Explaining the Fate of Ethnic Minority Parties:

An Analysis across Seventeen Post-Communist Countries.*

Nakai Ryo

Abstract.

Why do ethnically minority parties succeed or fail to win seats? To solve this puzzle, this article explores cross-national and inter-temporal differences in the post-communist new democracies. This study argues that governmental policy positions and the strategic behaviour of ethnic minorities determine the success and failure of ethnic parties and account for the variance in their standings. A spatial model demonstrates how ethnic minorities react to other parties' policy changes, and statistical analysis using seventeen Central and East European countries' data verifies this hypothesis.

Keywords.

Ethnopolitics; Voting Behaviour; Party Politics

Introduction and method

Why do ethnic minority parties win seats in some countries but not in others? Why do ethnic parties rise or fall in the same country? Since many Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) countries democratised in the late 1980s and early 1990s, several ethnic minority groups have had the chance to voice their own interests through the electoral system and party politics. These processes led to the emergence of ethnic parties in several countries. For example, the Turkish minority's party has won a vast number of seats in the Bulgarian parliament. The Russian minority in Latvia formed political parties and holds capital city local government. Contrastingly, many Gagauzians living in Moldova have failed to elect their own ethnic parties to the Moldovan Parliament. The Russian minority in Estonia rarely support the ethnic Russian parties nowadays despite their popularity among Russian voters in the 1990s. How should we interpret these variations in political party systems between countries and overtime?

Such questions have typically been accounted for by classically institutional or socio-economic explanations, as Meguid (2005) pointed out. However, as many new studies have observed these types of classic explanations trend limitations to some extent and rarely solve a puzzle like the one mentioned above. When institutional and socio-economic explanation show some limitations, actor-centric perspective will be useful. Building on theoretical works that are more actor-oriented which assuming strategic behaviour of political parties and ethnic minority voters, this study argues that setting policy related to national integration, such as language law and

franchising, are important variables in explaining the variance of ethnic parties' representation. In addition, the rationality of ethnic minorities is a very important assumption to support this hypothesis and explain the variances across party systems.

This article consists of three parts. The first section represents a theoretical review of the literature, show limitations of institutional and socio-economic explanation, and summarize recent researches. The second section offers an original hypothesis, deduced theoretically from a simply formalized model. In the third section, multi-regression analyses for seventeen CEE countries verify the hypothesis and inspect the causal effects of several variables. Throughout, this paper use the term 'ethnic minority' frequently as a term that includes the broader concept of ethnic minorities, national minorities and minority races, and define 'ethnic party' as 'the political party which insists on a particular ethnic minority group's interests as first among others' (Chandra 2009).

Limitations of Institutional and Societal Explanations

In a broader meaning, the situation of ethnic parties could be characterized as a question of political party systems and a question of political representation by small groups. When we try to examine an ethnic party's situation, theories of political party systems should be mentioned. Classically, the variations in party systems have been observed mainly from two perspectives. Some scholars have emphasised the impact of institutional effects, and other scholars have focused on socio-economic factors. However, after the Third Wave of Democratization, these two classical types of explanations have showed their limitations in some extent.

Since Duverger's (1954) seminal work, political scientists have been eager to answer why some states have many political parties in their parliament while others have only a few. Institutionalists often have stressed the significance of electoral rule, majoritarian or proportional, to explain the variance of party systems. Other institutionalists who have paid attention to the magnitude of electoral districts assume that small minority parties tend to get seats in a district wherever or whenever the electoral magnitude is high. However, several scholars (Moser 1999; Kitschelt 2000; Moser and Scheiner 2004, 2009) have argued that the electoral systems in post-communist democracies do not affect in these areas as Duverger said, but rather institutional factors will affect it in a reverse way (Meleshevich 2007).

Table 1 clearly exhibits the limitation of institutional explanation in CEE countries. Several ethnic parties have won seats even their countries' electoral magnitudes have been low. Contrastingly, several ethnic minority groups have failed to represent its ethnic parties with high magnitude electoral system. Even it is also true that several ethnic parties have won seats in high magnitude electoral system and vice versa. In sum, it is appropriate to argue that institutional factor (electoral magnitude in table 1) could not be a single significant factor to explain minority representations, or have weak effect at least.

