図が理解出来るまで、何度も行動が逆であることを伝える。)

2. You inform her again and again until she follows your “Warning” or “Advice”.
(勧告や警告に従うまで何度も繰り返す。)
3. You provide information to other vessels around her and call their attention to her.
(周囲の船舶に状況を伝え、注意喚起する。)
4. Others. (その他の対応)

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | No answer |
|-------|----|---|----|---|-----------|
| Korea | 14 | 4 | 11 | 2 | 1 |
| Japan | 2 | 5 | 9 | 2 | 1 |

Chart 3: Question 2




Chart 4: Comparative action of Question 2

The different actions and procedures between Korea and Japan are remarkably shown in this question. More than half of the Korean operators answered that “they inform the crew members of wrong movement again and again until they understand the operator’s intention”. The Korean operators try to communicate them directly. On the other hand, more than half of the Japanese operators answered that “they contact and alert other vessels”. The Japanese tend to avoid a direct dialogue after they find that the communication become difficult. 11 Korean operators chose No. 3, too.

(3) A foreign vessel A is out of control. How do you correspond with her?

(暴走する外国船 A に対してどのように対応しますか。)

1. You provide information to the vessel, but you trust the captain's judgement with the action.
(情報提供を行うが、あとは船長の判断に任せる)
2. You alert her that her action is dangerous.
(危険行為であることを注意喚起する)
3. You provide information on the vessel A to other vessels.
(他の船舶に暴走船 A に関する情報提供をする)
4. Others. (その他の対応)

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | No answer |
|-------|---|----|---|---|-----------|
| Korea | 1 | 19 | 7 | 0 | 0 |
| Japan | 1 | 11 | 8 | 0 | 1 |

Chart 5: Question 3




Chart 6: Comparative action of Question 3

Most of the Korean operators answered that “they alert a vessel A to hazardous actions directly. 11 out of 17 Japanese operators chose the same action. Seven out of 23 Korean and eight Japanese operators chose No. 3 “they provide information on the vessel A to other vessels. In this question, it is shown that the Korean operators tend to communicate with the vessel A more directly than the Japanese operators.

(4) A foreign vessel A has knowledge of the passage and confidence in maneuvering her ship, but she does not comply with your instruction. How do you correspond with the crew?

(何度も通峡しているため、航路を熟知しており操船に自身を持っている外国船 A が、管制官の指示に従わない場合、どのような対応をしますか。)

1. You tell her to confirm her situation.
(状況を確認するように伝える)
2. You provide information on vessel A to other vessels around her.
(他の船舶に外国船 A に関する情報提供をする)
3. You call her again and provide her information, but you trust the captain's judgement with the action.
(再度、情報提供を行うが、あとは船長の判断に任せる)
4. Others. (その他の対応)

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | No answer |
|-------|---|---|---|---|-----------|
| Korea | 8 | 6 | 8 | 4 | 2 |
| Japan | 5 | 6 | 2 | 6 | 1 |

Chart 7: Question 4




Chart 8: Comparative action of Question 4

Eight out of the Korean operators chose the action, “they provide information again, and then they trust the captain’s judgement”, whereas only two Japanese operators chose the

same action. Six Japanese operators, who chose No. 4, “Other”, gave the following comments in Japanese:

- I send a patrol vessel.
- I provide information on other vessels.
- I contact other vessels in the vicinity of the vessel A and encourage them to understand each other.
- I repeat “advice”.
- I request a patrol boat to lead (instruct) the vessel A.
- I convey the intention such as “they will send a patrol vessel to execute directions safely.

(Translation by the author, Kawamoto)

The Japanese operators tend to take safety countermeasures by contacting a patrol vessel.

- (5) **Although you provide information to her in English, the crew members do not understand English and communicate with you sufficiently. How do you correspond with the crew?**

(英語で情報提供を行うが、外国船 A の乗組員が英語を十分理解出来ず、コミュニケーションが上手く成立しない場合、どのような対応をしますか。)

1. You repeat your information slowly.
(ゆっくりと何度も情報提供を行う)
2. You ask if there are some English speakers on board.
(英語が理解できる乗組員が乗船しているか尋ねる)
3. You provide information on a vessel A to other vessels around her.
(他の船舶に外国船 A に関する情報提供をする)
4. Others. (その他の対応)

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | No answer |
|-------|----|---|---|---|-----------|
| Korea | 18 | 7 | 5 | 1 | 1 |
| Japan | 5 | 7 | 7 | 1 | 0 |

Chart 9: Question 5




Chart 10: Comparative action of Question 5

18 out of the Korean operators take the action to “provide information slowly and many times directly”. They manage to let the crew members, who cannot communicate with them sufficiently, understand their information in English. On the other hand, only five Japanese choose the same action. One operator, who did not chose No. 1, answered that “he or she provides information using some different expressions”. Seven Japanese operators chose No. 3, “they provide information on the vessel A to other vessels”. One Korean and one Japanese operator gave their comments. The Korean wrote that they would insure if “There is Korean Captain on your ship?” or “make her delay to act such as departure / shifting / arrival”. (sic) The Japanese operator’s wrote “An operator, who speaks Korean language, communicates with the vessel A. (If the crew member is a Korean.)

(6) The line gets entangled and you cannot hear the crew member’s English. How do you correspond with the crew?

(外国船乗務員の英語が雑音等で聞き取りにくい場合、どのような対応をしますか。)

1. You listen to message again and again.

(何度も聞き返す)

2. You provide information with another measure such as a FAX, telephone, or other means.
(他の手段 (FAX、電話等) で連絡をするように伝える)
3. You do not call her and you trust the captain's judgement with the action.
(船長の判断に任せ、以後応答しない)
4. Others. (その他の対応)

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | No answer |
|-------|---|----|---|---|-----------|
| Korea | 8 | 12 | 0 | 5 | 1 |
| Japan | 5 | 7 | 7 | 1 | 0 |

Chart 11: Question 6




Chart 12: Comparative action of Question 6

In the case of this situation, eight out of 23 Korean operators try to contact or listen to the vessel many times, and 12 operators tell the vessel to make contact by other measures such as fax or telephone. On the other hand, 5 out of 17 Japanese operators chose No. 1 and No. 3. However, seven Japanese operators comment they employ other expressions in Japanese as follows:

- I say, "Call us again in 30 minutes." (We repeat this many times.)
- I speak to the crew members slowly until they say "Roger" or "Copy".
- I say, "Call us again in one hour."
- I change the channel.

- I tell the crew members to speak loudly because of noise.
- I ask the crew members to call us again.
- I ask them to call the VTS center if necessary or change the channel.

(Translated by the author, Kawamoto)

Five Korean operators wrote the following comments in English:

- When she is coming closer, call me back.
- Please call me back after one hour. (2 operators)
- Check your VHF and call me back after 1 hour.

In this situation, the operator in both countries try to call the crew members again to communicate with them.

(7) When you provide information to a foreign vessel, her attitude is overbearing. How do you correspond with the crew?

(管制官が情報提供をする際、外国船から威圧的な態度を取られた場合、どのように対応しますか。)

1. You correspond with her more calmly than the usual.
(いつも以上に冷静な対応をする)
2. You provide information to her as usual.
(通常通りの情報提供をする)
3. You indicate to her that her attitude is overbearing and call her attention to it.
(威圧的な態度であることを指摘し、注意する)
4. Others. (その他の対応)

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | No answer |
|-------|----|----|---|---|-----------|
| Korea | 11 | 10 | 3 | 0 | 1 |
| Japan | 7 | 8 | 1 | 0 | 1 |

Chart 13: Question 7




Chart 14: Comparative action of Question 7

In this situation, the actions of both Korean and Japanese operators are very similar. 11 Korean and seven Japanese operators try to adjust to the overbearing attitudes of the crew members more flexibly and than usual. Ten Korean and eight Japanese operators provide information as usual. VTS operators are always required to maintain unruffled even if in an emergency situation, hence, operators' in both VTS centers, three Korean and one Japanese answered that they would point out clearly such crew members that their attitude was overbearing. One Japanese, who did not check any numbers, wrote "We give information and repeat it slowly".

(8) How do you correspond with a foreign vessel A which takes a wrong course?

(針路を見失ってしまった外国船 A に対して、どのように対応しますか。)

1. You advise her to confirm her position again and again.
(船舶 A に対して位置確認するよう何度も指示する)
2. You watch over her because she is panicked.
(A がパニックになっているので、見守る)
3. You provide information on vessel A to other vessels around her and call their attention to her.
(他の船舶に対して、注意喚起をする)
4. Others. (その他の対応)

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | No answer |
|-------|----|---|---|---|-----------|
| Korea | 22 | 1 | 7 | 0 | 1 |
| Japan | 8 | 1 | 5 | 5 | 0 |

Chart 15: Question 8




Chart 16: Comparative action of Question 8

The 8th question clearly shows a big difference in the actions and measures between Korea and Japan. Most Korean operators (22 out of 23 operators) answer that “they advise the vessel A to confirm its position many times”. They tend to communicate with the vessel and advise it directly. Whereas eight Japanese operators chose the same action, the ratio is less than half of the total Japanese operators. Seven Korean and five Japanese operators chose No. 3. They advise other vessels to pay attention to the vessel which is steering the wrong course. Four Japanese operators, who chose No. 4 (Others), gave some of the following comments:

- I advise the vessel A to stay at the present position until some vessels which are approaching her are past and clear. (He/she images poor visibility.)
- After I judge that the vessel A is steering the wrong course, I will provide information once or twice.
- I provide detailed targets such as buoys or lighthouses, and then I give further information to the vessel A in order to take a correct course.
- I provide information on her correct course.

(Translated by the author, Kawamoto)

According to the Japanese operators' comments, they provide detailed information such as targets, actions or the direction of vessel A after the operators confirm the vessel's situation. On the other hand, the Korean operators advise the vessel A to confirm her course by herself many times directly.

(9) A vessel has a risk of grounding while the captain who has knowledge of the passage is out. How do you correspond with the crew?

(航路を熟知している船長が席を外した間に乗り揚げの危険が生じた場合、どのような対応をしますか。)

1. You trust the vessel to make a judgement and you do not correspond with her.
(本船に判断を任せ、対応しない)
2. You advise another crew to avoid grounding.
(他の乗組員に指示する)
2. You tell the crew to call the captain.
(すぐに船長を出すように指示する)
4. Others. (その他の対応)

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | No answer |
|-------|---|----|----|---|-----------|
| Korea | 0 | 13 | 14 | 2 | 0 |
| Japan | 1 | 9 | 6 | 3 | 0 |

Chart 17: Question 9




Chart 18: Comparative action of Question 9

When the captain of the vessel is out of a pilothouse and the vessel is running into danger, 14 Korean operators ask the crew members to call the captain immediately, whereas six Japanese operators take the same action. Thirteen Korean and nine Japanese operators advise the crew members to avoid grounding directly. An answer No.1 is a halfhearted correspondence, so only one Japanese operator choose this action. Two Korean and three Japanese operators chose No.4 (Other.). The Japanese operators describe their correspondence: “I tell the crew members that they have a danger of grounding and repeat the message”, “I provide Warning or Advice”, and “We maintain providing information to them”. One Korean operator wrote the comment “We warning other vessels around her”. (sic)

(10) You advised a vessel A to pass astern of a vessel on the opposite course, but the vessel A intends to cross ahead of another vessel. How do you correspond with the vessel?

(船舶 A に反航船の船尾を通過するように伝えたが、スピードを上げて船首を通過すると伝えてきた場合、船舶 A に対してどのような対応をしますか。)

1. You provide the intention of the vessel A to another vessel.
(反航船に船舶 A の意向を伝える)
2. You think of advice while keeping watch.
(状況を見守りながら指示を考える)
3. You tell vessel A to follow your advice and advise her to pass astern of another

vessel.

(情報提供内容を守るよう指示をし、船尾を通過させる)

4. Others. (その他の対応)

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | No answer |
|-------|----|---|---|---|-----------|
| Korea | 15 | 1 | 9 | 3 | 0 |
| Japan | 7 | 3 | 7 | 4 | 0 |

Chart 19: Question 10




Chart 20: Comparative action of Question 10

In this case, 15 out of 23 Korean operators answered that they would provide the intention of the vessel A to the vessel on the opposite course. Whereas seven out of 17 Japanese operators chose the same action, the ratio is less than half. On the other hand, nine Korean and seven Japanese operators answer that they advise the vessel A to follow their information and let her pass astern of the vessel on the opposite course. Two Korean and three Japanese operators chose No. 4, “Others”. One of the Korean operators says, “We warning other vessels around her.” (sic) The Japanese operators say, “I repeat that she has a danger of grounding”, “I provide Warning or Advice”, or “I maintain providing information”. According to this data, both Korean and Japanese operators tend to communicate with the captain and crew members and provide the advice or information regarding the dangerous situation.

(11) How often do you use or speak English except for VTS operating a week?

(管制業務以外で、週何回英語を話しますか。)

1. Almost every day 2. Three or four hours 3. Once or Twice
4. No use

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | No answer |
|-------|---|---|---|----|-----------|
| Korea | 5 | 1 | 2 | 15 | 0 |
| Japan | 2 | 1 | 3 | 11 | 0 |

Chart 21: Question 11




Chart 22: Frequency of use of English (%)

In this question, the author researched how often the operators in Korea and Japan used English for a week except for VTS operations. The interesting result is that more than 60 percent of the operators in both countries do not use or speak English in everyday life. The environment of both countries are very similar and they have few chances to speak English. However, they use Maritime English when they provide information to foreign vessels or crew members, hence, they need to endeavor in its use, study, and practice English enthusiastically.

(12) Check the number which you belong to.

(該当する番号に○を囲んでください。)

- A. Sex: 1. Male 2. Female

| | 1(Male) | 2 (Female) | No answer |
|-------|------------|------------|-----------|
| Korea | 17 (73.9%) | 5 (21.7%) | 1 |
| Japan | 16 (94.1%) | 1 (5.8%) | 0 |

Chart 23: The ratio of Male & Female

All things considered, the number of male operators is overwhelmingly larger than female personnel in both countries. The reason is that most officers in the Korean Coast Guard, Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs, and Japan Coast Guard are male. At this time, the operators above the level of an adviser answered this questionnaire. There were four female operators including one responder.

B. Age: 1. 20~29 2. 30~39 3. 40~49 4. 50 and up

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | No answer |
|-------|---|----|---|----|-----------|
| Korea | 3 | 12 | 2 | 6 | 0 |
| Japan | 0 | 1 | 4 | 12 | 0 |

Chart 24: Age




Chart 25: Age bracket (%)

In the Kanmon Kaikyo VTS center, the responders are above the level of an adviser, so

70 percent of the operators are over 50 years of age, and approximately 20 percent of them are in the forties. There are some operators from ages 30 to 39, but no one in their twenties. On the other hand, more than 50 percent of the Korean operators are in their thirties. Contrary to expectation, there are only two operators in their forties. There are six operators more than 50 years of age. This ratio is less than half of Japanese operators.

C. Years of operator's experience:

1. Less than 3 years
2. From 3 to under 5 years
3. From 5 to under 8 years
4. 8 years and more

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | No answer |
|-------|---|---|---|----|-----------|
| Korea | 7 | 1 | 3 | 12 | 0 |
| Japan | 4 | 1 | 4 | 8 | 0 |

Chart 26: Years of operator's experience




Chart 27: Years of operators' experience (%)

According to Chart 27, each category is similar in both countries. The experienced and inexperienced operators work together. At the Kanmon Kaikyo VTS Center, the chief or advisors (instructors) in each group undertake the task of teaching. Especially, new operators team up with the experienced operators for a couple months. During this period, the new operators learn many kind of skills including Maritime English which they need to use to provide information for safe navigation in the Kanmon Passage.

4. A Case Study on Marine Accidents at Sea

4.1 Accidents at Sea in Korea

The incident of Sewol, which occurred on April 16, 2014, is one of the worst marine disasters in South Korea. There were 476 passengers on board. There were 172 survivors, 295 deaths and 9 missing. The ferry was traveling from Incheon to Jeju, off South Korea's southwestern coast. Many passengers were high school students during a school excursion. According to Hwang (2015), there were several causes such as a superannuated, superfluous load capacity, manipulation of ballast water, the captain and crewmembers' inexperienced conduct, and defective governmental rescue system. A great many lives were sacrificed due to the inappropriate correspondence immediately after the incident. According to Kwon (2016), Sewol turned twice to alter her course. After the second turn, she lost balance and listed 20 degrees into the water at 0849, causing cargo to fall to one side of the ferry. At about 1118, "the bow and stern of the ferry were submerged, leaving a section of the hull about 6 feet high and 100 feet long showing above the water. The Sewol took two and a half hours to capsize completely" (33) (See Figure 13.).



Figure13: Sunken vessel, Sewol Ho

Sunday, 04.20.2014, 01:47 PM | (10804 views) | Turkey Sea News International Shipping Magazine. <http://www.seanews.com.tr/what-caused-sewol-sinking/126073/>

It is considered that one of the causes was the Jindo Vessel Traffic Services

operator's conduct. The following is the transcript released by the Ministry of Ocean and Fisheries of the conversation between the Jindo Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) and the Sewol. The original transcript is in Korean and the English translation was done from Korean by The Associated Press.

Table 3: VHF Communication Records in Korea

| Time | Communications |
|-------------------------|--|
| 9:07 a.m. | <p>SEWOL: Jindo VTS, this is Sewol ferry.</p> <p>JINDO VTS: Sewol ferry, Sewol ferry, this is VTS. Is your ship sinking now?</p> <p>SEWOL: Yes, that's right. <u>Please send the coast guard here right away.</u></p> <p>JINDO VTS to Ship A: This is Jindo VTS.</p> <p>SHIP A: Yeas, go ahead.</p> <p>JINDO VTS to Ship A: 2.1 miles to your right, the Sewol ferry is sinking. We ask for your help in its rescue. Please go there and rescue it.</p> <p>SHIP A: Yes, we're on our way.</p> |
| 9:09 a.m.- 9:09 a.m. | (Jindo VTS makes calls to other ships to help out, and a second one responds.) |
| 9:10 a.m. | <p>SEWOL: Jindo VTS, this is Sewol.</p> <p>JINDO VTS: Yes, this is VTS.</p> <p>SEWOL: We are too tilted. We're almost going to fall over.</p> <p>JINDO VTS: How are the people on board? Ship A is approaching your ship as fast as it can.</p> <p>SEWOL: <u>We are too tilted, we almost can't move.</u></p> |
| 9:11 a.m. | <p>JINDO VTS to Ship B: This is Jindo Coastal VTS. On your portside M/V Sewol is man overboard.</p> <p>SHIP B: OK. OK. I will alter course port side.</p> |
| 9:12 a.m. | JINDO VTS: Sewol, this is Jindo VTS. Are the people on board on the life rafts or life boats? |

| | |
|------------------|--|
| | SEWOL: No, we're not yet. The ship is too tilted, we can't move. |
| 9:13 a.m. | <p>JINDO VTS: How many people are on board?</p> <p>SEWOL: Yes, 450 people..... It's about 500 people.</p> <p>JINDO VTS: Yes, right now, a ship nearby, Ship A, is on its way.</p> <p>SEWOL: Yes, <u>please come quickly.</u></p> |
| 9:14 a.m. | <p>JINDO VTS: We are even contacting all nearby fishing boats.</p> <p>SHIP A: The boat next to ours is evacuating. It's completely tilted to the left, it's dangerous to approach, but we'll try to approach while keeping a safe distance as much as we can.</p> <p>JINDO VTS: Please approach as fast as you can. Please cooperate actively to rescue people.</p> <p>SHIP A: Yes. If the passengers evacuate, we'll rescue.</p> <p>JINDO VTS: Sewol ferry, are passengers able to evacuate?</p> <p>SEWOL: <u>The ship is too tilted, so it's impossible to evacuate.</u></p> <p>JINDO VTS: We are contacting as many patrol boats and fishing boats and they are on their way.</p> <p>(Jindo VTS communicates with another ship that offers to help.)</p> |
| 9:17 a.m. | <p>JINDO VTS: Sewol ferry, this is Jindo VTS. Can you hear? (Repeats four times.) What's the status of the sinking?</p> <p>SEWOL: It's tilted more than 50 degrees to the left and it's impossible for people to move either left or right. Crew members are asked to wear life jackets and stand by. ... But actually it's impossible to check if they're wearing them or not. The crew members are gathered on the bridge and cannot move. Please come quickly.</p> |
| 9:18 a.m. | <p>JINDO VTS: OK, Sewol. <u>How high has the water risen inside the ferry?</u></p> <p>SEWOL: That cannot be checked either. I can confirm from the front side of the ship that some of container boxes on the deck have fallen, but I can't move. I can't move even one step, left or right, on the bridge, so I'm holding the wall, barely standing.</p> |

| | |
|-----------|--|
| | <p>JINDO VTS: Ship A is nearby and is approaching.</p> <p>SEWOL: Yes. OK.</p> <p>SHIP A: If passengers don't evacuate, I can't move alongside. Anyway, we'll be careful and move alongside to provide support.</p> |
| 9:19 a.m. | <p>JINDO VTS: (Unclear to whom this is addressed.) Currently, it is completely impossible for the Sewol ferry to evacuate. When you get there and when passengers evacuate, please rescue them as safely as you can. (Jindo VTS calls other ships.)</p> |
| 9:21 a.m. | <p>SEWOL: Is the coast guard on its way? How long will it take to get here? Harbor affairs Jeju (another shore authority), can you hear the Sewol?</p> <p>JINDO VTS: Sewol, right now, Ship A is approaching. It's impossible for it to come alongside. It is standing by.</p> |
| 9:22 a.m. | <p>SEWOL: OK. How long will it take for the coast guard to get here?</p> <p>JINDO VTS: Yes, hold on.</p> |
| 9:23 a.m. | <p>SHIP A: We are right in front of you. We will stand by and when the people evacuate, we'll rescue them.</p> <p>JINDO VTS: Yes, understood. Nearby, Ship B and Ship C are on their way. When passengers evacuate, please rescue them immediately.</p> <p>SHIP A: Currently, there are some things floating near the front side of the Sewol. It's impossible to approach. It looks like it's about to sink.</p> <p>JINDO VTS: It'll take 15 minutes before patrol boats arrive. Broadcast to the passengers that they should wear life jackets.</p> <p>SEWOL: It's impossible to broadcast now.</p> |
| 9:24 a.m. | <p>JINDO VTS: Even if it's impossible to broadcast, please go out as much you can and make the passengers wear life jackets and put on more clothing.</p> <p>SEWOL: <u>If this ferry evacuates passengers, will you be able to rescue them?</u></p> <p>JINDO VTS: <u>At least make them wear life rings and make them escape!</u></p> |

| | |
|-----------|--|
| | <p>SEWOL: <u>If this ferry evacuates passengers, will they be rescue right away?</u></p> <p>JINDO VTS: Don't let them go bare, <u>at least make them wear life rings and make them escape!</u></p> |
| 9:25 a.m. | <p>JINDO VTS: The evacuation of people on board Sewol ferry... <u>the captain should make a decision about evacuating them. We don't know the situation there. The captain should make the final decision and decide quickly whether to evacuate passengers or not.</u></p> |
| 9:26 a.m. | <p>SEWOL: <u>I'm not talking about that. I asked, if they evacuate now, can they be rescued right away?</u></p> <p>JINDO VTS: Patrol boats will be there in less than 10 minutes.</p> <p>SEWOL: In 10 minutes?</p> <p>JINDO VTS: Yes, in about 10 minutes, 10 minutes!</p> |
| 9:27 a.m. | <p>JINDO VTS: Sewol ferry, a helicopter will be there in one minute.</p> <p>SEWOL: <u>I can't hear you. Please talk to me slowly and clearly.</u></p> <p>JINDO VTS: A helicopter will be there in one minute.</p> <p>SEWOL: <u>Say it again.</u></p> <p>JINDO VTS: A helicopter will be there soon.</p> |
| 9:28 a.m. | <p>SEWOL: There are too many passengers. A helicopter is not enough.</p> <p>JINDO VTS: A helicopter will be there and other ships nearby are approaching, for your information.</p> |
| 9:29 a.m. | <p>SEWOL: OK, got it, Jindo VTS. I can see a ship, but I can't read an AIS (location tracking data). What is the name of the red tanker near the front part of our ferry? Ask the ship to stand by, not in front of us but on the left side.</p> <p>SHIP A: Yes, we're standing by, but because of the rising tide, we're being drifted. This is (Ship A). Helicopter is above now, for your information.</p> <p>(Jindo VTS talks to another ship that offers to help. It sends out an announcement that the ferry is sinking with 400 passengers on board and</p> |

| | |
|--------------------------------------|---|
| | that all ships in the area should approach and help. Another ship responds to the call.) |
| 9:32 a.m. | (The Sewol provides its exact coordinates to Jindo VTS.) |
| 9:33 a.m.- 9:37 a.m. | (Jindo VTS tells all boats to throw out lifejackets and lifeboats to rescue people when they evacuate.) |
| 9:37 a.m. 9:38 a.m. | JINDO VTS: Sewol ferry, Sewol ferry, this is Jindo VTS. SEWOL: Yes, this is Sewol ferry, Sewol ferry. JINDO VTS: <u>What's the status of the sinking?</u> SEWOL: It's impossible to check. Right now, well, passengers are (doesn't finish sentence). Coast guard and other ships are 50 meters away. Through the left side, people who are going to evacuate are trying to evacuate. I did broadcast, but it's impossible to move even to the left side. JINDO VTS: OK, got it. SEWOL: The ship is tilted 60 degrees to the left. Right now, even the aircraft is up there, coast guard. (Meaning unclear.) (The transcript continues with Jindo VTS sending out SOS calls and contacting other boats to help. It also calls repeatedly to the Sewol, which does not respond.) |

Table 3 shows the VHF Channel 12 Communication between the Jindo VTS Center and the Sewol ferry and other vessels. The original transcript is used in the Korean language. (Turkey SeaNews International Shipping Magazine: <http://www.seanews.com.tr/what-caused-sewol-sinking /126073/>)

In the VHF communication between Sewol and Jindo VTS, the following vague replies are found:

- (1) 9:07 a.m. Sewol said, "Please send the coast guard here right away." But Jindo VTS did not reply to the request and they contacted other vessels.
- (2) 9:10 a.m. Sewol said, "We are too tilted, we almost cannot move." Jindo did not reply and contacted other vessel again.