Table 1: Ethnic parties' representations and institutional/societal factors.

	electoral magnitude (institutional factor)	
	under 70[1]	over 70[1]
ethnic party win seats	Russian (Estonia; before99), Russian (Latvia), German (Poland), Albanian (Macedonia; after02), Serbian (Macedonia; after02), Roma (Macedonia; after02), Turkish (Bulgaria), Hungarian (Romania).	Polish (Lithuania), Hungarian (Slovakia), Hungarian (Serbia), Bosniak (Serbia), Serbian (Montenegro), Greek (Albania).
ethnic party does not win seats	Russian (Estonia; after03), Slovak (Czech), Roma (Czech), Hungarian (Romania), Italian and Hungarian (Slovenia)[2], Serbian (Croatia)[2], Roma (Croatia), Albanian (Macedonia; before98), Serbian (Macedonia; before98), Roma (Macedonia; before98), Roma (Bulgaria), German (Romania)[2], Roma (Romania)[2].	Russian (Lithuania), Roma (Slovakia), Croat (Serbia), Roma (Serbia), Gagauzian (Moldova), Slavic people (Moldova), Russian (Ukraine), Crimean Tatar (Ukraine).

	demographic composition (societal factor)	
	under 5 percent	Over 5 percent
ethnic party win seats	German (Poland), Hungarian (Serbia), Bosniak (Serbia), Greek (Albania), Serbian (Albania; after02).	Russian(Estonia;before99), Russian (Latvia), Polish (Lithuania), Hungarian (Slovakia), Serbian (Macedonia), Albanian (Macedonia; after02), Roma (Macedonia; after02), Turkish (Bulgaria), Hungarian (Romania),
ethnic party does not win seats	Roma (Czech), Slovak (Czech), Italian and Hungarian (Slovenia)[2], Roma (Croatia), Croat (Serbia), Roma (Serbia), Serbian (Macedonia; before98), German (Romania)[2], Gagauzian (Moldova), Slavic People (Moldova), Russian (Ukraine), Crimean Tatar (Ukraine).	Russian (Lithuania), Russian(Estonia;after03), Roma (Slovakia), Roma(Hungary), Serbian (Croatia)[2], Albanian (Macedonia; before98), Roma (Macedonia; before98), Roma (Bulgaria), Roma (Romania)[2],

1. an average of electoral magnitude in CEE countries is around 70.
2. taking a seat only in ethnic minority special mandate seats is not sorted out as "winning seats" here.

Source: Cordell and Wolff eds. 2004; Bugajski 2005; and each state central electoral committee's webpage.

Other scholars have treated socio-economic variance as the most important factor. The brilliant work of Lipset and Rokkan (1967), the godfathers of the socio-economic perspective in party-system formation, has suggested that social cleavages define the situation in parliament. If a country has many social cleavages, economic, or class struggles will yield a polarised parliament. Works that emphasise the special role of ethnic voting and see an ethnic line as an essential cleavage are also categorised here. Essentialists have emphasised that ethnic minorities feel the greatest pleasure in voting itself, not by receiving some political and material benefits through an election, because ethnic minorities place a special emphasis on the effusion and the manifestation of their identity.

Socio-economic explanations also have not accounted for post-communist Europe countries and show limitations. We easily understand that demographic intensities of ethnic minorities have never mattered for ethnic parties' representation as shown in table 1. Moreover, even though all CEE countries have some differences in their histories and international relations, but most of them have faced similar political tasks (Geddes 1995; Millard 2004). Most of them have faced economic privatization, democratization, the need to rebuild the nation, pension reform and debates concerning whether or not to join the EU. Whitefield (2002) asserted that CEE countries generally had dealt with similar political tasks despite their unique historical and socio-economic contexts. He inspected 12 CEE countries' 'political cleavages' and presented 10 of them that had ethnic problems as cleavages. However, their party systems as related to ethnic parties have displayed differences.

Applying Spatial Theory for Ethnic Voting

Recent literatures have tried to account for the variation of party systems from a more actor-oriented approach. Some studies explain how those varied circumstances can be accounted for by differences that result from interest coordination between political parties and voters. Horowitz and Brown (2005) verified through regression analysis that institutional variables and socio-economic variables were invalid in explaining political party systems in CEE countries, including the number of significant political parties. They argued instead that the ideological concentration-polarization in political party systems is a very significant variable. Ideological positioning should be treated as a set of policy positions for each party. In short, to explain the variance in ethnic parties' situations, we must pay attention to policy positions. Mahr and Nagle (1995) emphasised policy positions in CEE countries and noted differences between western and eastern party systems.

Every party seeks power resources in electoral markets, and ethnic minority voters, like all other voters, try to register their preferences for officeholders in parliament through elections. In the post-communist emerging democracies, generally speaking, organizational bases for each political party are weak and highly vulnerable. In addition, voters support for each party and linkage between parties and societies are so fluid and unconsolidated (Kitchelt et al 1999; Lewis 2003). This situation let each party have strong incentives to appeal various voters for support maximization. As Kitschelt (2000) pointed out, ethnic groups remained as solid societal groups after the atomization in the communist era. Under the newly

democratized situations, voters does not have enough political knowledge about political parties (like policy orientation, credibility, interest structure, and so on), hence they tend to rely on more visible factors of candidate like their ethnicity. Consequently, several political parties, even organized by ethnic majority, try to retain ethnic minorities' vote by credit claiming or by pork barrel measures. Birnir (2007) argued that ethnic representations are never always "intransigent" and it is less possible that ethnic minorities cast a ballot for ethnic minority parties when saliency of ethnic cleavages defined by governmental policy or ethnic attractor is low. Kostadinova's regression analysis showed that, even though it was not the main point of her argument, ethno-linguistic fractionalization index variables have never had unique and static effects to account for party system polarization (Kostadinova 2002). Although some scholars have argued that ethnic minority voting behaviour have its own specialty (Cox 1997; Horowitz 1985), Cox's own regression analysis implied that societal ethnic factors never affected the results of voting behaviour.

It is possible that ethnic voters have voted strategically, using their rationality as every voter does. This research assumes rationality as voters could vote retrospectively evaluating politicians actions (Fiorina 1981). Chandra (2004, 2009) theorises about the mechanism that generates differences of support for ethnic parties in each local district in India. If margins of win by ethnic parties in electoral district at last time is larger than the percentage of minorities in that district, leverage of voting its party go negative. It means that ethnic minority voters will abandon their votes for the ethnic parties and seek other parties that tend to contribute to their political and material interests. In short, ethnic minority voters behave very strategically (like as every voters do) and not ideologically fixing.

They will react to a political elites' policy performance and its changes, and will try to prevent their vote from being wasted. Since their behaviour resembles strategic voting[1] and react appropriately for policy change, we are able to treat ethnic voting behaviour as usual voting behaviour is. Even though some theorists of electoral studies and strategic voting have hedged, saying that their theoretical frames would be inapplicable for ethnic voters, I argue that it is more appropriate to treat ethnic voters in the same way as 'normal' voters.

Formalizing these arguments with the basic Hotelling (1929) model,[2] this article represents a simple frame to show the voting behaviour of ethnic minorities and the situation of ethnic parties in national parliaments.

Figure 1

---

(1) There are several definitions of 'strategic voting'. This article defines it here as 'casting a vote for a second- or third-best party to escape wasting a vote'.
(2) This model has been famous as an original work following Downs (1957) model. The argument about the reasonability around this model will be omitted from the present article because there are a vast number of works from the past 80 years, and it is out of domain to this work.

Figure 1 denotes a highly hypothetical situation in which there are only three political parties in parliament. Party A shall be a conservative political party and mainly supported by titular majority people. Party B shall be a liberal political party and also mainly supported by titular majority people. Party C shall be a small ethnic minority party. We can assume that every policy, including integration policy, will be determined by bargaining and coordination among the big parties, A and B, because party C is relatively small and unable to mobilise well to exert its presence. Every party has a linear function representing subjective costs that the voters feel in voting for each party. If the policy positions of party j, represented as p_j, and the preferences of voter i (v_i) are quite the same, voter will not feel any cost (other than the cost of voting itself), but the broader the distance between the party j stance and the voter i preference, the more discount cost $D_{ij}=|p_j-v_i|$ the voter will feel. A voter will vote for a party that they perceive costs them the least. Moreover, when voters perceive a very high cost of voting for any party, they will not cast a vote. Then, there should be the concept of a cost permissible limit for every voter i, and it is represented as a function Q_i. If and only if $D_{ij}>Q_i$ for any j, voter i does not vote for any party.