- (3) 9:13 a.m. Sewol said, "Please come quickly." Jindo VTS said, "We are even contacting all nearby fishing boats."
- (4) 9:14 a.m. Sewol said, "The ship is too tilted, so it's impossible to evacuate." Jindo said again, "We are contacting as many patrol boats and fishing boats as possible and they are on their way. (Jindo VTS communicates with another ship that offers to help.) At this time, Jindo VTS did not give Sewol precise advice.
- (5) 9:17 a.m. Sewol said, "The crew members are gathered on the bridge and cannot move. Please come quickly." Jindo VTS answered, "OK, Sewol. How high has the water risen inside the ferry?" The crew members of Sewol could not move, so it was hardly possible to check the condition of the ship in detail. Jindo VTS's question did not seem to be accurate.
- (6) 9:24 a.m. Sewol asked Jindo VTS the same question twice; "If this ferry evacuates passenger, will they be rescued right away?" Jindo VTS replied, "At least make them wear life rings and make them escape." Sewol needed to know whether they would be rescued immediately or not, however, Jindo VTS just advised them to make them wear life rings and repeated it.
- (7) 9:25 a.m. Jindo VTS said to Sewol, "The evacuation of people on board Sewol ferry...the captain should make a decision about evacuating them. We don't know the situation there. The captain should make the final decision and decide quickly whether to evacuate passengers or not". Sewol answered, "I'm not talking about that. I asked, if they evacuate now, can they be rescued right away?" Jindo VTS said, "Patrol boats will be there in less than 10 minutes". The communication between them is confused and Jindo VTS did not understand the ferry's intention. Furthermore, Jindo VTS advised the captain to make the final decision immediately. Sewol asked Jindo VTS whether the passengers would be able to be rescued as soon as possible.
- (8) 9:27 a.m. Jindo said to Sewol, "A helicopter will be there in one minute". But Sewol could not hear and catch the message from Jindo VTS. The ferry asked them to speak slowly, clearly, and say the message again. But Jindo VTS repeated the message one-sidedly.

(9) 9:37-9:38 a.m. Jindo VTS asked Sewol a question, “What’s the status of the sinking?” Sewol answered, “It’s impossible to check....it’s impossible to move even to the left side”. It is considered probably that Jindo VTS did not understand the condition of the ferry sufficiently. The crew members could not confirm the condition of the hull because they could not move at all.

Judging from the VTS communications, the Jindo VTS operators’ misleading information is easily seen in the conversation with Sewol. Despite a matter of life or death situation, the operators could not give immediate and precise replies. The crew members were panicked, could not keep calm, and they required quick rescue. However, Jindo VTS operators did not perceive the abnormal condition of not only the ferry but also the crew members. The operators have to understand and correspond to such an emergency situation sufficiently. Furthermore, Kwon (2016) states the situation of a patrol vessel and a helicopter: “Having no communication with the Station Jindo-VTS, the Patrol Vessel-123 and the Group Mokpo and not listening to TRS in order to concentrate on flight control, Helicopter B511 of the Group Mokpo arrived on scene at 0927, without knowing how many people were on the ferry and how to save them.” (32) There were no communication between the VTS, the patrol vessel and the helicopter. So they did not get sufficient information on the condition of the ferry and how to save the passengers and crew members at all. In Korean communication style, “following the formalities”, “not seeing the timing” and “arguing their opinions first” is clearly apparent. In the VHF communication record, the VTS operator repeated messages one-sidedly and did not try to understand the crew member’s messages. The VTS operators should have exchanged the messages with the ferry and understood the serious situation of it immediately and accurately.

4.2 Accidents at Sea in Japan

There was a serious accident in the Kanmon Passage on October 27, 2009. According to Japan Transport Safety Board (2011), containership CARINA STAR, boarded by a master with 15 crew members, was proceeding eastward toward Hanshin Port through the Kanmon Passage in Kanmon Port. A destroyer of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) KURAMA, boarded by a master with 295 crew members, was proceeding westward through Kanmon Passage toward Sasebo Port, Sasebo City, Nagasaki Prefecture. At 1556.09, the two ships collided with each other in the vicinity of Moji Saki, Kitakyushu City, Fukuoka Prefecture. There were no missing or deaths. As for damage to the ships, “CARINA STAR sustained a fracture opening on the starboard bow outer-plate, whereas KURAMA sustained substantial damage on the bow, which caused both ships to catch a fire at the damaged areas.” Six crew members of KURAMA suffered injuries during the fire-fighting operations, however, there were no injuries among the crew of CARINA STAR. (1) (See Figure 14 and Figure 15.)

According to the investigation of the Japan Transport Safety Board, the CARINA STAR, which is an eastbound vessel, was approaching QUEEN ORCHID and tried to overtake QUEEN ORCHID on her port side. After CARINA STAR overtook QUEEN ORCHID, CARINA STAR met KURAMA, which was a westbound vessel. The two vessels got too close and they could not avoid each other. The Japan Transport Safety Board describes that one of the causes was communication between CARINA STAR and Kanmon MARTIS. After QUEEN ORCHID said, “Overtake me on my port side”, Kanmon MARTIS advised CARINA STAR to overtake on her port side. The message was “advice”, not an “order”, so the captain must have made the decision on his own. However, the master of CARINA STAR thought the message was a directive with authority. He just complied with the message, he said. (70-71)



Figure 14: KURAMA on fire

Kurama Photo by Masayuki Tanaka (2009/10/27)

(<http://mainichi.jp/selet/jiken/graph/20091027kurama/16.html>)



Figure15 : CARINA STAR damaged

(Photo by Kyouji Yamashita, 2009/10/27/11:26

<http://mainichi.jp/select/jiken/graph/20091027kurama/20.html>)

Measures of Kanmon Marits VTS operators from VHF communication records are analyzed. Table 1 shows the VHF communications between Kanmon Martis and three vessels: CARINA STAR, KURAMA and QUEEN ORCHID (See Table 4.).

Table 4: VHF Communication Records in Japan

(Ship A: CARINA STAR, Ship B: KURAMA, Ship C: QUEEN ORCHID)

| Time | Party | Communications |
|----------|----------------------------|--|
| 19:18 | Kanmon Martis, Ship B | In Japanese, Ship B to Kanmon MARTIS: “We have just passed the HS line. We will proceed westward through Kanmon Strait and cross the MN line.” Kanmon MARTIS to Ship B: “About two miles ahead of you, KAISHO-MARU, a vessel navigating in the opposite direction, is performing dredge work near Buoy No.2. The current there is 3 kn westward, falling.” Ship B to Kanmon MARTIS: “OK, roger. We will proceed with full attention. |
| 19:52:18 | Kanmon Martis to Ship C | “Vessel behind you, vessel behind you, CARINA STAR is approaching you. Her speed is 14kn. Pay attention.” |
| 19:52:32 | Ship C to Kanmon Martis | “Ok,Ok. It’s surpassing. Overtake me on my port side, on my port side.” |
| 19:52:38 | Kanmon Martis to Ship C | “Ok. Then you should keep starboard side. You are now middle of the fairway. Move to starboard side right now. Over.” |
| 19:52:46 | Ship C to Kanmon Martis | “Ok, Ok. I will be a little course to starboard side.” |
| 19:53:08 | Kanmon Martis to Ship A | “CARINA STAR, vessel ahead of you, QUEEN ORCHID is moving to starboard side, so please |

| | | |
|----------|---------------------------------|---|
| | | overtake on her port side. Over.” |
| 19:53:26 | Ship A to Kanmon Martis | “Ok, roger I will overtake.” |
| 19:53:31 | Kanmon Martis to Ship A | “Overtake on her port side, QUEEN ORCHID is moving to starboard side, but one M ahead of you, Japanese navy ship is coming. Pay attention. Over.” |
| 19:53:46 | Ship A to Kanmon Martis | “Ok, thank you, I will overtake on my port side. ⁴⁹ ” |
| 19:55:55 | Kanmon Martis to Ship A | “CARINA STAR, CARINA STAR, opposite course vessel, pay attention. CARINA STAR, pay attention.” |
| 19:56:32 | Ship B to Kanmon Martis | “Kanmon MARTIS, Kanmon MARTIS, this is JDS KURAMA, Ship No. 144.Over.” |
| 19:56:38 | Kanmon Martis to Ship B | “CARINA STAR is getting extremely close to you. Pay attention. Take evasive action.” |
| 19:56:42 | Ship B to Kanmon Martis | “We collided with a tanker, in Hayatomo Seto. The tanker is on fire. Over.” |
| 19:56:52 | Kanmon Martis to Ship B | “Roger. Fix your condition of ship. Open this CH 16.” |
| 19:57:18 | Kanon Martis to every vessel | Kanmon MARTIS to every station: “All stations, All stations, this is Kanmon MARTIS. 5 cables east of Kanmon Bridge, a JDS and foreign vessel CARINA STAR collided and are stuck together. Vessels around there pay attention. This is Kanmon MARTIS.” |

Table 4. VHF Communication Records between the Kanmon Kaikyo VTS Operators and the other vessels. (Japan Transport Safety Board, 2011: 91)

The most important point is that the Kanmon Kaikyo VTS operator said, “Please

overtake on her port side". (at 19:53 p.m.) In the Oxford English-English Dictionary, "please" means "used as a polite way of asking for something or telling somebody to do something" or "used to add force to a request or statement". Many Japanese often use "please" naturally. The captain of the Carina Star perceived the message as an order, because the Kanmon Kaikyo VTS operators are government officers who have authority. However, the message was meant as "advice", not a direct "order", so the captain had to make a final decision in this situation. On the other hand, the VTS operator should have said "the captain should make a final judgement", but he did not. It can be considered that the operator thought the captain would understand his message that made reading between the lines necessary.

Next, the typical Japanese communication style is shown in the operator's messages. He said, "Carina Star, vessel ahead of you, QUEEN ORCHID is moving to starboard side, so please overtake on her port side". Williamson and Kawamoto (2016) refers to the communication as follows:

Culturally, Japanese people often use indirect or inarticulate expressions that when translated to English seem vague, or even incomprehensible to non-Japanese speakers. In the case of this incident, the operator gave background information first.... It can be easily suggested that Kanmon Kaikyo VTS operator should have given clear, direct messages to the Carina Star that accurately described the context of the situation in order to avoid possible collision. However, fundamental differences in culture and lexicon present important differences in cognitive and communication styles. In many respects, Japanese reasoning could be described as circular and indirect, so background context comes first and main points come at the end of an exchange. These messages reflect the cultural dynamics that present fundamental challenges in adapting or modifying intrinsic style of verbal communication for Japanese operators that regulate Japanese waters. (105-106)

The Kanmon Kaikyo VTS operator should have made the main point first, and the background should follow afterwards. All vessels are moving and there is a time limit to communicate. The VTS operators are required to give some messages promptly, accurately and directly within a time limit. They should perceive that minor misunderstanding can become the cause of serious incidents.

Chapter 3. Analysis

In Chapter 3, the questionnaire surveys and the accident from both countries detailed in Chapter 2 are analyzed. The different measures between Korean and Japanese operators are clearly explicated through these questionnaires.

1. Analysis of Surveys

According to the result of the survey in Chapter 2.3 and 4, the measures corresponding to the emergency situation and the serious incidents in Korea and Japan are found. A measure of the notable differences in both countries are shown in Questions No. 1, No. 2, No. 3, No. 4, No.5, No 8, and No. 9.

In Question No. 1, the situation is that “when the operators warn a foreign vessel A it is running into danger, but the crew members ignore the operators’ message or give no reply” (See Chapter 2.). More than 50 percent of the Korean operators answered that “they call the vessel A by fax or telephone” and they required her to communicate with a direct contact. Other operators (14 personnel) answered that “they provide information on the vessel A to other vessels”. Whereas, 41 percent of Japanese operators answered that they try to provide information to other vessels. According to their comments, they strive to send a telegram by AIS and then, they call all ships on Channel 16 using “All call” procedure.

In Question No. 2, the operators are asked whether they provide a “warning” or “advice” to a vessel, that answers “Roger”, “I understand”, or “No problem”. However, if they do not respond to the operators’ message, 60.8 percent of Korean operators try to provide information on the dangerous situation and let the crew members know their intentions directly and clearly. They clearly consider it important that the captain and crew members need to understand the real situation and have an awareness of the crisis on their own. In the Kanmon Kaikyo VTS Center, 5 operators answered that “they call the vessel again and again until the crew members follow the advice or warning”. They take strong measures toward the vessel to endure they follow their message. Approximately 50 percent operators from both countries strive to contact the other vessel in order to inform it of dangerous situations (See Chart 4.).

In Question No. 3, the measures toward a foreign vessel A which is out of control are inquired. A majority of the Korean operators answered that “they alert that her actions are dangerous” at 82.6 percent. However, 64.7 percent of Japanese operators try to take the same measures. On the other hand, approximately 50 percent of Japanese operators answered that “they provide information on the dangerous vessel to the other vessels first. The Korean operators strive to alert the vessel to her dangerous actions directly in their first message (See Chart 6.).

In Question No. 4, the situation of a vessel A, which has knowledge of the passage and maneuvering ability that fails to follow advice is inquired. Measures are divided among the operators in both countries. The most interesting action is that 34.7 percent of the Korean operators answered “after providing information to the vessel, they trust the captain’s decision”. Only 11.7 percent of the Japanese operators, on the other hand, took the same measures. Approximately 30 percent of them answered “they advise the vessel to confirm the condition”, or “they provide information on the vessel A to other vessels”. They employ circumlocution in this situation. Furthermore, three Japanese operators send a patrol vessel and ask her to advise the vessel A directly (See Chart 8.).