However, most ethnic small parties suffer from an inability to win an election, and we should also take this into account in the calculation, along with policy positions. Every voter feels some discount cost to vote for a small party because his/her vote could be wasted. This extra discount cost feelings for voting for a small party could be represented as an increase on the discount cost function, like party C in Figure 2.

Figure 2

In this situation, distance between policy position of party p_3 and preference of voter v_1 is closer than distance between p_2 and v_1. However, voter v_1 cast their ballot for party B in this world, because that choice costs less. In other words, $D_{1,2}$ is smaller than $D_{1,3}$.

Let us consider about policy change. When political party B shifts their policy stance from p_2 to p_2', it is denoted as Figure 3 below, and the voter v_2 is likely to change his/her voting party. Because the $D_{2,2'}$ became smaller than $D_{2,3}$.

Figure 3

Now, the policy change of Party B from p_2 to p_2' means that every potential supporter for party C could change their voting preference from Party C to Party B. If we define and express this situation in natural language, many members of the electorate (in this article, this means minority voters) cast their ballot for a large, second-best party even though they know there is a party whose policy is quite close to their preferences, in order to avoid wasting a vote. It is reasonable to assume that a policy change should be treated as significant variables to explain the variation in ethnic parties' fates based on theoretical deduction. It leads to the hypotheses below.

Hypothesis 1:
The vote share of ethnic parties is affected by other parties' (or governmental) policy change.

In addition, a rival hypothesis will be represented as below.

Hypothesis 2:
If an institutional design is advantageous (high proportionality, low threshold and large magnitude of a district) for a small party, the ethnic minority parties will win seats.

Hypothesis 3:
If the society is more fractionalised in terms of ethnicity, or has much ethnic minority population, ethnic minority parties could win seats.

Statistical Analysis

To evaluate the hypothesis presented above, this study empirically analyzes the relationship between electoral outcomes and the government position on national integration policies toward ethnic minority groups. The integration policy refers to several factors, such as politics, economics and social concerns, hence these factors are integrated into a set of policy initiatives. Even if it is difficult to estimate and score the individual parties' policy stance over several years and in several different countries, we can estimate the governmental policy or stance that has been generated by coordination among significant political parties.

This analysis takes into account several other factors. Institutional factors consist of several aspects, as mentioned in literature review section, like the electoral system, magnitude of electoral districts and so on. Societal factors consist of mainly the language-group or ethnic-group situation. External diplomatic factor will also be tested.

The unit of analysis is each ethnic group in each election in each CEE country. For example, Lithuania has two ethnic groups-Russians and Poles- and they have experienced elections 5 times, this his generates 10 cases in the dataset. The ethnic party's seats and policy variables are coded separately to correspond with each ethnic group. A country-year, which is coded as 'democracy' at Polity IV and as 'free' at Freedom House, shall only be used in this data sample because this research treats electoral issues (See Appendix). For example, Croatia in the '90s shall be excluded from this dataset because it was coded as 'Not Free' by Freedom

House at that time.

Dependent Variable

It measures proportion (permillage) of seat share by ethnic minority parties calculated from each country's election result. Determination of ethnic parties has been made in line with Bugajski's work (2002), and several expert literatures (see appendix). Each ethnic group is coded separately, as is each ethnic party.

Independent Variables

Political Discrimination and **Political Rights** are the scores of governmental integration policy about political official discrimination and empowerment for minorities. These are first independent variables used to assess this article's hypothesis. It is coded from the Minorities At Risk (MAR) project dataset.[3] These variables are dummy variables. If there is official political discrimination for ethnic minority (if MAR score takes 1), Political Discrimination takes 1 and the others take 0. If there is official empowerment policy for ethnic minority, Political Rights takes 1 and the others take 0.

Language Discrimination and **Language Rights** are the second independent variables used to evaluate argument. These variables indicate the status of ethnic minorities' languages. These variables are also on dummy scales. If official language policy is regulated to use ethnic language even in civil society and outlines some type

---

(3) Detailed definitions are: 1 -official political discrimination and intensive discrimination in civil society; 2 -no official discrimination but historical intensive discrimination in civil society; 3 -no official discrimination but weak discrimination in civil society; 4 -official protective policy but weak discrimination in civil society; 5 -there is no ethnic discrimination.

of punishment, Language Discrimination takes 1 and the others take 0. If minority language has or could have official status in the local or national unit, Language Right takes 1, and the others take 0. I refer to Spolsky (2004) to make and code these variables.

Control Variables

PR-SMD controls for the institutional effect as an explanation of the situation of ethnic parties. It is the proportion of seats (0-1) which is determined by Proportional Representation (PR) system. Therefore, if a country adopts a full Single-member district (SMD) system, this variable is coded as 0, and if a country adopts Mixed-systems and 120 of 200 seats are elected by a PR system, it is coded as 0.6.

Magnitude is the average number of district magnitude. When a country's magnitude has some extent of range between tiers, and tiers under a mixed-method system, this variable is coded with a large number in cording this variable, because small parties such as ethnic parties generally tend to run for in the district with larger magnitude.

Threshold is simply coded as the percentage that is needed to get seats in each country's national election. If some countries give ethnic groups some privileges as discharging of threshold, the simple Hare quota, which is needed for winning a seat, would be applied for coding.

EthnicSeats is dummy variables whether there are special mandate seats for ethnic minority or not. If there are, it is coded as 1.

Fractionalization is the primary variable for controlling for socio-economic factors. The famous work by Alesina et al. (1997) is used here. This variable indicates the polarization of ethnicity

and language in each state.

Composition is a variable that represents the ratio of each ethnic group composition in the national population. This is also a control variable for socio-economic factors. I coded this data from the CIA World Factbook's web resources.

LobbyActor is control variable entertaining external or international factor. Jenne (2004, 2007) demonstrate that ethnic minority group enhance demands when they could take a support from external lobby actor (their national "Homeland" or the other organizations). Each minority group who has "national homeland" takes 1, and the others take 0 in this test.

Pre-Seats measure the proportion of seat share by ethnic parties in pre-election. This variable is coded based on electoral result at time t-1.

In regression analysis, there is correlation between political integration policy factors and language integration policy factors. So, this analysis calculates separately from each other. Moreover, this study employs generalized linear model (GLM) method assuming two types of distribution, negative binominal distribution (NBD) and log-normal distribution (LND), because many dependent variables are slanted to zero.

Table 2: The results of statistical analysis.

Distribution assumption	NBD		LND	
	model 1	model 2	model 3	model 4
Composition	0.038	0.079*	0.778**	0.547
	(0.032)	(0.040)	(0.372)	(0.394)
Fractionalization	-1.210	-1.093	24.959	8.273
	(2.107)	(1.978)	(26.048)	(24.455)
Threshold	-0.414	-0.231	-0.060	0.016
	(0.158)	(0.163)	(0.421)	(0.409)
EthnicSeats	1.046**	0.774	5.691	1.457
	(0.522)	(0.568)	(7.799)	(7.588)
PR-SMD	1.596	2.785***	27.316	18.776
	(1.217)	(0.983)	(16.780)	(14.079)
Magnitude	-0.003	-0.001	-0.028	-0.230
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.030)	(0.030)
LobbyActor	1.845***	2.632***	7.949	14.576**
	(0.542)	(0.427)	(7.388)	(5.856)
Pre-Seats	23.925***	21.020***	837.680***	832.643***
	(6.114)	(4.934)	(71.923)	(68.212)
PoliticalDiscrimination	2.403**		19.770*	
	(0.835)		(10.551)	
PoliticalRights	0.747		14.470	
	(0.606)		(8.833)	
LanguageDiscrimination		-1.043		31.989*
		(1.315)		(16.699)
LanguageRights		0.035		15.318**
		(0.615)		(6.578)
Constant	-0.042	-2.210	-42.198**	-24.347
	(1.837)	(1.458)	(20.378)	(15.578)
p-value: omnibus test	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
log likelihood	-356.6	-359.2	-591.4	-589.8
AIC	737.3	742.5	1206.8	1203.6
N	124	124	124	124

*** $p < 0.01$ ** $p < 0.05$ * $p < 0.10$

Dependent Variable: Proportion of Seats Share by Ethnic Minority Parties
Statistical Model: Generalized Linear Model