According to Chart 10, when the crew members do not understand English and cannot communicate with the VTS operators sufficiently, 78 percent of the Korean operators answered that “they provide information slowly and many times”. They manage to make direct communication with the vessel A. However, Japanese operators’ opinions are divided in the Kanmon Kaikyo VTS Center. When they realize difficult in communication at first exchange, they try to take another measures such as “they ask whether English speakers are on board” or “they provide information to other vessels” (See Chart 10.).

In Question No. 8, when the vessel A takes a wrong course, the differences between measures in both countries is obvious. (See Chart 16.) 95.6 percent of the Korean operators strive to contact the vessel A directly and advise her to confirm her position by herself. Whereas, 8 Japanese operators try to take the same measure, however, they provide more detailed targets like buoys or lighthouses, because many vessels, which take a wrong course, do not confirm their positions and are probably in a state of panic.

The operators think that the vessels need more detailed information to proceed on the correct course.

According to the data in Chart 18, 60.8 percent of the Korean operators require the crew to call the captain as soon as possible when the vessel has a danger of grounding while the captain is out of the pilothouse (See Chart 18.). Whereas 35.2 percent of the Japanese operators try to take the same actions, 52.9 percent of them will advise the crew members to avoid grounding. In Korea, 56.5 percent of the operators try to take the same measures. From the data in Chart 18, it is clear that the Korean operators will contact the captain directly because he/she has responsibility for the vessel. On the other hand, the Japanese operators contact the crew members, who are able to answer their requests immediately, because they think the vessel has to take an immediate action to avoid grounding or danger.

From the above results, different measures in Korea and Japan are clear. The Korean operators tend to strive to communicate with the captain or crew members and advise them to improve the serious situations directly. Furthermore, when they are not able to contact the ships, they use a fax or a telephone. It is considered that their communication style is to have dialogue with the crew of vessels directly and enthusiastically. In the Kanmon Kaikyo VTS Center, on the other hand, several operators contact the vessels directly, however, approximately 50 percent of them tend to provide information to other vessels around her. The operators strive to let other vessels know of a vessel with trouble to avoid accidents. Furthermore, when necessary, they provide more detailed information such as a buoy or a lighthouse.

Next, the different measures of two serious incidents in Korea and Japan are analyzed. According to the VHF communication records (Table 1) between Korean VTS Center and the Sewol, the operators' advice or information does not seem to be appropriate to the ferry. Furthermore, the crew required the rescue or help, however, the operators did not meet the requirement or answer them. For example, the Sewol required the VTS Center to send the coast guard immediately (09:07) and inform them that the ferry was too tilted, and the crew and passengers could not move at all. Whereas, the operator did not answer their requests. The crew members might have known about the

rescue or the operator's advice. Jindo VTS center called the ferry and repeated the message, "Can you hear?" four times. They desired to know the situation of the ferry and whether it was sinking, hence, they tried to communicate with her directly. In the results of the questionnaires, Charts 4, 6, 10, and 16 show that the Korean operators tend to contact the ferry and provide information or advice directly. After the crew explained their situation, Jindo VTS center asked, "How high has the water risen inside the ferry?" However, the crew had told them about the serious situation and it seemed to be impossible for them to confirm the condition of the ferry. At 09:24 a.m., the crew member asked Jindo VTS center whether they would be rescued immediately if the ferry evacuated passengers twice, however, the operator advised them to make the passengers wear life rings and escape. The ferry needed the center to rescue the passengers as soon as possible. Whereas, the operator did not answer their request accurately, and imposed their advice on the crew unilaterally. At 09:37, Jindo VTS center asked the ferry about the status of the sinking, but the crew members could not check it because it was impossible to move. The Jindo VTS operator did not understand the serious situation and was incapable of ascertaining detailed information sufficiently.

According to Kwon (2016), the communication between the Patrol Vessel, Helicopters and the Sewol did not work smoothly collaboration in closer for following reasons:

At 0857, the Incident Command Room at the Group Mokpo ordered the ROKCG Patrol Vessel-123 100 tons to depart to the scene, which was the closest ROKCG Search-and-Rescue SAR unit to the ferry, and also ordered Helicopters B511, B512 and B513 to depart to the scene. While approaching the scene around 0858, the Patrol Vessel-123 made two calls to contact the Sewol-Ho on VHF FM channel 16 as requested by the Group Mokpo but was unsuccessful. Therefore, the Patrol Vessel-123 focused on a cooperation plan with nearby ships because they were told that there were many passengers on the ferry. This focus on a cooperation plan prevented the Patrol Vessel-123 from communicating with Helicopters and the Sewol-Ho. Moreover, the

primary rescue operation of the Patrol Vessel-123 was to rescue people in the water, so the members focused on the routine rescue operation without having any further discussion on different scenarios. (28)

Not only the Jindo VTS Center but also the Patrol vessel and Helicopters did not share information on the condition of the Sewol such as the number of the passengers or the status of the sinking. Mutual understanding was essential to read the accurately of the situation on the Sewol. If this had been accomplished, they could have rescued the crew members and passengers.

In the same manner, the serious incident between the Carina Star and Kurama, highlights some typical Japanese communication styles. The first feature is that the Kanmon Kaikyo VTS operator used “please” in the message when he/she provided advice to the vessel. Japanese often use polite language in public naturally, however, it is unnecessary for the VTS operators to use “please” in these cases, as they are government personnel with legal authority. When Japanese say “Please overtake on her port side” in Japanese language, they use “Hidarigawa wo oikoshite kudasai”. In Japanese language, “~kudasai” means “please”, so they use “please” in such as commands or requests which is different from English in usage.

Second, Japanese tend to describe situations indirectly and end up taking time to reach a point or such as when the Japanese operator who said, “Carina Star, vessel ahead of you, Queen Orchid is moving to starboard side, so please overtake on her port side”. He/she provided background information before reaching the main point. However, the VTS operators need to provide accurate information directly because time is limited. Chart 4 and 6 illustrate the typical Japanese communication patterns. In the Chapter 4, only 2 operators answered that “they will describe the wrong action to the vessel which does not follow a warning directly”. The others answered that “they will provide information on the vessel to other ones in the vicinity”. Furthermore, many crew members are non-English speakers, hence, they need to understand the information quickly and correctly.

Third, the operator’s message, “please overtake on her port side” is “advice” not an

“order”. However, the master of Carina Star thought it was an order with authority resulting in the most serious misunderstanding between the operator and the master of the vessel.

The Japan Transport Safety Board (2011) pointed out one more cause as follows:

It is considered somewhat likely that the Operator of Kanmon MARTIS did not have accurate knowledge of the position where Ship A would overtake Ship C and how Ship B would pass there was related to the occurrence of the accident. Furthermore, it is considered somewhat likely that movement of Ship B of proceeding at a speed of about 17 kn was related to the occurrence of the accident. (71)

The operator should have known the vessels' situation such as positions or speeds accurately, and then provided correct information or an advice to avoid collision between the Carina Star and the Kurama.

2. Results: Comparing Cultural Dynamics

The questionnaires and the VHF Communication records of Korean and Japanese VTS centers were analyzed in the preceding section. In this section, both cultures are compared in view of the analysis. Both Korea and Japan have high context cultures, which are indirect, ambiguous, harmonious, reserved and tacit in nature. However, there are fundamental differences between both countries as well.

Korean people are indirect, meticulous and tend to avoid confrontation. A sense of harmony, group conscious, shame and selflessness is shared with the Japanese. They, however, have flexibility outside in international situations such as negotiations or zero distance situations. There are two fundamentally important aspects in the Korean culture. First, Koreans trend to avoid discord and try to save the face of both parties. Their culture was influenced by Confucianism. The word “true heart”, which means “sincerity” has penetrated Korean society, with an ideal of behaving in accordance to the highest social and ethical standards of unselfishness, honest loyalty to superiors and a strong work ethic. Secondly, Koreans are more open-minded and flexible than the Japanese, hence, they once have established good relationships, they employ a “zero-distance” stance outsiders. Furthermore, they can display the unique characteristic suddenly switching their positions 180 degrees without any warning or explanation in negotiations or discussions.

The above-mentioned culture and communication styles are found in the questionnaires and the VHF communication records. The Korean VTS operators tend to communicate directly with the captain or crew members, and advise them to improve a serious situation. They usually manage to make sure that the crew members understand their intentions directly and clearly. Furthermore, they strive to alert the vessel towards her dangerous actions directly in the first message. When they are not able to contact the ships, they strive to use a fax or a telephone. In brief, they direct contact with the vessels is the objective. As can be ascertained, this communication style comes from culture. It could be concluded that tragic wartime experiences and a history of invasion, probably influenced these tendencies when direct lines of communication was paramount.

In the Sewol incident, misunderstandings between the Korean VTS center and the crew of the ferry caused the serious incident and many passengers and crew members passed away. Some misleading operations by the center are found in the record. The crew members explained the dangerous situation to the Jindo VTS center, but the operators asked, "How high has the water risen inside the ferry?" The crew members could not answer the question because they were not able to move and confirm the situation of the hull at all. In another situation, the crew members asked the VTS center whether they would be rescued as soon as possible if the passengers were evacuated twice, however, the operator did not answer the questions and just advised them to make the passengers wear life rings and make them escape. The operators seemed to stick to routine operation, however, even thought it was a life or death scenario. They should have confirmed the situation of the ferry and passed on decisions immediately. It is said that whenever Asians make a decision, they need to consult with their superior, hence it takes a long time to make decisions. To make matters worse, the Jindo VTS center, the Patrol vessel and Helicopters did not share information on the serious condition of the Sewol.

On the other hand, Japan displays a predominately High Context culture. This culture has its origins from Shinto, Buddhism and Confucianism. There is a great value placed on harmony, group consciousness and saving face to avoid conflicts in not only their society but also on the international stage. Hence, they tend to avoid expressing their true feeling or opinions clearly and avoid "Yes" or "No" situations. Ambiguity and silence is a unique characteristic in Japan, but, at the same time, that makes people from other countries irritated and confused. Furthermore, Japanese value the ability for tacit understanding or 'reading between lines' which is expressed in the proverb "A word is enough to the wise." Japanese people tend to guess and try to perceive a person's feelings or thoughts with non-verbal information. They read his or her facial expressions or body language to judge the person's state of mind. They sometimes do not express everything that they have in mind and may leave their true intentions unspoken. Conversely, they think others might understand their feeling without saying a word. This communication dynamic can be the cause of misunderstandings and unfortunate confrontations among them.

In the VHF communication records between the Carina Star and the Kanmon Kaikyo VTS Center, the communication gaps were shown clearly. The first apparent gap was seen when the operator provided “advice” to the vessel and used “please” in the sentence. The operators are government personnel, hence, they have the legal authority and do not need to use polite speech. However, many Japanese do so somewhat unnaturally when speaking English. The second gap was providing too much background information before getting to the main points in communication with the vessel. The result is a lot of time to provide essential warnings or guidance. It is said that people from other countries find it difficult to understand the real feelings or intentions of the Japanese. The third gap was the most important piece of communication. The operator said, “Please overtake on her port side”, which was to be “advice” and not an “order”. However, the master of the Carina Star accepted this as an order because he thought the operators had official enforcement authority and the crew should follow it. Especially as it was the law after an incident in 2009. They did not use the message markers, hence, the operator’s “advice” was not clear or direct for the master. Another point is that the operator seemed to think the master of the Carina Star might understand his or her advice and the master would make a final decision by himself. When the captain receives “advice” from the operator, it is his responsibility to decide the movement or measure. It is clear that one of the causes of the incident was the operator’s ambiguous message as they should have confirmed their messages and the situation with the vessel.

As compared with the questionnaires in Korean and Japanese VTS centers, the Korean operators tend to provide information to the vessels more directly than the Japanese. When the Japanese operators cannot contact vessels, they try to provide information on the vessels to other vessels in the vicinity. Furthermore, as for vessels which have lost their courses, Japanese operators give them more detailed and meticulous information using the buoys or lighthouses. Whereas, similar measures corresponding to emergency situations are demonstrated by the operators in both countries as they provide information more calmly than usual when the crew is overbearing against the operators. Both of them are very careful to correspond with the crew.

Both Korea and Japan have high-context cultures and their similar communication patterns are found in this study. However, Korean people are more direct employ than Japanese. Koreans employ zero distance and value open-mindedness in dialogue with others in order to establish good communication, whereas Japanese keep others at a distance in order to avoid conflict or hurting the feelings of others, hence, to maintain a good relationship with others.

Chapter 4. Improved Measures and Possible Solutions

This chapter presents a discussion of measures corresponding to different situations and suggestions with hope for finding better procedures for smoother communications between VTS officers and foreign vessels.

1. A Study of Measures Corresponding to Different Situations

In the VHF communication records, the Jindo VTS center contacted the Sewol, the Patrol vessels and Helicopters in the Korean language, hence, the communication in English cannot be analyzed in this section. According to Kwon (2016), one of the causes of the Sewol incident is that cargo on board was more than twice the legal limit and improperly secured. It is clear that the priority of the shipping company of the ferry was profits with little concern for proper procedures and regulations. When the ferry made the second turn sharply, she lost her balance and the cargo fell to one side of this ferry. Next, the operators' misleading are found in the VHF communication records. When the Sewol ferry asked the Jindo VTS center for rescue, the operators did not answer or provide accurate answers to the ferry. Furthermore, they did not understand the ferry's serious situations in detail, so the communications between the Jindo VTS center and the Sewol ferry were incoherent. In brief, the operators provided the messages or advice one-sidedly. The Jindo VTS operators provided this message; "The evacuation of people on board Sewol ferry...the captain should make a decision about evacuating them. We do not know the situation there. The captain should make the final decision and decide quickly whether to evacuate passengers or not" (VHF Communication Records in Korea). Kwon (2016) stated that "when the Station Jindo-VTS was asked by Helmsman Park about the abandonment or evacuation, the Station Jindo-VTS responded for the Captain to decide as soon as possible whether to evacuate the ferry, stating that the Station Jindo-VTS did not have enough information to make the evacuation decision" (31) The operators might not have realized the true situation of the ferry in detail, and also the captain should have been responsible to make the final decision. However, in an emergency, the VTS centers have to collect and provide accurate information about situations and make advice or warn vessels properly and correctly. Kwon (2016) also

pointed out that “Helmsman Park and the second mate also tried to contact the Patrol Vessel-123 on VHF FM channel 16 at 0926 and 0928 respectively, but they received no answer”. (32) The reason why they did not contact the ferry was that not only the Patrol Vessel but also Helicopters concentrated on flight control. As a result, they did not know how many people were on the ferry and how to save them.

The captain and the crew members on board were thrown into confusion. Kwon (2016) pointed out that “a communication officer announced the passengers to stay in the room and not to move outside.” “He made the announcements based on his own judgement without reviewing the Operation Management Regulations Document and without getting permission from the Captain or the Chief communication officer.” (29) However, the captain of the Sewol abdicated all responsibility and was rescued first. Kwon (2016) describes the problems with Helicopters and the Patrol Vessel-123 as follows:

Two rescuers lifted only several passengers staying on the fifth deck because they had no information about the “many passengers staying put in the cabins.” Helicopter B512 of the ROKCG Jeju and Helicopter B511 of the Group Mokpo arrived on scene at 0932 and 0945 respectively, and both of them started rescuing people on the decks. Two helicopters’ pilots were not aware of the information about “passengers staying put in the cabins” either, for the same reason as that of Helicopter B511. On 0930, the Patrol Vessel-123 arrived on scene as the first rescue ship to the ferry and reported to ROKCG HQ about the status of the ferry, i.e., that no passengers were on the decks of the ferry or were in water. The Patrol Vessel-123 was not aware of the communication made between the ferry and the Station Jindo-VTS because the two parties had communicated on VHF FM channel 67 while the Patrol Vessel-123 was communicating with others on VHF FM channel 16 and SSB. On 0938, the Patrol Commander dispatched a rubber boat to the ferry, and the boat rescued the ferry’s engineers including the Chief engineer who stayed on the third deck of the ferry. After rescuing the crewmembers, a

member of the Patrol Vessel-123, Lee, Hyung-Rae, went up the ferry to drop the life rafts and dropped two life rafts, one activated immediately and the other activated after a while. (32) After the drops, he just came back to the boat, without letting passengers know about the evacuation. At that time, Helmsman Park with the first mate's help tried to reach life rafts on the port side to drop them but was unsuccessful in doing so due to the list. ...A member of the Patrol Vessel-123, Park, Sang-Wook went into the bridge, found no one was there and simply came back without doing anything. At 0956, the Commander of the Group Mokpo made his first order from the ROKCG Cutter-3009 for the Patrol Vessel-123 to announce "abandon the ferry" using its loudhailer and guide passengers to evacuate. However, the Patrol Vessel-123 did not follow the order. (33)

The Jindo VTS Center, the Patrol Vessel-123, the Group Mokpo, the Helicopter B513 of the ROKCG Group Jeju and the Helicopter B511 of the Group Mokpo did not have important details or information related to the number of the passengers or serious situation of the Sewol because of insufficient communications. Furthermore, even the captain did not know the exact number of passengers, either. As a result, they could not aid many passengers and more than 295 lives were lost.

Generally, Japanese often communicate with people from other countries in English using typical Japanese communication style and cultural dynamics. The Kanmon Kaikyo VTS operators conducted communications between the operators and the Carina Star in the same manner. Two important points were made clear in the analyzed Chapter 3. One was a clear difference in prioritization as Japanese tend to give background information first, and the main points come at the end of the phrases. This communication style is indirect and their expressions contain many circumlocutions or round about phrases. Another point is that the operator added "please" before the advice to "overtake on her port side". In Japanese language, "please" or "*~shitekudasai*" is a polite ritual-type expression, so Japanese do not realize that it is a command or an order in English. And also, they often use "Pay attention" in their communication with vessels.

According to Williamson and Kawamoto (2016), this phrase is used incorrectly as it does not mean, “You should pay attention to other vessels in your area” in this instance, which was the operator’s intention. (109) The operator should have used “Pay attention to her movement.” Or “Navigate with caution.”

When the author observed the Kanmon Kaikyo VTS Center, some operators often said, “Sorry” or “Yes, yes”. “Sorry” means to “apologize for something”, hence, when they make a mistake with a sentence or phrase in contact with the vessels, they should say, “Mistakes” or “Correction”. Furthermore, Japanese often say “*Ha*” (Yes) when they give responses to make the conversation go smoothly. However, “Yes” means “to show agreement” or “to accept an offer”. Since they are government personnel with legal authority, they should not use “Yes” so easily. Using “sorry” and “yes, yes” could be the cause for misunderstandings. Japanese operators tend to translate literally from Japanese to English without understanding the other party’s culture or communication styles.

Furthermore, the Japan Transport Safety Board (2011) stated their opinions to the Commandant of the Japan Coast Guard as follows:

5.1 Opinion to the Commandant of the Japan Coast Guard

It is considered somewhat likely the reason for the Carina Star’s action of trying to overtake the Queen Orchid on her port side in the situation where the Carina Star had approached the starboard side of the Queen Orchid was that Master A had taken the message sent by Kanmon MARTIS for just a provision of information as an enforcement power because they were in the imperative form in English without message markers on the message, which were not adopted by Kanmon MARTIS. In addition, it is considered somewhat likely that the Operator of Kanmon MARITS did not have accurate knowledge of the position where the Carina Star would overtake the Queen Orchid and how Kurama would pass there was related to the occurrence of the accident. Furthermore, it is considered somewhat likely that the movements of Kurama of proceeding at a speed about 17 knots were related to the occurrence of the

accident. (71)

(1) {3}Public announcement of the use of the international standard communication procedures The Kanmon MARITS should inform vessel passing the Kanmon Strait that Kanmon MARITS use message markers when giving information, advice or instruction based on the international standards. (71-72)

According to Japan Transport Safety Board, Kanmon MARTIS started using message markers such as “Instruction”, “Advice”, “Warning”, “Information”, “Question”, and “Correction” in accordance with the amendments of the relevant laws and regulations on July 1, 2010. Furthermore, “it has been deployed with five supervising Operators in charge of the supervision and coordination of services related to advice, etc.” (74) In addition, the system of the three-week-training course for new VTS operators was established in 2009 and they study these laws, regulations and Maritime English.

The VTS operators in both Korea and Japan should collect information on the radar screen and monitors, and communicate with vessels with detail and accurately, and then, they need to examine the information and situations carefully, and provide them to vessels. The Jindo VTS operators did not contact and coordinate with the Patrol Vessel-123, the Group Mokpo, Helicopter B513 of the ROKCG Group Jeju and Helicopter B511 of the Group Mokpo sufficiently. Moreover, they did not understand the situations of the Sewol, and as a result, this accident took a heavy toll of human lives including many high school students. The Kanmon Kaikyo VTS operators did not have accurate information on the Carina Star, The Queen Orchid and Destroyer Kurama. Furthermore, the operators provided information, advice, and warnings without using the message markers. As a result, the master of the Carina Star understood the message from Kanmon MARTIS as not a provision of information but as one of authority. Although Japanese communication style is indirect and ambiguous, they should provide information to vessels directly and accurately within a time limit in order to avoid misunderstandings.

2. Better Procedures for Smoother Communications between VTS Officers and Foreign Vessels

In view of the results of the questionnaire survey, the two case studies of the accidents at sea in South Korea and Japan, the author would like to suggest some possible solutions.

- 1) The operators in both countries should collect as much information as possible on the situations of vessels, crew members and weather in advance such as the speeds and positions of vessels, their intentions, abilities of maneuvering, tidal currents and the crew's English skills. Then, the operators can grasp a clear picture of these situations. Thus, they can calculate what the vessels would like to know. When they provide information to vessels, they need to consider accurate information, timing and English. Furthermore, the VTS centers should have smooth and stable communication with the coast guard, patrol vessels, helicopters and other support.
- 2) The VTS centers should introduce effective ways to learn practical English and try to improve the operators' English skills. The structures of Korean and Japanese languages are different from English, hence, they should know the differences between English and their mother tongues. They tend to translate passages and exchanges literally and English structures are changed by interference by their native languages. They should use message markers after beginning of exchanges including Information, Advice, Question, and Warning in order to ensure the crew understands them correctly. In the collision between the Carina Star and Kurama in the Kanmon Passage, the VTS operator did not use a message marker, so the Master of the Carina Star thought the message was an order they had to follow. Needless to say, the crew members should learn Maritime English in order to communicate with the VTS operators and make a bridge-to-bridge contact with other vessels in English. English education for the crew is not sufficient at present and some crew cannot understand messages from the center. They need to understand Maritime English as much as possible and contact the operator and other vessels quickly and accurately.

3) In Japan, seven VTS centers have introduced practical Maritime English training systems and have their own manuals. Furthermore, special training systems for new VTS operators or supervisors have been carried out at the Japan Coast Guard Branch School since 2010. Whereas, in Korea, the Maritime English training system has been introduced for new operators before they go on duty in each center. Some Korean and Japanese professors and the VTS operators wish to undertake collaborative studies. In fact, some joint seminars and conferences have been held not only in Asian countries but also at other world venues. Unfortunately not many studies have been planned currently. However, Korean and Japanese operators see the need to conduct workshops for practical Maritime English in proper pronunciation, and measures to be taken in emergency situations to avoid accidents. They have to understand many varieties of English spoken by foreign crew members with specific accents or dialects and English expressions with interference from native languages. The operators should use the recording data and audio sources to study and analyze the features of many kinds of English. In addition, the VTS operators sometimes provide information to foreign vessels in English with interference from their native Korean or Japanese. Their messages need to be clearly understood by foreign crews quickly and accurately. The operators should be required to endeavor to use a standard of correct and accurate Maritime English for smoother exchanges.

There is heavy traffic in the Port of Busan and the Kanmon Passage daily, hence, marine accidents occur frequently in these areas. The Port of Busan became the hub port of Northeast Asia and the in-transit cargo has been increasing. On the other hand, some accidents are caused by communications between VTS operators and foreign vessels. Korean and Japanese operators had thought that the best method was for all crew members to understand operators' messages in English. But as a result, their usage was fraught with broken or mistaken English expressions. However, the operators in Busan VTS center, Busan New Port and the Kanmon Kaikyo VTS center say that they have been searching for the best procedures to improve communications in order to avoid

incidents. Their consciousness seems to have changed and they need to aim for not only improvement in exchanges but they should discuss Maritime English and emergency measures and serious situations. For these purpose, joint studies for practical and standardized Maritime English are paramount for the operators of both countries now and the future.

Conclusion

In this thesis, a comparative study of the Maritime cultures of South Korea and Japan was conducted by an analysis of data from questionnaires situations inquiring and investigating the actions and procedures of Japanese and South Korean VTS operators in emergency. Moreover, serious maritime accidents in Japan and the South Korea were analyzed in detail and the actions and procedures were considered with the data collected from questionnaires and the VHF communication records of both countries. The first step of this study was a discussion based on current conflicts between Japan and the South Korea in order to set the framework of cultural comparison.

Chapter 1 highlighted cultural perceptions of each other by discussing four conflicts such as historical textbooks, Takeshima/Dokdo territories, Yasukuni Shrine and the issue of comfort women. Moreover, the author compared important elements of both cultures and the important factors of their respective relationship influenced by these mindsets. This thesis focused on the comparative the cultural dynamics and actions or decisions based on these perceptions, hence, histories and politics of the two countries are not considered primary points. According to the “Analysis Report on Comparative Data”, more than 70 percent of the South Korean respondents have a negative impression of Japan, whereas, more than 50 percent of Japanese have an unfavorable impression of South Korea. The reason why the Korean people have negative impressions is their tragic history such as the invasion by Japan and the continuing issues of conflicts discussed in this thesis. The people of both countries think Japan—Korea relations have worsened over a long period of time and also they cannot see a beginning of resolution of both sides. However, most have considered a better relationship as important because they are neighbors. Furthermore, they feel that peace and security in the Northeast Asia region is essential for better cooperation in economy and in industry. On the other hand, whenever people in Japan and the South Korea discuss Japan—Korea relations, they come up against four conflicts: historical textbooks, Takeshima/Dokdo territories, Yasukuni Shrine and the comfort women issue. It is difficult to say that conflicts between the two countries will be easing up for the near future.

The first issue is “historical textbooks”. In South Korea, history textbooks have been edited by the National Institute of Korean History and the First Tosho Kenkyu-Kaihatsu Institute. In other words, school textbooks are edited and authorized by the Government of South Korea and historical awareness and viewpoints are determined by it. Whereas, according to the Japanese Government, they do not control the historical perspective under the current system because of academic freedom and freedom of thought. However, the Korean government says that Japan has distorted history and they have glossed over some parts of the real history, hence, South Korea has requested them to amend textbooks which the Japanese government does not accept. Furthermore, the Japanese often call for “necessary consideration”, but it is ambiguous and there is no clear definition or standard. There have been strong protests such as burnings of Japanese flags, boycotts of Japanese products and the public demonstrations by some Koreans. However, some positive movements such as historians and teachers making further efforts of dialogue on this difficult issue between the two countries.