We could observe several points from this result. First, political discrimination as policy output have significant effects to explain the proportion of seats won by ethnic parties. We could interpret that it is important whether official political acts of discrimination are implemented or not, as model 1and 3 show. When and where ethnic minorities obtain political rights, ethnic parties lose support. This is counterintuitive, but reasonable and line up with theoretical hypothesis of this study. Second, Language policies also appropriately have significance in model 4 as hypothesis predict. However, these lack significant effects in negative binominal regression. Third, Institutional factors could have some weak effect only in model 1 and 2, but not consistently. There are ineffectiveness of electoral institutions' factors in model 3 and model 4. Third, Socio-Economic factors have never consistently affected the performance of ethnic minority parties well. Only demographic compositions of ethnic minorities show significance to explain dependent variables in model 2 and 3. At last, presences of ethnic minority groups' national homeland significantly predict the winning seats by them. This may paritially explain why most of all Roma groups' parties have never been able to represent.

The credibility of winning seats by ethnic parties have been determined by its performance (*pre-seats* variable), even any other significant variables are controlled. In other words, supporters of ethnic parties (most of them belong to an ethnic minority) did not be exclusively affected by variation of electoral institutions. S/he votes for an ethnic party if its performance have been considerably good, but they avoids wasting a vote if such ethnic parties have failed to win seats; and all of a voter's behaviours are defined by these strategies. Moreover, this result also demonstrates that

the fate of ethnic parties is not solely determined by electorates' ideological principles. If ethnic voting had unusual aspect compared with general voting behaviour, and the expression of identity would be important for members of an ethnic minority, then they would vote without consideration of a party's performance in the last election. However, they have changed their support for ethnic parties in response to the parties' capability. This infers the rationality of ethnic voters.

Regression analysis revealed the significance of the policy factor and of voters' responsive attitude. It represented the ineffectiveness and limitation of a perspective treating electoral institution as an sole determinant factor to explain the rise and fall of ethnic minority parties. This finding verifies the theoretical deduction in the above section, and has some relevance to the application of that theory to CEE post-communist democracies.

Conclusion

This paper has argued about the divergent situations of ethnic minority political parties in newly democratised countries, and concludes that the fate of ethnic parties has been explained by a more actor-centric approach, which focuses especially on the changes in integration policy and the strategic voting behaviour of minority voters. Institutional or socio-economical explanations show some limitations.

Assuming voters' rationality and the responsibility for policy change, our theoretical and formalised deduction explains well the reason why ethnic parties could or could not win seats. Moreover, through an analysis of CEE democracies, the statistical verifications

support the theoretical argument empirically. It has been shown that ethnic party supports seldom strongly depend on the neither electoral institutional factors nor socio-economic factors. Ethnic composition seems to be somewhat effective in accounting for ethnic parties' fates, but it is inconsistent. Policy does influence whether ethnic minorities can enter the political arena or not.

This research showed the importance of the policy factor and of voters' incentives to explain ethnic parties' fates. The question about ethnic parties should be included in questions about the party system, but classical works about party systems rarely define the variance among ethnic parties in CEE countries. My argument proposed a more plausible explanation for this question, and builds a bridge for further empirical research about ethnopolitics.

Appendix. Statistical analysis units

Countries and election years
Estonia (1992, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007),
Latvia (1993, 1995, 1998, 2002, 2006),
Lithuania (1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008),
Poland [Lower Chamber] (1991, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2007),
Czech [Lower Chamber] (1996, 1998, 2002, 2006),
Slovakia (1994, 1998, 2002, 2006),
Hungary (1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006),
Slovenia (1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008),
Croatia (2000[Lower Chamber], 2003, 2007),
Serbia (including Serbia Crna Gola) (2000, 2003, 2007, 2008),
Montenegro (2006),

Albania (2005),

Macedonia (1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2008),

Bulgaria (1990, 1991, 1994, 1997, 2001, 2005),

Romania (1996, 2000, 2004, 2008),

Moldova (1994, 1998, 2001, 2005),

Ukraine (1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2007).