Another issue is that of the territorial conflict of Takeshima/Dokdo. Both countries have been competing for the proprietary of these small islands. The relationship between them has worsened because the South Korean President Myung-bak Lee landed on the island. The island has scarce vegetation and water, but natural gas seems to exist around the island's territory. In 1952, the President of the South Korea, Syngman Rhee issued a declaration concerning maritime sovereignty. He established the Syngman Rhee Line, hence, the Japanese Government protested against the declaration and the line. The territorial issue began at this time. Both Japan and South Korea assert the recognition of the existence of the island with their own documents and maps. South Korea has stationed permanent security personnel on the island, constructed lodgings, a monitoring facility, a lighthouse and a port and docking facilities. On the other hand, the Japanese government stated that the actions of Korea were clearly inconsistent with international law, so Japan sought a peaceful solution and proposed that the dispute would be referred to the International Court of Justice. However, South Korea rejected all Japanese proposals. The territorial dispute is very tough because Koreans think of the island as a symbol of sovereignty and independence from Japan and they have

asserted that no territorial dispute exists regarding Dokdo. Whereas the Japanese position is that they will continue to seek the settlement of the territorial issue on the basis of international law in a calm and peaceful manner. Japan tends to maintain a peaceful position without forceful language.

Another such conflict is over visits to Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese prime ministers where the Class-A, B, and C war criminals are enshrined. Approximately 70 percent of the South Korean people do not accept their visits and they are a strongly vocal against them. The Government of South Korea's statement is that Japanese prime ministers should face up the real history and reflect on their past invasion. Thus, the Korean government continue to protest this issue strongly. On the other hand, a reason for prime ministers' visits to this shrine comes from Japanese cultural traditions such as Shinto. Respect and worship of ancestors who lost their lives at war for Japanese nation belief that was the motivation expressed by Prime Minister Koizumi. He wanted to express to respect and gratitude in the Japan's present peace and prosperity are founded on the noble sacrifices made by them. He also stated that "in the past, Japan caused tremendous damage and suffering to Asian people through its colonial rule and aggression". However, the Korean government and people continue to perceive the actions of Japanese prime ministers and cabinets as never confronting history directly, denying the past and glorifying aggression and militarism.

The fourth issue is that of "comfort women". Approximately 56 percent of Koreans are interested in this issue. The Korean government asserts that comfort women were forced by Imperial Japan to serve as sex slaves for its soldiers and 51.8 percent of all comfort women were Koreans because of colonies and countries occupied by Japan. The Japanese government has been researching the facts by means of individual hearings of former military personnel and relevant documents. As a result, they recognized that the issue of comfort women is one that severely injured the honor and dignity of many women and has extended its sincere apologies and remorse to all those women known as comfort women. Furthermore, it founded the Asian Women's Fund (AWF), which implemented "medical and welfare support projects" and provided "atonement money". Prime Minister Hashimoto sent a letter expressing apologies and remorse directly to each former comfort

women. However, Koreans have requested strongly that the Japanese government should apologize to these women because the letter was not sufficient. Strong Korean attitudes can be seen by the weekly protest outside the Japanese embassy in Seoul reaching its 1000th. The comfort women monument was established in front of the Japanese embassy, in the U.S.A and China, and the Korean President has called for the Japanese emperor to apologize if he visits Korea. The people and government of Korea requested that the Japanese government should not only take “moral responsibility” but also “legal responsibility”.

Korean and Japanese cultures were discussed with an emphasis on differences and similarities for this study. Korea has a unique culture influenced by religions including Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, Christianity and Shamanism. Moreover, Korean people have experiences of repeated invasions, which have influenced on their identity or nationality. De Mente pointed out that Confucianism deeply influenced Korean society while Buddhism and Taoism shaped philosophical attitudes and Shamanism influenced attempts to ward off and deal with life’s calamities. In other words, a group consciousness and selflessness developed from these religions. In addition, many Koreans were affected by Catholicism and became independent from China. Christianity penetrated into Korean people and society, especially women who desired human rights, social equality, and other democratic principles.

One unique trait known as *Haan* culture remains deeply rooted against the Japanese at present. It is said that the word is a key word to understand Korean culture. Repeated invasions, Japanese colonization and exploitation caused the feeling of *Haan* in many ways and Korean people had been forced endurance and forbearance under the eternal violence, as a result, they have suppressed and accumulated anger and feelings of unfairness. *Haan* has been transmitted from generation to generation of Koreans and even young people have this feeling of “*haan*” against Japan. Furthermore, “*Sadaejuu*” or flunky, and Petit Sinocentrism are important concepts. This means that China has a great power, dealing with the great and serving the great, whereas, Korea has a minor power and they need to cooperate with this great power. However, Koreans were able to cope with “holding up their pride for the nationalism”, hence, it is difficult for Korean

people to lose the feeling of *Haan* against a small country, Japan which annexed and ruled them.

The Korean mindset such as shame culture, group consciousness and harmony was discussed. In a culture people try to avoid causing emotional pain to others and try to save face. Some Koreans are influenced by not only feelings of shame but also a sense of guilty shared by Christians. However, many Koreans think that they have been more influenced by this shame culture. Second, group consciousness or groupism is a typical Korean characteristic. It shows the emotional and intellectual homogenization. They had passed through tragic periods such as repeated invasions and as a result, they were influenced by common beliefs and aspirations. Moreover, group consciousness was introduced as the most powerful psychological factor by the Korean elite ruling classes. Harmony is one of the typical Korean characteristic which was achieved through the repression of individualism and supremacy of collectivism. They have lived and worked in particular groups, hence, they had to avoid conflicts among them. In addition, a hierarchical relationship is a typical to Korean culture. This means that their attitudes and behaviors are determined by their place in a vertical society.

Japanese culture is influenced by religions such as Shintoism, Buddhism and Confucianism. Although the people have no religious beliefs, they are accurately reflected in the Japanese society, everyday life or their behaviors. Japanese sensibility is based on Shinto and they have felt their cultural identity in it, moreover, it supported the Emperor system. Buddhism has laid roots deeply in their lives and forms the spiritual culture. It is a practical morality with an emphasis on human relations, a reverence for ancestors, and the worship of individual sect founders. Furthermore, Confucianism teaches how to consider proper behavior and human relationships. These three religions are an essential part Japanese culture and valued.

It is said that typical characteristics of the Japanese include *Honne* vs. *Tatema* (true feelings vs. public pretense), hierarchy, harmony and shame culture. These are all relevant to group consciousness. Japanese have lived in a small society and community and they needed to avoid conflicts and create a comfortable atmosphere in their own groups for a great deal of human relationships, peace and harmony. Moreover, the role

of a go-between is very important for Japanese people in order to avoid direct competitions and confrontations. In addition to the above characteristics, “shame culture” and “sincerity” exists in the Japanese mindset. “Shame culture” means that they try to avoid saving face and avoid shame, because they are always afraid of the judgement of others. It is said that this shame culture has influenced the moral foundation of Japanese society and community, along with the importance of honor by maintaining “face” in the society. The feeling of “sincerity” is very important for Japanese people as a moral virtue in Japan, hence, there is always the ideal to be sincere in actions. Japanese people try to maintain a harmonious atmosphere with others by acting sincere in order to avoid conflict and avoiding loss of face in their community.

This consideration of Japanese and Korean cultural differences and similarities is found out in their cultures. Koreans have a feeling of *haan* strongly against Japan because of the invasion, colonization and annexation of the past. It is a fact that will not be easy to loose much less erase the tragic memories of these historical events for the foreseeable future. Moreover, Korea had been dominated by China for several hundred years, hence, “Sadaejuui” and “Petit Sinocentrism” are a part of mindset making a strong sense of nationalism and identity directed towards this “small” country. They are also influenced by Christianity much more than Japan that brings a stronger independence and a pursuit for equality and advocacy of human rights. On the other hand, the ratio of Christianity in Japan is small, whereas social influence by Shintoism, Buddhism and Confucianism is strong. The Japanese are not as religious but it shapes their values and customs. Both cultures share influences by Confucianism and Buddhism, which is an important in their life styles and philosophical attitudes. Both cultures demonstrate group consciousness, harmony and hierarchy to avoid conflict and disputes in order to maintain good relationships. In addition, they both display a shame culture where saving face or avoiding loss of honor to make good impressions is an important social mechanism. People in both countries value traditions, customs and respect seniors and their ancestors for generations.

Chapter 1 covered impressions and perceptions of each other among the Japanese and South Korean nation, historical encounters as well as differences and similarities in

culture. At the conclusion of this chapter, actions and measures resulting from conflicts between these countries and the cultural implications that make resolutions challenging between Japan and South Korea were considered through four contemporary areas of conflict. The government and people of South Korea have stated consistently that Japan did not face up to their history and apologize to the Korean people for its invasion and the comfort women forced to work in Japanese wartime brothels. Furthermore, Koreans say that the Japanese government glorifies wars by its paying respects to Class A criminals. Korean attitudes and actions against Japan are strong and clear. They protested historical textbooks, they boycotted Japanese products, burned a Japanese national flag and did made public demonstrations. In 2012, South Korean President, Myun-bak Lee landed on Takeshima/Dokdo and established a stone monument. South Korea had stationed permanent security personnel, a lighthouse and port and docking facilities. In particular, Dokdo is a symbol and identity of Korean sovereignty, hence, they shows strong and direct attitudes against Japan. With regards to the comfort women, Koreans established “comfort women” monuments not only in front of the Japanese embassy but also in the U.S. and China.

The Japanese actions and attitudes are quite different from those of Koreans. Chief Cabinet Secretary Kiichi Miyazawa and Yasuo Fukuda expressed deep remorse and made heartfelt apologies to Asian countries. They promised to undertake the corrections and amendments requested by Korean officials. However, the Japanese government stated that they would take the “necessary consideration” and this ambiguous attitude is unsettling to the Korea side. Regarding the conflict over Takeshima / Dokdo territories, after the visit of South Korean President Lee to the islands, the Japanese government protested strongly. Moreover, Prime Minister Noda sent a letter to Lee and it was returned to him and this was seen as a slight towards him and Japan. The Japanese government would like to find a peaceful solution, hence, they entrusted it with the International Court of Justice and avoided direct communication with the Korean government by use of this go-between policy. Yasukuni Shrine is one of the other challenging conflicts between the two countries. Whenever Japanese prime ministers visit the shrine, the Korean government protests them that they glorify the Japanese

military and Class A, B, and C criminals. However, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi stated that he visited there to express respect and gratitude to the persons who passed away for the nation. The comfort women issue is the most delicate issue of the four and most Koreans show interest. These women were forced by the Japanese military to serve as sex slaves for its soldiers, hence, they were severely shamed injured and not only physically but mentally loss of honor. Korean people established comfort women memorials and the Japanese government required them to remove the monuments promptly. However, this resulted in an escalation of protest with more statues placed around the world. The Japanese government founded the Asian Women's Fund to express their sincere apologies and remorse. However, Koreans protested against Japan and required them to apologize officially and indemnify comfort women for the suffering and damage to their honor and well-being because Koreans thought the Japanese government founded the AWF as a way to avoid its responsibility. These conflicts have not been solved yet, but clearly illustrate the cultural dynamics behind the path to resolution obviously to settle them by making compromise. They will require understanding of real intentions masked by different cultures and a grasp of the history behind them.

Chapter 2 is a comparison of communication styles in Korea and Japan in relation to questionnaires given to Busan VTS Center and Busan New Port in South Korea, and Kanmon Kaikyo VTS Center in Japan for a study on the measures for corresponding emergency situations. Furthermore, marine accidents at sea in both countries detailed in this respect. Some differences and similarities are found in their communication styles. Hall (1989) describes High/Low context culture. People in High Context cultures are able to read "between lines" and understand the unsaid because of their background knowledge. In other words, their communication styles are indirect, ambiguous, harmonious and reserved. Japan and Korea are included in these cultures. Whereas, people in Low Context cultures usually expect explanations and their communication style is direct, liner, open and based on feelings or true intentions. Hall and Hall (1990) placed Japan at the top of the list of High Context cultures. In fact, their communication style is indirect, using of few words, respecting for long silences, the intentions of others,

and waiting politely until they take turns. It is often said that Japanese do not express their opinions and true intentions. The reason is that Japanese have lived in a small country or community, hence, they value harmony, hierarchy and maintain good relationships to avoid conflicts. Unfortunately, these Japanese attitudes can cause misunderstandings on the international stage and at business negotiations. Korea has a High Context culture as Japan and they are indirect and harmonious to avoid confrontations. The word “*chinshim*” is very important for Koreans and its means attitudes in the society, and philosophy and spirituality. In addition, they have what could be described as “radar” for acts of sincerity or a strong sense of the need. On the other hand, they demonstrate a sense of flexibility in outside business negotiation with zero distance. According to De Mente (1998), outsiders are not able to understand and accept Korean behaviors easily because it often appears to be totally arbitrary and purposely disruptive. Thus, once they establish a good relationship, they tend to be more open-minded and flexible and the combination of these two cultural trait are used skillfully.

The mission content at the Vessel Traffic Service centers of Korea and Japan were stated detailing how Busan Port became the world’s largest ship building center and hub port providing diverse transport services, whereas, approximately 600~700 vessels including foreign registered ones pass through the Kanmon Passage each day. The operators of these centers use Maritime English as the median with the foreign vessels or crew members. With the rise of vessels passing through these areas, marine accidents are on the increase. The center provides necessary and timely information or advice using Radar, AIS, or CCTV, ITV and VHF radiotelephone. Their mission is to maintain and improve safety and efficiency of vessel traffic to avoid accidents or dangers and possible violations of traffic rules.

The questionnaire survey was carried out at Busan VTS Center and Busan New Port in South Korea, and the Kanmon Kaikyo VTS Center in Japan in 2013 and 2014. According to the results, the different measures of Korean and Japanese operators were clear. Korean operators try to provide information to a vessel which ignored their message directly, or they try to contact it by using FAX, telephone, or other means. In

another situation, when crew of a vessel does not comply with the operator's message, they try to inform their incorrect action again and again. And, when a foreign vessel is out of control, most Korean operators alert them that their actions are dangerous. They repeat their information to the crew who do not understand them many times and slowly, too. Moreover, when a vessel is taking a wrong course, they advise them to confirm the position again and again. As a vessel has a risk of grounding while the captain is away, half of the Korean operators tell the crew to call the captain immediately. As stated above, Korean operators manage to contact the vessel and provide "Advice" or "Information" directly and show strong attitudes. On the other hand, the Japanese operators' measures are a little somewhat different. When the Japanese find that it is difficult to communicate with crew of the vessels, they try to contact other vessels, provide information and ask for their cooperation. Moreover, they call all ships on Channel 16. In other situations, when a vessel takes a wrong course, the Korean operators try to contact them directly and tell them to confirm the position by themselves, whereas, some Japanese operators try to provide more detailed targets such as buoys or lighthouses.

VHF communication records of serious marine accidents in South Korea and the Kanmon Passage were analyzed in detail. On April 16, 2014, a terrible marine disaster of Sewol occurred, in the position about 11 miles from Jindo Island in South Korea. The ferry capsized and 304 of the 476 passengers were dead or a few are still missing. It is said that one of the causes of the incident was the VTS operators' misleading directions. It can be considered that they did not take measures corresponding to the Sewol's questions or requirements sufficiently. For example, the master and crew members could not get information on the hull because they could not move at all due to the heavy list. However, the Jindo VTS operators asked some irrelevant questions. Furthermore, they did not collect necessary information on the ferry and failed to communicate with not only the ferry but also the patrol vessels, helicopters and the coast guard sufficiently. As a result, the rescue was delayed and many passengers including high school students were sacrificed in the incident. In the Kanmon Passage, the containership Carina Star and a destroyer of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Kurama collided in the vicinity of Moji-Saki, Fukuoka Prefecture on October 27, 2009. Fortunately, there were

no fatalities or missing, however, six crew members of the Kurama were injured during the fire-fighting operations. It is considered that one of the causes of the collision was the operators' advice or information. The operators provided messages such as "Carina Star, vessel ahead of you, Queen Orchid is moving to starboard side, so please overtake on her port side". The master of the containership understood the message as an order, because the operators have authority, hence, they should say that the captain must make a final decision and provide messages accurately and directly.

In Chapter 3, the author analyzed the surveys of the operators' measures by comparing the results of both countries. In section 1, Korean operators try to communicate with crew members of vessels directly, and when they cannot contact the crew, they call the crew by fax or telephone. They strive to provide information on the dangerous situation and manage to let the crew understand their information directly and clearly. Moreover, they tend to alert dangerous actions to the vessel when the operators cannot communicate with crew members due to their poor English skills. Korean operators try to make direct communications with the crew. Furthermore, the operators strive to contact a vessel which takes a wrong course, and advise them to confirm the position by themselves directly. On the other hand, Japanese operators tend to contact other vessels when one vessel has a problem. Moreover, when they find that the communication is difficult, they manage to take other measures. And also, they provide further detailed information such as buoys or lighthouses to the vessel taking a wrong course. Judging from the results, different measures in both countries are quite clear found. Korean operators try to contact a vessel with trouble by using a fax or a telephone directly, whereas half of the Japanese operators tend to contact other vessels around a vessel with troubles. Moreover, they provide more detailed information.

In this chapter, the author studied the different measures in the maritime disasters in both countries, too. It is considered that there are two causes in the incident of Sewol. One of them is that the communication between the ferry and the Jindo VTS Center did not work properly. For example, the operator's advice did not suit the situation of the ferry which was sinking. The reason is that the center did not collect accurate information on the ferry and understand the serious situation. All crew members did not

move and confirm their ferry at all. Another cause is that the center could not build up a close cooperation with the Group Mokpo, ROKCG Patrol vessel and helicopters because they did not share information on the ferry sufficiently. On the other hand, in a VHF communication record of a collision incident between the Carina Star and Kurama, some typical Japanese communication styles were clear. One is that the Japanese operator used “please” before the message “overtake on her port side”. This is “advice” to the Carina Star, however, the master of the vessel received it as an order instead of advice, and it had some enforcement power because the operators have legal authority. Furthermore, the operator provided background information before the main point. The communication style is indirect and circumlocutory. Hence, they should have provided messages to the vessels directly and accurately.

In the next section, the author compared the cultures in both countries by analyzing the surveys and the VHF communication records. Both countries have high context cultures, hence, it is not too much to say that their cultures are share similar, traits such as being indirect, ambiguous, sharing a sense of harmony and shame and showing reserve. However, differences of two countries were clear as well. Koreans are more open-minded, direct and flexible than Japanese. The surveys show that Korean operators tend to contact crew members directly and obviously. This communication style comes from their history and culture such as a tragic wartime experiences such as repeated invasions. Moreover, in the VHF communication record, their one-sided correspondences were shown. Whereas Japanese have an advanced ability to read the mind or between lines, many Japanese do not express their true intentions to avoid conflicts not only among their society but also on the international stage. A communication style including many indirect and ambiguous expressions were found in the surveys and the VHF communication record.

In Chapter 4, the author studied the measures corresponding to different situations and suggested better procedures for good communications between VTS officers and foreign vessels. The two VHF communication records of the Jindo VTS Center and the Kanmon Kaikyo VTS Center were analyzed in the first section. The deficiency of the information on the situation of Sewol was one of the causes of South Korea’s serious

maritime disaster. The Jindo VTS Center did not recognize the condition of the ferry, moreover, they provided the messages or advice one-sidedly and did not share the information with the patrol vessels and helicopters. As a result, the rescue was delayed and more than 300 passengers and crew members were dead or missing. In the Kanmon Passage, on the other hand, there was a collision of a containership and Kurama in 2009. It is considered that one of the causes was a misunderstanding of the communications between the VTS operators and the master of the vessel. When Japanese operators provide information to foreign vessels, they often use English with various degrees of Japanese language and culture interference in expressions. The English usage can cause a misunderstanding, moreover, lead to a big accident. Furthermore, the VTS operators did not have detailed and accurate information on the vessels such as the positions and speeds. The operators in Japan and South Korea should collect and understand information in detail and accurately when they communicate with vessels.

In the last section, the author made three suggestions for possible solutions. The first suggestion is that VTS operators should collect accurate information on vessels promptly, and provide it to them with good timing and precisely. Moreover, the operators need to share information with other facilities at the same time. The second one is that the operators need to improve their English skills because they do contact foreign vessels in Maritime English. In fact, more than 70 percent of vessels passing Pusan Port and the Kanmon Passage are foreign registered vessels and the crew members are non-English speakers. Hence, it is necessary for the operators to give information with message markers and simple expressions. The third suggestion is that joint studies on Maritime English and measures in emergency situations will be important in the near future. The operators should be accustomed to many kinds of English spoken by non-English speakers with special accents or expressions. These varieties of English should be analyzed through VHF communication records or other sound sources. Furthermore, they need to understand the differences between English, and Korean and Japanese languages. The most important mission of the VTS centers is to reduce or prevent accidents at sea. Joint studies of practical Maritime English for good communication will be effective for VTS operators in both countries in the near future.

This thesis is to study the actions and procedures of the Vessel Traffic Service officers in Japan and Korea. The method of the study was a survey of the VTS operators in Japan and Korea, and an analysis of the VHF communications of two serious incidents in both countries. The author conducted an action and procedure comparison between Korean and Japanese operators through their cultures and communication styles. Hence, this paper does not discuss the issues related to their histories or politics, but she needed to study four conflicts such as historical textbooks, Takeshima/Dokdo territories, Yasukuni Shrine and comfort women and the actions and statements of both governments in order to examine their cultures and movements. Recently, marine traffic has grown and many vessels pass in Busan Port and the Kanmon Passage. However, the number of marine accidents is on the rise. Reducing or preventing accidents is an important issue. In Chapter 4, three possible solutions were suggested. One of them was joint studies on Maritime English and measures in emergency situations in Japan and Korea. They have Maritime English education systems in both countries, but the author thinks that they need to research and study jointly with scholars of Maritime English education. The VTS operators communicate with foreign vessels in Maritime English, but both operators and crew members are not English speakers. They use English with many kinds of accents and expressions, hence that causes misunderstandings. Accordingly, their pronunciations and expressions should be analyzed and not only VTS operators but also crew members should listen to the messages accurately and understand them. Joint research and study will be important in the future.

Furthermore, Chapter 1 shows that present relationship between Japan and Korea is not on the best of terms. Four conflicts such as historical textbooks, Takeshima/Dokdo, Yasukuni Shrine and comfort women yet to be unsettled. They should strive to find solutions in both countries to facilitate better relations between them. Hopefully people will see the importance and desire to come to understand and respect each other. Chung (2008) expressed the view on good relationships in the following manner:

It is time to think about the need to reestablish friendly and cooperative relations between the two governments in the name of their shared goal of

enhancing national interests and ensuring a peaceful and prosperous life for their people amid the very unstable situation in Northeast Asia, including the Korean Peninsula (229). Korea and Japan have maintained, and will continue to maintain, closer relations than any other two countries in the world in terms of geography, history, culture and ethnicity (254). The people of the two countries cannot expect to overcome this historical conflict if they only ask those of the other side to improve their historical perspectives. They need to take a more flexible and refined attitude. They should bear in mind that they are involved in especially reciprocal relations (255).

The VTS operators in both countries did not collect and understand the situations in serious incidents, consequently, they could not provide accurate information and make correspondence with the vessels promptly and exactly. Likewise, in the relationship between Japan and Korea, of course to stress their own viewpoints is important, however, they should strive to understand the other party's background including thought, culture, customs and history. Knowing and understanding each other must be the first step towards improvements or solutions. From now the VTS operator's English and audio recording data will be necessary to reduce incidents and study the accurate measures to implement with foreign vessels jointly in order to aim the improvement maritime relations between Japan and Korea.

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NOTES

1. Ryoo Mi-Lim, *Maritime Topics for English Learners* Unit 9. Sea Commerce: Shipping and the Economy (p.98)
2. VHF=Very High Frequency
3. The Japan Association of Marine Safety. (2003) "Sea and Safety" No. 517. p.32
4. See Figure 10: Marine Traffic Information Service
5. Busan, Incheon, Yeosu/Gwang, Masan/Jinhae, Ulsan, Donghae, Mokpo,Pohang, Jeju, Daesan, Gunsan, Pyeongtaek, Busan New Port, Wando and Jindo
6. IMO Standard Marine Communication Phrases
7. Hall. (1976). "*Beyond Culture*"
8. They were called Usan-guk or Ulleungdo during the Silla period. (MOFA Korea)
9. Expert of the Cairo Declaration: "Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent. (MOFA document)
10. MOFA document
11. "Statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary Kiichi Miyazawa on History Textbooks" on August 26, 1982 (MOFA of Japan)
12. Samil Independence Movement: Demonstrations for Korean National Independence from Japan that began on March 1, 1919 in the Korean capital city of Seoul.
13. National Clearinghouse for United States-Japan Studies: Indiana University <http://www.indiana.edu/~Japan/Degests/textbook>.
14. "Comments by the Chief Cabinet Secretary, Mr. Yasuo Fukuda on the history textbooks to be used in junior high schools from 2002" on April 3, 2001. (MOFA of Japan)
15. "Historical Conflict and Dialogues Between Korea and Japan with the Focus on the Current Issue Concerning Japanese Historical Textbooks " – The Historical Perceptions of Korea and Japan
16. "Comment by Minister for Foreign Affairs Makiko Tanaka on the Official Stance Conveyed by the Government of the Republic of Korea on the Decision to Authorize

Japanese History Textbooks” on May 8, 2001. (MOFA of Japan)

17. “The subject of the History Textbook Problem between Japan and Korea, and a view”

18. “Kannichi Rekishikyokasyomondai no Shitekitankai (1945~present)

19. The organizing committee for the Korea-Japan Historians’ Meeting, The Trend of Historical Study in the Post-war Period, Kookhak Community Corporation., 2002. (Chung: 2008)

20. MOFA of Japan: Japan’s Consistent Position on Territorial Sovereignty over Takeshima

21. Japanese Government says that “The establishment of the Syngman Rhee Line constitutes an illegal delineation of the high seas, and the occupation of Takeshima by the ROK constitute an illegal occupation undertaken without basis in international law”. (MOFA of Japan)

22. According to MOFA of Japan, “Japan, which has consistently followed the path of a peaceful nation since the end of World War II, has been seeking a peaceful solution in dealing with this situation.”