Ethnic Minority Parties

Estonia: Our Home is Estonia/ United People's Party/ Constitutional Party/ Russian Party in Estonia,

Latvia: Equal Rights, Russian Citizen Party/ National Harmony Party/ For Human Rights and United Latvia/ Concord Center,

Lithuania: Lithuanian Russian Union/ Pole's Electoral Union of Lithuania/ Pole's Electoral Alliance of Lithuania/ Minority People's Alliance,

Poland: German Minority/ Cultural Society of the Germans in the Opole District,

Czech: Union of Slovak/ Community of Slovak/ Democratic Alliance of Slovaks/ HSMS, Romany Civil Initiative/ Romany National council/ Polish Council/ Union of German culture/ Council of Jewish Communities (This analysis excludes molavia-oriented parties because it is appropriate to treat those as regional parties),

Slovakia: Hungarian Coalition/ Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement/ Coexistence,

Hungary: National Minority Roundtable/ Council of Gypsies in Hungary/ Roma Parliament/ Democratic Alliance Hungarian Gypsies/ Independent Gypsy Association/ Association of Germans/ Democratic Union of Slovak in Hungary/ Jewish Cultural Alliance/ Democratic Federation of Serb/ Democratic Association of

Romanian,

Slovenia: Italian Union/ Interest Community of Hungarian Minority,

Croatia: Serb People's Party/ Independent Democratic Serbian Party/ Party of Democratic Action of Croatia/ Democratic Union of Hungarian (This analysis excludes "Istoria deomcratic council" because it seems to be regional parties),

Montenegro: Serbian Radical Party/ Serbian National Renewal/ Serbian Fatherland/ Serbia National Party (SNP)/ SNP-NP-DSS/ Together for Yugoslavia/ Serb List/ Radical Party of Montenegro/ Serbian Union/ Bosniak Coalition/ Albanian Alternative/ Albanians Together/ Democratic Union of Albanians/ Liberals and Bosniak Party-Correct in the Past, Right for the Future,

Albania: Unity for Human Right Party,

Bulgaria: Movement for Rights and Freedoms,

Romania: Association of Italians of Romania/ Bulgarian Union of the Banat/ Cultural Union of Ruthenians of Romania Uniunea/ democratic Forum of Germans of Romania/ Democratic Union of Slovaks and Czechs in Romania/ Democratic Union of Turco-Islamic Tatars of Romania/ Federation of Jewish Communities of Romania/ Greek Union of Romania/ League of Albanians of Romania/ Lipovan Russian Community of Romania/ Party of the Roma/ Turkish Democratic Union of Romania/ Union of Armenians of Romania/ Union of Croatians of Romania/ Union of Poles of Romania Dom Polski/ Union of Serbs of Romania/ Union of Slavic Macedonians of Romania/ Union of Ukrainians of Romania,

Moldova: Unity-Transnistria, Union of Patriot Movement/ Gagauz People/ Democratic Party of the Gagauz,

Macedonia: Democratic Union for Integration/ Party for Democratic

Prosperity/ Democratic League of Bosniaks/ Democratic Party of Albanians/ Democratic Party of Serbs/ United Party of Romas in Macedonia/ Democratic Party of Turks/ Party for Roma Integration/ Party of the Democratic Forces of Roma in Macedonia/ Democratic Party of the Bosnmiaks/ Union of Roma in Macedonia/ Party for the Movement of Turks in Macedonia,

Serbia: Hungarian Coalition/ Bosniac List for a European Sanjak/ Albanian Coalition/ Roma Party/ Roma for Roma/ Roma Union of Serbia/ Montenegrin Party/ Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians/ Together for Tolerance ?anak, Kasza, Ljaji?/ Alliance of Vojvodina Magyars/ Democratic Fellowship of Vojvodina Hungarians/ Democratic Reform Party of Muslims (This analysis defines Vojvodina oriented parties as regional parties except above),

Ukraine: Crimia Russian Party/ Democratic Movement of Donbas.

References

Alesina, A., Devleschawuer, A., Eastealy, E. Kurlat, S., Wacziarg, R., 2003. "Fractionalization." *Journal of Economic Growth*, 8, 155-194.

Birnir, J. K., 2007. *Ethnicity and Electoral Politics*. Cambridge University Press, New York.

Bugajski, J., 2002. *Political Parties of Eastern Europe: A Guide to Politics in the Post-Communist Era*. M.E.Sharpe, New York and London.