23. On October 27, 1900, the Korean Empire issued Imperial Decree No. 41, proclaiming the renaming of Ulleungdo as Ullo and the promotion of the post of inspector to country magistrate. In the Second article of the same decree, it is provided that “all of Ulleungdo as well as Jukdo and Seokdo [Dokdo] shall be placed under the jurisdiction of Ullo-gun, Ullo country. (MOFA of Korea)

24. SCAPIN=Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Instruction Note

25. “The Dokdo-Takeshima Issue” Its Origins and the Current Situation

26. The Boshin War: 1868-1869, the Seinan War: 1877, the Sino-Japanese War: 1894-1895, the Russo-Japanese War: 1904-1905

27. Yasukuni Shrine <http://yasukuni.or.jp/english/about/foundation>

28. Chapter 6. Controversies Surrounding the Question of the Japanese Army’s Comfort Stations and ‘Comfort Women’

29. The Ordinance on Women’s Volunteering Labor Corps was promulgated in August 1944.

30. The view of the Government of Japan concerning the comfort women issue
31. Overview of the activities of the Asian Women's Fund (MOFA of Japan)
32. "On the Issue of Comfort Women", August 4, 1993: Cabinet Councilors' Office on External Affairs
33. August 4, 1993
34. Genron NPO and East Asia Institute, "The 3rd Joint Survey on Korea-Japan Public Opinion: Final Report on Korea-Japan Comparative Analysis", 2015
35. Confucianism as Cultural Constraint: A Comparison of Confucian Values of Japanese and Korean University Students
36. According to De Mente, in 1866 the Yi court ordered nine of the French Catholic priests living in Seoul executed and unleashed a pogrom against Korean converts to Catholicism that resulted in the massacre of some eight thousand. p.180
37. "*Hwabyung* in Korea: Culture and Dynamic Analysis"
38. According to De Mente, the Paekche kingdom, first located in the vicinity of present-day Seoul and then on the southeastern side of the peninsula, where Pusan (Busan) is now located, introduced Buddhism, silk culture, the forging of iron, and a wide variety of arts and crafts into Japan.
39. Agency For Cultural Affairs Government of Japan:
http://www.bunka.go.jp/tokei_kakuso_shuppan
40. A Bilingual Handbook on Japanese Culture
41. De Mente. Japan's Cultural Code Words-233 Key Terms That Explain the Attitudes and Behavior of the Japanese
42. "Shin Sukato no Kaze-Nikkan=Awasekagami no Sekai"
43. Approximately 104,000 soldiers who died during the Korean War are enshrined in this places.
44. Chapter 1 Lecture: High-Context and Low-Context Cultures Styles
45. Zero distance is a term which is used in Gengo toiu Kankyo. It means not only distance but also a relation between people.
46. Automatic Identification System
47. Closed Circuit Television

48. MARINE TRAFFIC INFORMATION SERVICE

49. It is considered possible, as stated before in 3.2.5 (1) {4}, that the phrase “on my port side” was mistakenly used for the phrase “on her port side.” (Japan Transport Safety Board. 91)

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日韓海事文化比較研究に関するアンケート調査ご協力をお願い

博士論文にて、日韓海上交通センター運用管制官の外国船への対応の比較を研究しております。お忙しいとは存じますが、アンケート調査へのご協力をよろしくお願いいたします。

(北九州市立大学大学院社会システム研究科博士後期課程 河本 恵美)

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(1)~(10)までの各状況において、どのような対応を行いますか。該当する対応の番号を○で囲み、具体的なメッセージを英語で書いてください。

また 11. 12 は、該当する番号を○で囲んでください。

- (1) 危険な方向に向かっている外国船 A に警告をするが、乗組員が無視をして全く応答がない場合、どのように対応しますか。
1. 周囲の船舶に外国船 A に関する情報提供をする
 2. 応答するまで交信し続ける
 3. 他の手段 (FAX、電話等) で伝える
 4. その他の対応 ()

<具体的にメッセージを書いてください。>

- (2) 管制官が勧告や警告を出した際、"Roger.", "I understood.", "No problem!" と返答するものの、全く従わない場合どのような対応をしますか。
1. 意図が理解出来るまで、何度も行動が逆であることを伝える
 2. 勧告や警告に従うまで何度も繰り返す
 3. 周囲の船舶に状況を伝え、注意喚起する
 4. その他の対応 ()

<具体的にメッセージを書いてください。>

(3) 暴走する外国船 A に対してどのように対応しますか。

1. 情報提供を行うが、あとは船長の判断に任せる
2. 危険行為であることを注意喚起する
3. 他の船舶に暴走船 A に関する情報提供をする
4. その他の対応 ()

<具体的にメッセージを書いてください。>

(4) 何度も通峡しているため、航路を熟知しており操船に自身を持っている外国船 A が、管制官の指示に従わない場合、どのような対応をしますか。

1. 状況を確認するように伝える
2. 他の船舶に外国船 A に関する情報提供をする
3. 再度、情報提供を行うが、あとは船長の判断に任せる
4. その他の対応 ()

<具体的にメッセージを書いてください。>

(5) 英語で情報提供を行うが、外国船 A の乗組員が英語を十分理解出来ず、コミュニケーションが上手く成立しない場合、どのような対応をしますか。

1. ゆっくりと何度も情報提供を行う
2. 英語が理解できる乗組員が乗船しているか尋ねる
3. 他の船舶に外国船 A に関する情報提供をする
4. その他の対応 ()

<具体的にメッセージを書いてください。>

(6) 外国船乗務員の英語が雑音等で聞き取りにくい場合、どのような対応をしますか。

1. 何度も聞き返す
2. 他の手段（FAX、電話等）で連絡をするように伝える
3. 船長の判断に任せ、以後応答しない
4. その他の対応（

）

<具体的にメッセージを書いてください。>

(7) 管制官が情報提供をする際、外国船から威圧的な態度を取られた場合、どのように対応しますか。

1. いつも以上に冷静な対応をする
2. 通常通りの情報提供をする
3. 威圧的な態度であることを指摘し、注意する
4. その他の対応（

）

<具体的にメッセージを書いてください。>

(8) 針路を見失ってしまった外国船 A に対して、どのように対応しますか。

1. 船舶 A に対して位置確認するよう何度も指示する
2. A がパニックになっているので、見守る
3. 他の船舶に対して、注意喚起をする
4. その他の対応（

）

<具体的にメッセージを書いてください。>

- (9) 航路を熟知している船長が席を外した間に乗り揚げの危険が生じた場合、どのような対応をしますか。
1. 本船に判断を任せ、対応しない
 2. 他の乗組員に指示する
 3. すぐに船長を出すように指示する
 4. その他の対応 ()

<具体的にメッセージを書いてください。>

- (10) 船舶 A に反航船の船尾を通過するように伝えましたが、スピードを上げて船首を通過すると伝えてきた場合、船舶 A に対してどのような対応をしますか。
1. 反航船に船舶 A の意向を伝える
 2. 状況を見守りながら指示を考える
 3. 情報提供内容を守るよう指示をし、船尾を通過させる
 4. その他の対応 ()

<具体的にメッセージを書いてください。>

- (11) 管制業務以外で、週何回英語を話しますか。
1. ほとんど毎日
 2. 週 3~4 回
 3. 週 1~2 回
 4. 全く使わない

(12) 該当する番号に○を囲んでください。

- A. 性別 1. 男性 2. 女性
- B. 年齢 1. 20~29 歳 2. 30~39 歳 3. 40~49 歳 4. 50 歳以上
- C. 管制業務年数 1. 3 年未満 2. 3 年以上 5 年未満 3. 5 年以上 8 年未満
4. 8 年以上

お忙しい中、ご協力ありがとうございました。

"일한 해사 문화 비교의 연구" 에 관한 설문 조사에 협조를 부탁드립니다.

박사 논문에서 외국선에 대한 일한 해상 교통 센터 운영 관제관의 대응/비교를 연구하고 있습니다. 바쁘신 와중에 죄송합니다만 설문 조사에 협조해 주시면 감사하겠습니다.

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(1)~(10)까지의 각 상황에서 어떻게 대응하시겠습니까? 해당되는 번호에 동그라미를 하시고 구체적인 메시지를 영어로 써 주시기 바랍니다.

또한 11,12 는 해당되는 번호에 동그라미를 해 주십시오.

(1) 위험한 방향으로 가고 있는 외국선 A 에 경고를 하는데도 승무원이 무시하고 응답이 전혀 없는 경우 어떻게 대응하시겠습니까?

1. 주위에 있는 선박에 외국선 A 에 관한 정보를 제공한다.
2. 응답할 때까지 교신을 계속한다.
3. 다른 수단 (팩스, 전화 등)으로 전한다.
4. 기타 대응 ()

<구체적인 메시지를 써 주십시오.>

(2) 관제관이 권고나 경고를 했을 때 "Roger." , "I understood." , "No problem!" 이라고 대답하면서도 전혀 따르지 않을 때 어떻게 대응하시겠습니까?

1. 의도를 이해시킬 수 있을 때까지 행동이 반대라는 것을 거듭 전한다.
2. 권고나 경고에 따를 때까지 거듭 되풀이 한다.
3. 주위에 있는 선박에 상황을 전하고 주의를 환기 시킨다.
4. 기타 대응 ()

<구체적인 메시지를 써 주십시오.>

(3) 난폭하게 항행하는 외국선 A에 대하여 어떻게 대응하시겠습니까?

1. 정보 제공은 하되 그외는 선장의 판단에 맡긴다.
2. 위험한 행위임을 경고한다.
3. 다른 선박에 외국선 A에 관한 정보를 제공한다.
4. 기타 대응 ()

<구체적인 메시지를 써 주십시오.>

(4) 여러 번 해협을 통과하여 항로를 잘 알고 있으며 운항에 능숙한 외국선 A가 관제관의 지시에 따르지 않을 때 어떻게 대응하시겠습니까?

1. 상황을 확인하도록 전한다.
2. 다른 선박에 외국선 A에 관한 정보를 제공한다.
3. 거듭 정보를 제공하되 그후는 선장의 판단에 맡긴다.
4. 기타 대응 ()

<구체적인 메시지를 써 주십시오.>

(5) 영어로 정보를 제공하는데 외국선 A의 승무원이 영어를 충분히 이해하지 못함으로써 발생하는 의사 소통의 문제에 대하여 어떻게 대응하시겠습니까?

1. 정보를 천천히 그리고 거듭 제공한다.
2. 영어를 이해할 수 있는 승무원의 승선 여부를 묻는다.
3. 다른 선박에 외국선 A에 관한 정보를 제공한다.
4. 기타 대응 ()

<구체적인 메시지를 써 주십시오.>

(6) 외국선 승무원이 잡음 등으로 인해 영어를 알아 듣지 못할 때 어떻게 대응하시겠습니까?

1. 거듭 되묻는다.
2. 다른 수단 (팩스, 전화 등) 으로 연락하도록 전한다.
3. 선장의 판단에 맡기고 이후 응답하지 않는다.
4. 기타 대응 ()

<구체적인 메시지를 써 주십시오.>

(7) 관제관이 정보 제공을 할 때 외국선이 위압적인 태도를 보였을 때 어떻게 대응하시겠습니까?

1. 평상시 이상으로 냉정하게 대응한다.
2. 평상시 대로 정보 제공을 한다.
3. 위압적인 태도임을 지적하고 충고한다.
4. 기타 대응 ()

<구체적인 메시지를 써 주십시오.>

(8) 침로를 잃어버린 외국선 A에 대하여 어떻게 대응하시겠습니까?

1. 선박 A에 대하여 위치를 확인하도록 거듭 지시한다.
2. 패닉 상태에 있는 A를 지켜 본다.
3. 다른 선박에 대하여 주의를 환기시킨다.
4. 기타 대응 ()

<구체적인 메시지를 써 주십시오.>

- (9) 항로에 대하여 잘 아는 선장이 자리를 비운 사이에 좌초할 위험이 생긴 경우 어떻게 대응하시겠습니까?
1. 선박 자신의 판단에 맡기며 대응을 하지 않는다.
 2. 다른 승조원에게 지시를 한다.
 3. 즉시 선장이 나오도록 지시한다.
 4. 기타 대응 ()

<구체적인 메시지를 써 주십시오.>

- (10) 선박 A 에게 반항선의 선미를 통과하도록 전했는데도 속도를 올려서 선수를 통과하겠다고 전해 왔을 때 선박 A 에 대하여 어떻게 대응하시겠습니까?
1. 반항선에게 선박 A 의 의향을 전한다.
 2. 상황을 지켜 보면서 어떤 지시를 할 것인지 생각한다.
 3. 제공한 정보 내용을 지키도록 지시하고 선미를 통과시킨다.
 4. 기타 대응 ()

<구체적인 메시지를 써 주십시오.>

- (11) 관제 업무 외에 주에 몇번 영어를 쓰십니까?
1. 거의 매일
 2. 주 3~4 번
 3. 주 1~2 번
 4. 전혀 쓰지 않는다

(12) 해당되는 번호에 동그라미를 해 주십시오.

- A. 성별 1. 남자 2. 여자
- B. 연령 1. 20~29 세 2. 30~39 세 3. 40~49 세 4. 50 세 이상
- C. 관제 업무 연수 1. 3년 미만 2. 3년 이상 5년 미만
3. 5년 이상 8년 미만 4. 8년 이상

바쁘신 와중에 협조해 주셔서 감사 드립니다.