Chandra, K., 2004. *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India*. Cambridge University Press, New York.

Chandra, K., 2009. "Why Voters in Patronage Democracies Split Their Tickets: Strategic Voting for Ethnic Parties." *Electoral Studies*, 28 (1), 21-32.

Cordell, K., Wolff, S. (Eds.), 2004. *The Ethnopolitical Encyclopedia of Europe*. Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire and New York.

Cox, G. W., 1997. *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems*. Cambridge University Press, New York.

Duverger, M., 1954. *Political Parties: Organization and Activity in the Modern State*. Cambridge University Press, New York.

Fiorina, M. P. 1981. *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections*. Yale University Press, New Haven.

Geddes, B., 1995. "A Comparative Perspective on the Leninist Legacy in Eastern Europe." *Comparative Political Studies*, 28 (2), 239-274.

Horowitz, D. L., 1985. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angels.

Horowitz, S., Browne, E. C., 2005. "Source of Post-Communist Party System Consolidation." *Party Politics*, 11 (6), 689-706.

Hotelling, H., 1929. "Stability in Competition." *The Economic Journal*, 39 (153), 41.-57.

Jenne, E., 2004. "A Bargaining Theory of Minority Demands: Explaining the Dog that Did not Bite in 1990s Yugoslavia." *International Studies Quarterly*. 48 (4), 729-754.

Jenne, E. 2009. *Ethnic Bargaining: The Paradox of Minority Empowerment*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London.

Kitschelt, H., Mansfeldova, Z., Markowski, R., et al. (Eds.), *1999. Post-Communit Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation*. Cambridge University Press, New York.

Kitschelt, H., 2000. "Linkages between Citizens and Politician in

Democratic Politics." *Comparative Political Studies*, 33 (6), 845-879.

Kostadinova, T., 2002. "Do Mixed Electoral Systems Matter?: A Cross-national analysis of Their Effect in Eastern Europe." *Electoral Studies*, 21 (1), 23-34.

Lewis, P. G., 2003. Political Parties. In: White, S., Batt, J., Lewis, P. G. (Eds.), *Developments in Central and East European Politics 3*. Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire and New York.

Lipset S., Rokkan, S. (Eds.), 1967. *Party Systems and Voter Alignment: The Cross-national Perspectives*. The Free Press, New York.

Mahr, A., Nagle, J. D., 1995. "Resurrection of the Successor Parties and Democratization in East-Central Europe," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 28 (4), 393-409.

Meguid, B. M., 2005. "Competition between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream Party Strategy in Niche Party Success," *American Political Science Review*, 99 (3), 347-359.

Millard, F., 2004. *Elections, Parties, and Representation in Post-Communist Europe*. Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire and New York.

Minority at Risk Project, 2005. Minorities at Risk Dataset. College Park: Center for International Development and Conflict Management. Retrieved April 20, 2010, from http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/

Meleshevich, A. A., 2007. *Party Systems in Post-Soviet Countries: A Comparative Study of Political Institutionalization in the Baltic States, Russia, and Ukraine*. Palgrave Macmillan, New York.

Moser, R. G., 1999. "Electoral Systems and the Number of Parties in Postcommunist States." *World Politics*, 51 (3), 359-384.

Moser, R. G., Scheiner, E., 2004. "Mixed Electoral Systems and Electoral System Effects: Controlled Comparison and Cross-National Analysis." *Electoral Studies*, 23 (4), 575-599.

Moser, R. G., Scheiner, E., 2009. "Strategic Voting in Established and New Democracies: Ticket Splitting in Mixed-member electoral Systems." *Electoral Studies*, 28 (1), 51-61.

Muller-Rommel, F., Fettelschoss, K., Harfst, P., 2004. "Party Government in Central Eastern European Democracies: A Data Collection (1990-2003)." *European Journal of Political Research*, 43, 869-893.

Rose, R., Munro, N., 2009. *Parties and Elections in New European Democracies*. ECPR Press, Colchester.

Spolsky, B., 2004. *Language Policy: Key Topics in Sociolinguistics*. Cambridge University Press, New York.

Whitefield, S., 2002. "Political Cleavages and Post-Communist Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science*, 5, 181-200.

（本学法学部准教授）